22Sep

DCMS Committee inquiry on gambling regulation

22nd September 2023 Harris Hagan 275

In case you missed it earlier in the month, on 5 September 2023, the Rt Hon Stuart Andrew MP (Gambling Minster), Ben Dean (Director, Sport and Gambling at DCMS), Andrew Rhodes (Chief Executive, Gambling Commission), Sarah Gardner (Deputy Chief Executive, Gambling Commission) and Tim Miller (Executive Director for Research and Policy, Gambling Commission) appeared before the DCMS Committee examining the Government’s approach to the regulation of gambling. The Gambling Commission gave evidence in the first session at 10am, and the Gambling Minister and DCMS gave their evidence in the second session at 11.30am.

Watch the recording of the DCMS committee oral evidence sessions:

22Sep

Julian Harris wins VIXIO’s 2023 Compliance Lifetime Achievement Award

22nd September 2023 Harris Hagan 237

We are very delighted to announce that Consultant and Founder Julian Harris has been awarded the Global Regulatory Award for Compliance Lifetime Achievement by VIXIO Regulatory Intelligence.

This special award recognises Julian’s unprecedented work in trailblazing a “culture of compliance and regulatory standards within the industry” for more than 40 years. During that time, Julian has advised many of the world’s largest online and land-based gambling companies, regulators, governments, financial institutions, and private equity firms on gambling law and regulation. Julian has also been at the forefront of thought leadership in the gambling sector, sharing his extensive experience and insight on various gambling regulatory issues by authoring many articles on the topic, including acting as editor of global publications on gambling law, and in his speeches at conferences across the world. He also served as President of the International Association of Gaming Advisors, the first person to do so from outside North America, testament to the esteem in which he is held amongst gaming advisers worldwide.

Julian first came to specialise in gambling law in 1981 representing the Gaming Board for Great Britain (the then British regulator). He co-founded Harris Hagan with John Hagan in 2004, in anticipation of the Gambling Act 2005 and the expected growth of the gambling industry in Great Britain. It was a bold and inspired decision at a time when niche law firms were rare in the City of London.

Upon receiving this distinguished award, Julian commented:

“I am greatly honoured and humbled by this award. I have felt privileged to have enjoyed being a part of this exciting industry for some 40 years, working with industry, fellow advisers and regulators internationally.
To receive this award from such a distinguished panel of judges and from the most respected global regulatory awards is particularly gratifying.”

The 2023 Global Regulatory Awards will take place on 29 November 2023.

22Sep

White Paper Series: Defining the Future VIXIO Webinar

22nd September 2023 Harris Hagan 236

On 15 September 2023, Bahar Alaeddini appeared as a panellist on a VIXIO Regulatory Intelligence (formerly GamblingCompliance) webinar titled “UK White Paper: Defining the Future” together with Tim Miller from the Gambling Commission, Sarah Fox from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and Dan Waugh from Regulus Partners. The panellists had an insightful and lively discussion about some of the proposals in the recent wave of consultations and next steps:

03Aug

White Paper Series: Direct marketing and cross-selling in the crossfire

3rd August 2023 Gemma Boore 266

Welcome back to Harris Hagan’s White Paper Series of articles.

We have previously discussed the UK Government’s proposals relating to gambling sponsorship (see our previous White Paper Series article on sponsorship).

In this article, we outline changes proposed in the Gambling Commission’s Summer 2023 consultation regarding direct marketing and cross-selling (the “DM Consultation”), which was published on 26 July 2023 and will remain open for 12 weeks, closing 18 October 2023. We then contrast these proposals with the UK Government’s recommendations in the White Paper: High stakes: gambling reform for the digital age regarding direct marketing and cross-selling. Finally, we explain how, if implemented, the Gambling Commission’s proposals would change current privacy and direct marketing laws, and how they apply to the gambling industry as a whole.

1. Background

In Chapter 2 of the White Paper, which deals with marketing and advertising, tougher restrictions on bonuses and direct marketing are one of the key reforms proposed by the Government. In the introduction to the chapter, the Government confirms that it recognises that online bonus offers can present risk, particularly for those experiencing gambling harm. In order to mitigate this risk, one of the key recommendations in Chapter 2 is that the Gambling Commission consult on strengthening consent for direct marketing, with the aim to give customers more choice in terms of the marketing they receive and how.

According to the White Paper, the proposal to strengthen consent for direct marketing is in addition to what the White Paper refers to as (emphasis added):

“the forthcoming introduction of requirements to not target any direct marketing at those showing strong indicators of risk, as outlined in the Gambling Commission’s requirement 10.”

For those in the know, this rather cryptic/confusing reference is to Requirement 10 of social responsibility code provision (“SRCP”) 3.4.3 of the Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice (“LCCP”), which reads as follows (emphasis added again):

“Licensees must prevent marketing and the take up of new bonus offers where strong indicators of harm, as defined within the licensee’s processes, have been identified.”

Requirement 10, which is now in force, was originally due to come into effect on 12 September 2022 alongside the Gambling Commission’s revised Remote Customer Interaction Guidance (“RCI Guidance”). However, to widespread surprise, the Gambling Commission delayed the implementation of Requirement 10 to 12 February 2023 and decided at the last minute to consult on the RCI Guidance before it came into effect.

The subsequent Consultation on Remote Customer Interaction (the “RCI Consultation”) was launched on 22 November 2022 and open for only six weeks (subsequently extended to nine) instead of the traditional 12. Eight months later, the RCI Guidance is still not in effect and the Gambling Commission has yet to publish a response to the RCI Consultation.

It is therefore confusing that the White Paper (published on 27 April 2023):

links to the not-yet introduced RCI Guidance when it refers to Requirement 10;
refers to the Requirement 10 as “forthcoming”; and
suggests that Requirement 10 applies where there are “strong indicators of risk” (not “strong indicators of harm”, the latter being the language of both SRCP 3.4.3 and the RCI Guidance).

It is also perplexing that the Gambling Commission has chosen to publish the DM Consultation before the RCI Consultation, despite promising the contrary at IAGA’s 40^th Annual Gaming Summit in Belfast.

For further analysis on the RCI Consultation (which we now have no idea when the response to which will be received), please see our five-part series of articles with Regulus Partners. available here: Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4 and Part 5.

Back to the topic at hand: Direct marketing. In the White Paper, the Government sets out a number of proposed principles for the Gambling Commission to explore through the DM Consultation, set out below:

At first blush, these appear on balance to be sensible suggestions that broadly build upon principles in existing privacy and direct marketing laws; we discuss this in further detail below.

More recently, in a pre-briefing to selected industry stakeholders on 5 July 2023, the Gambling Commission used its own terminology/short hand to describe the areas upon which the DM Consultation would focus:

Finally, on 26 July 2023, the Gambling Commission published its first summer consultation, a copy of which is available here:

Download the DM Consultation

Below, we:

explain the current legal position in relation to each of the principles identified by the Government in the White Paper as requiring reform;
(attempt to) link the White Paper principles to the Gambling Commission’s proposal, as set out in the DM Consultation, to add a new SRCP to the LCCP regarding direct marketing preferences (“SRCP 5.1.12”); and
finally, share our views on possible implementation issues, timelines, practicalities and direct costs that may impact the industry should SRCP 5.1.12 come into force in its current form – with the aim to help respondents shape their own responses to the DM Consultation.

For ease of reference, the proposed wording for SRCP 5.1.12 is set out below:

“Applies to: All licences
SR Code – 5.1.12 – Direct marketing preferences
Licensees must provide customers with options to opt-in to direct marketing on a per product and per channel basis. The options must cover all products and channels provided by the licensee and be set to opt-out by default. These options must be offered as part of the registration process and be updateable should customers’ change their preference. This requirement applies to all new and existing customers.
Channel options must include email, SMS, notification, social media (direct messages), post, phone call and a category for any other direct communication method, as applicable.
Product options must include betting, casino, bingo, and lottery, as applicable. Operators must make clear to customers which products they offer are covered under relevant categories.
Where an operator seeks an additional step for consumers to confirm their chosen marketing preferences, the structure and wording of that step must be presented in a manner which only asks for confirmation to progress those choices with one click to proceed. There must be no encouragement or option to change selection; only the option to accept or decline their selection.
Customers must not receive direct marketing that contravenes their channel or product preferences.”

If you would like our assistance responding to the DM Consultation, please contact Gemma Boore or your usual contact in the Harris Hagan team.

2. Analysis

Principle A in the White Paper: Opt-in to marketing and offers should be clear and separate options at sign‑up, not bundled with other consent such as broader terms and conditions and privacy policy.

What is the current legal position?

As rightly noted in the White Paper, there are already clear requirements that operators must seek informed and specific consent to send direct marketing to consumers. These are outlined in the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (“PECR”) and UK General Data Protection Regulation, as implemented by the Data Protection Act 2018 (“UK GDPR”) – both enforced by the Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”).

The current legal position can be broken down as follows:

PECR requires that, subject to limited exceptions, specific prior consent must be obtained to send direct marketing to individuals by electronic communication (e.g. emails, calls and texts – NB. this does not include non-electronic methods of communication, this will be important later on).
According to ICO guidance, the best way to obtain valid consent is to ask customers to tick opt-in boxes confirming they are happy to receive marketing calls, texts or emails from you.
Consent is defined in the EU General Data Protection Regulation (“EU GDPR”) (which was transposed into national law by UK GDPR following Brexit) as “any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her” .
To put things simply, the implementation of EU GDPR significantly strengthened the concept of consent for the purposes of PECR and meant that many companies needed to refresh consents previously obtained for direct marketing as they did not meet EU GDPR’s new higher threshold of consent. This was typically because existing consents had not been freely given (e.g. they were obtained in order to gain an incentive, such as an entry into a competition); were not specific enough (e.g. they did not specify who would send the marketing, or what type of marketing would be sent); or had been obtained by means of a pre-ticked box during sign up (which does not involve an affirmative action by the customer – rather, it requires inaction).
There is however, one key exception in PECR to the requirement to obtain consent to direct electronic marketing and this is known as the “soft opt-in”.
Broadly, the soft opt-in means that you do not need to obtain consent when you’re sending marketing emails or texts to offer similar goods or services to your customers or prospective customers. The example given in the ICO guidance is that “if a customer buys a car from you and gives you their contact details, you’d only be able to market to them things that relate to the car eg offering services or MOTs”.
To rely on the soft opt-in, you must give the customer a simple opportunity to refuse or opt out of the marketing, both when first collecting the details and in every message after that.

As can be seen from the above, there is an argument that the second limb of Principle A (i.e. consent should not be bundled with other consent such as broader terms and conditions and privacy policies) does not alter the current legal position. The higher threshold of consent to direct electronic marketing is already required and has been since 25 May 2018 (when EU GDPR came into force). It would be very difficult to argue that marketing consents bundled with consent to, for example, terms & conditions or privacy notices are “freely given, specific, informed or unambiguous” – and any gambling operators engaging in this practice are already at risk of enforcement action from the ICO. So, what did the Government want the Gambling Commission to change?

What is proposed in the DM Consultation?

SRCP 5.1.12 proposes new specific requirements for licensees to offer all customers (not just new) more granular consent options (per channel and per product) – with consent options set to opt-out by default (i.e. not pre-ticked). There is no exception to this rule, i.e. gambling companies will no longer be able to rely upon the soft opt-in. Arguably, this does not change the high bar of consent that is already required under UK GDPR and PECR (as intimated by the Gambling Commission’s pre-briefing); rather, it removes an exception to the high bar of consent which otherwise applies to all other commercial businesses in the UK.

Turning to the first limb of Principle A (i.e. opt-in to marketing and offers being clear and separate options at sign-up), this indicated that the Government wanted to give consumers more choice in terms of whether they receive (i) marketing and/or (ii) offers.

The Government’s commentary regarding submissions in the call for evidence from people suffering from gambling harms sheds some light on what was intended here:

“Submissions from people with personal experience of gambling harms elaborated on the negative effects which can come from… …direct marketing and inducements. These ranged from feeling ‘spammed’ by the volume of marketing, including in forms such as push notifications that they had not intentionally agreed to; to continuing to receive marketing even after an operator had removed them from offers due to the risk of harm and receiving promotions via email during periods of abstinence which triggered a relapse.”

It appears the Government is distinguishing between marketing of a service, on one hand (for example, provision on odds for sporting events or new casino games by email, text or push notification); from the provision of incentives such as free bets or bonus offers, on the other.

Surprisingly, there is no equivalent reference to this distinction in the DM Consultation.

What could possibly go wrong?

If operators can no longer rely upon the soft opt-in exception, this would:

significantly alter current practices whereby operators and affiliates have to date, in line with current rules, sent (e.g.) marketing emails and texts to customers offering similar services;
result in operators and affiliates needing to seek fresh consent from millions of individuals that have not actively opted-out to marketing – potentially losing huge tranches of customer databases in the process; and
mean gambling would stand alone – in terms of being the only commercial industry in which express consent is always required in order to send electronic marketing.

These changes are likely to have a huge impact on big and small operators alike, as well as the affiliates that send direct marketing on their behalf – each of which are likely to have spent significant time and money curating their customer databases lawfully since EU GDPR, often by relying on the soft opt-in.

And when would this momentous change take place? The Gambling Commission notes that preferences to receive offers would need to “be reconfirmed in a new format”, implying that fresh consent must be obtained in order to be able to continue marketing to customer databases after a certain date. Will this be the case from a hard-stop date, or will an operator be permitted to send marketing until its customer is next presented with the option to reconfirm preferences (e.g. the next time they sign in) – meaning that some customers will forever lie in limbo, receiving marketing but never confirming that they no longer wish to receive it?

The Gambling Commission’s commentary in the DM Consultation regarding the process for existing customers suggests that the latter option may indeed be the case:

“We are proposing that, if introduced, licensees must direct customers to the webpage or area of the site/app where they can decide whether to opt in to offers or not at the first opportunity after implementation date, for example upon next login.”

Either way, refreshing consent for all soft opted-in customers (or, in the worst-case scenario, all customers), will undeniably result in a huge number of customers that are currently receiving marketing with no objections, suddenly being suppressed from marketing lists – and consequential loss of revenue for operators and affiliates.

How many of those customers will expressly opt back in with each operator, for each product and for each channel – surely only a proportion…. was this what is intended? A clean start for the population as a whole – so those who wish to receive gambling marketing can, once again, choose to receive the (metaphorical) filth and the remaining population (who must have either gambled or opted into marketing at some point if they are currently receiving marketing – after all, EU GDPR did happen) can be spared? Was this really what the Government intended in the White Paper or the Gambling Commission’s way of quashing gambling advertising to the greatest extent possible, despite the Government’s conclusion that it could not find a causal link between advertising and gambling harms or the development of a gambling disorder?

Finally – although those in the pro-gambling camp may not wish to highlight this in their response – no commentary on the DM Consultation would be complete without acknowledging the lack of mention of the Government’s recommendation that opt-ins to marketing and offers should be clear and separate options at sign‑up. Although this may be a relief for the industry (who might want to distinguish consent for incentives vs generic marketing), what does it say about the Gambling Commission’s ability to transpose the UK Government’s recommendations into enforceable, realistic and practical requirements? Playing devil’s advocate, it is of course, possible that the Gambling Commission plans to save this final treat for its forthcoming consultation on free bets and bonus offers, which is due later this year.

We can but “watch this space”.

Principle B in the White Paper: Customers should be able to change preferences at any time through their account settings.

What is the current legal position?

The right to withdraw consent is entrenched under EU GDPR. Article 7(3) provides that the “data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time” and “It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent”.

Similarly, and as noted above, those seeking to send direct electronic marketing without obtaining consent under the soft opt-in must be given a simple opportunity to refuse or opt out of the marketing, both when first collecting the details and in every message after that.

The question is therefore how the DM Consultation was intended to build on current legal requirements.

Some light is shed on the issue by the following commentary in the White Paper:

“…a recent behavioural audit of popular online gambling operators found there was usually extra friction associated with unsubscribing from communications, including ‘scarcity messages’ to discourage consumers from doing so.”

This audit, which was conducted by the Behaviour Insights Team (“BIT”), cited various examples of ‘dark patterns’ used by gambling operators. Dark patterns are techniques used to encourage or compel users into taking certain actions, potentially against their wishes.

From a marketing perspective, the dark patterns identified in BIT’s audit included emotional messaging (e.g. making the customer feel guilty about wanting to unsubscribe) and false hierarchies (e.g. making buttons that the operator wants the customer to press brighter, more colourful, or easier to find, than for example, an unsubscribe button).

What is proposed in the DM Consultation?

SRCP 5.1.12 requires that options to opt-in for direct marketing must be offered to customers as part of the registration process and be “updateable” if customers want to change their preferences.

In addition, the Gambling Commission acknowledges the results of the BIT audit in the preamble to the DM Consultation and cites an example of one operator seeking confirmation when a customer opted-out of marketing in a way which appeared designed to introduce a fear of missing out on offers. In its commentary, the Gambling Commission notes that:

“While seeking a confirmation could be useful to ensure preferences haven’t been accidentally altered, any accompanying message shouldn’t be aimed at discouraging the player’s choice.”

This led to the following (slightly long-winded and very specific) requirement in SRCP 5.1.12:

“Where an operator seeks an additional step for consumers to confirm their chosen marketing preferences, the structure and wording of that step must be presented in a manner which only asks for confirmation to progress those choices with one click to proceed. There must be no encouragement or option to change selection; only the option to accept or decline their selection.”

What could possibly go wrong?

The first requirement for preferences to be “updateable” is of course, an extension of the White Paper’s explicit suggestion that customers should be able to change marketing preferences at any time via account settings. This practice of course, already being common within the industry (not least because the right to withdraw consent is a fundamental concept of EU and UK GDPR) – but not a specific requirement under the LCCP. By incorporating such a requirement into the LCCP as a SRCP, compliance will be a condition of licences and in the event of breach, the Gambling Commission will have the right to take enforcement action, as well as the ICO.

The second requirement, introduced to prevent operators from encouraging customers not to unsubscribe from marketing, in our view, feels a little short-sighted. Rather than limiting such a restriction to additional steps in the unsubscription process, the Gambling Commission could have sought to prohibit the use of dark patterns in direct marketing completely, potentially by publishing new guidance.

By side stepping the issue, SRCP 5.1.12 addresses only one of the problems identified by BIT in its audit. This means that the use of other dark patterns may continue to permeate gambling marketing following the implementation of the White Paper and beyond. For example, in terms of emotional messaging or false hierarchies in other parts of the customer consent journey or within direct marketing messages themselves (rather than just on one page that confirms a customer’s request to unsubscribe).

Principle C in the White Paper. Operators must offer the opportunity to opt-in and out of different forms of communication (e.g. text vs email vs push notifications).

What is the current legal position?

The position under PECR is best summarised in the ICO’s Direct Marketing Guidance, which states (emphasis added) that:

“When using opt-in boxes, organisations should remember that to comply with PECR they should provide opt-in boxes to obtain specific consent for each type of electronic marketing they want to undertake (eg automated calls, faxes, texts or emails). Best practice would be to also provide similar opt-in boxes for marketing calls and mail.”

The ICO goes on to give the following example of good practice:

Push notifications and direct messages on social media are not mentioned in the ICO’s Direct Marketing Guidance, but it follows that specific consent should also be obtained to these channels as they are examples of electronic marketing.

According to the White Paper, the Government is not convinced that the granular level of channel consent required by PECR is being obtained across the industry as a whole:

“When signing up, many major operators offer only an ‘all or nothing’ approach where a user is either unsubscribed from all marketing or provides consent to all communications.”

It follows that the DM Consultation would explore the need to reiterate current PECR requirements, by mandating that specific consent is obtained to each channel that will be used for direct electronic marketing.

What is proposed in the DM Consultation?

As drafted, SRCP 5.1.12 requires that licensees must provide customers with options to opt-in to direct marketing on a per-channel basis. Specifically:

“Channel options must include email, SMS, notification, social media (direct messages), post, phone call and a category for any other direct communication method, as applicable.”

What could possibly go wrong?

While we knew it was very likely (if not a certainty) that the DM Consultation would consult on requiring the industry to obtain specific, granular consent for electronic marketing channels such as email, SMS and by extension, push notifications and direct messages on social media; we are surprised that the Gambling Commission is also considering requiring prior consent to marketing by telephone or post. It is surprising because neither of these channels are currently subject to consent requirements in PECR – rather, the ICO refers to options to opt out of these channels as being “best practice”.

As is the case with the removal of the soft opt-in, this change will mean the gambling industry stands alone in the UK as the only commercial industry in which consent is required to send marketing by post or live phone call. Is this not perhaps, a step beyond what was intended by the Government in the White Paper? If we turn back to Principle C in the White Paper, it is notable that this mentions text, email and push notifications only. Did the Government really think new restrictions should also apply to live phone calls and post – or is this another example of the Gambling Commission exceeding its remit and seeking to further suppress gambling advertising even when the Government has concluded there is a lack of conclusive evidence of a relationship between gambling advertising and harm?

Finally, respondents will note that there is a question in the DM Consultation regarding whether the category “any other direct communication method” future proofs SRCP 5.1.12. In our view, this does indeed have the effect of future proofing the provision but, in the same way as the references to “post” and “phone call” in SRCP 5.1.12 extend consent requirements beyond PECR, the catch-all category will also extend it to all other present and future non-electronic methods of communication. For example, a face-to-face conversation with a gambler in a casino, bingo hall, betting shop, racecourse – or even on the street.

Once again, is this really what is intended and if it is, how does one obtain consent to having a conversation with someone without any communication in the first place? In our view, in order to be practical, prevent inadvertent breach by licensees and reduce the current (perhaps unintended?) regulatory creep, SRCP 5.1.12 should be restricted to the types of electronic communication for which prior consent to direct marketing is already required under PECR (e.g. texts, fax, emails, automated phone calls etc).

Principle D in the White Paper. Customers should be given the option to opt-in to bonuses and promotional offers separately from other marketing, and to set controls regarding which products they receive offers on. Specifically, there should be no ‘cross-selling’ without user opt-in.

What is the current legal position?

Please see our analysis of Principle A above, for a discussion regarding the distinction between incentives and generic marketing – and conclusion that Government’s recommendation to these two forms of marketing be distinguished for consumers has not come to fruition in the DM Consultation.

With regard to cross-selling (which is the practice of marketing a product (e.g. casino) to a customer that is actively participating in another product (e.g. bingo)), it is important to remember that consent under UK GDPR must be freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous.

The “specific” and “informed” aspects of this definition suggest that the practice of cross-selling different products and services could prove difficult when express consent is relied upon. If an individual has agreed to receive marketing regarding online bingo, they would not expect to receive marketing regarding sports betting opportunities, for example.

The soft opt-in exception to PECR however, is more permissive. In this case, marketing emails or texts regarding similar goods or services can be sent to customers without express consent being obtained in advance. According to the ICO’s Direct Marketing Guidance, the key question when determining whether products are similar is whether the customer would reasonably expect messages about the product or service in question.

In the White Paper, the Government revealed that it was particularly concerned regarding cross-selling practices in the industry. It noted that although causality between problem gambling and gambling on multiple products was not clear, various pieces of evidence presented to it revealed troubling findings:

“the number of different gambling activities individuals participate in is a risk factor for harmful gambling in young people, and that participating in seven or more gambling activities was associated with harmful gambling in adults.”

“engagement with multiple activities is associated with harm, raising important questions about the appropriateness of operators actively encouraging customers to expand their repertoire, particularly to those products associated with a higher problem gambling rate such as online slots.”

The White Paper goes on to recommend that there should be an increased level of customer choice around whether customers receive promotional offers and if so, what kind of offers and for which products.

The key question for the Gambling Commission to consider was therefore, how granular should any such requirement be? Marketing of (i) online slots to horse racing bettors; or (ii) online bingo to sports bettors (being the two examples given in the White Paper) are obvious examples that are likely to require separate consent going forward. But what about marketing online slots to land-based slots customers or marketing online poker to customers that play other card games online?

What is proposed in the DM Consultation?

The Gambling Commission appears to have gone for the easy option here. It has proposed, in new SRCP 5.1.12, that licensees provide customers with options to opt-in to direct marketing on a per product basis. Specifically:

“Product options must include betting, casino, bingo, and lottery, as applicable. Operators must make clear to customers which products they offer are covered under relevant categories.”

For clarity, examples of products that fall into these broad categories are set out in the preamble to the proposal:

“…the betting option includes virtual betting, gambling on betting exchanges, betting on lottery products as well as all real event betting. Casino includes slots, live casino, poker and all casino games. Bingo includes only games offered in reliance on a bingo licence e.g., not casino products. Lottery covers any lottery product offered in reliance on a lottery licence.”

What could possibly go wrong?

The Gambling Commission’s decision to broadly categorise all gambling products into four pots: (i) betting, (ii) casino, (iii) bingo and (iv) lottery, will be welcome news for marketing teams. By grouping the wide array of potential gambling products so broadly, there will still be many opportunities for cross-selling within each stand-alone category.

To provide some colour – although it will no longer be possible to market slot games to sports bettors – operators with diverse product offerings will still be able to cross-sell a wide range of products. For example:

someone receiving marketing about sports betting could be sent opportunities to bet fixed odds on the weather, politics, lotteries or virtual events – or even match bet other users on a betting exchange;
someone receiving marketing about slot games could be shown games such as keno, poker, roulette, baccarat or any of the other wide array of games in the casino family;
someone receiving marketing about lotteries could be offered scratch cards to raise money for the same, or a similar, good cause.

In each case, these communications could be sent without prior specific consent – provided the customer consented to receive direct marketing regarding the wider category of products. Arguably, such consent may have been given in the first place, with the expectation that direct marketing would be sent regarding products that the customer was already actively using only (e.g. sports betting offers for sports bettors; free stakes for slot game players etc.) – this will no longer be the case.

We query whether in fact, this change chips away at – rather than extends – the high bar of consent currently required by PECR.

3. Conclusion

In this article, we have delved into the proposals in the DM Consultation regarding direct marketing and given you, the reader, our high-level observations on some of the issues that may arise if SRCP 5.1.12 is introduced in its current form, without amendment. This is, however, just the consultation phase and the Gambling Commission has released the proposed wording for SRCP 5.1.12 with the stated intention (whether or not honourable) of collating feedback from interested stakeholders before making a final decision on how to proceed.

In the short time before the consultation closes on 18 October 2023, we urge you to consider (and if possible, investigate) the impact that SRCP 5.1.12 would, as drafted, have on your business. If the industry is to positively influence the consultation process, it is imperative that it engages by submitting evidence-based and fully considered responses. The more voices that are heard, the more likely the Gambling Commission is to take into account feedback on its proposals and, if appropriate, adjust them to better reflect the recommendations made by the Government in the White Paper and hopefully, reduce the likelihood of unintended consequences.

The time has officially come to speak now – or forever hold your peace. Please get in touch with us if you would like assistance responding to any of the Gambling Commission or DCMS consultations.

27Jul

Source of funding: A glimmer of hope on the horizon?

27th July 2023 Jessica Wilson 238

It is no secret that source of funding has been an area of uncertainty and, often intense, frustration in recent years. Whilst source of funding is a mandatory aspect of the licensing lifecycle, there continues to be a distinct lack of clarity from the Gambling Commission as to what is expected from applicants, licensees, and their investors. In our view, this breaches the Regulators’ Code which requires the Gambling Commission to have clear information, guidance and advice to help those they regulate meet their responsibilities to comply. Without such guidance, insurmountable regulatory and commercial risks are attached to the British market, potentially rendering it unviable and unattractive for new entrants and their investors, particularly where they are financial institutions. In view of the importance of this issue to our clients and the industry generally, we submitted a freedom of information request to the Gambling Commission in March 2023. Coincidentally or otherwise, there is now a glimmer of hope on the horizon as the Gambling Commission plans to publish source of funding guidance this Summer.

What is source of funding?

Source of funding involves establishing the legitimacy of the source of the capital and revenue finance used in the licensee’s operation.

Disclosure is required to ensure (1) that the first licensing objective has not been compromised (preventing gambling from being a source of crime or disorder, being associated with crime or disorder, or being used to support crime), and (2) that the licensee or applicant is suitable to hold a licence (as detailed in the Gambling Commission’s Licensing compliance and enforcement policy statement), which includes “the resources likely to be available to carry out the licensed activities and the legitimacy of the source of the capital and revenue finance of the operation.”

When is disclosure needed?

The common touchpoints for disclosure to the Gambling Commission are:

operating licence applications – where “there is a positive obligation on applicants to show that they are able to satisfy the licensing objectives” and the Gambling Commission “will also wish to be satisfied as to the sources of the applicant’s finance to satisfy itself that such funds are not associated with crime or disorder.”
key event notifications following the taking of new loans / funding, or the disclosure of new shareholders; and
changes of corporate control.

Under section 122 of the Gambling Act 2005, the Gambling Commission may also request source of funding disclosure for the purpose of determining the suitability of a licensee to carry on the licensed activities.

The current requirements

Currently, there is no formal or detailed source of funding guidance setting out the Gambling Commission’s requirements and each case is considered on its merits.

From our extensive experience, we know that applicants and licensees are required, using a risk-based approach based on their knowledge of the investor and the size of the investment, to:

Follow the “breadcrumb trail” of money and provide documents (i.e. bank statements) to evidence the flow of funds from the original source, to the ultimate investment in the licensee / applicant.
Provide documentary evidence for the source of funding. This depends widely on the specific circumstances but, by way of example, if an investment was funded by:

a) a share sale, the SPA could be provided along with a bank statement showing receipt of the funds from the sale; or

b) personal savings, the Gambling Commission would wish to understand and see evidence as to how these savings had accrued and over what time period.

The onus is always on the gambling business, which can be challenging when the Gambling Commission rejects incomplete applications and the majority of the information can only be obtained from third parties; however, it is vital that they have used their reasonable endeavours to secure the necessary information.

Challenges and moving goalposts

Source of funding is a complex area, particularly if money has been raised through an investment fund with underlying limited partner (passive) investors, where often there are complex confidentiality agreements in place. It has also been known for gambling businesses to encounter investors who simply refuse to disclose their personal documents or are only willing to provide documents that are heavily redacted.

Ultimately, as set out in the Licensing compliance and enforcement policy statement, the Gambling Commission must “assess the likelihood of risk presented by and the potential impact that the risk if realised will have upon the licensing objectives.” In our view, this does not mean pursue a risk-free approach by testing every £.

Nowadays, the Gambling Commission’s expectations for source of funding are burdensome and follow a novel and unpublished approach (generally led by Forensics), often exceeding those of financial or other gambling regulators around the globe. In extreme circumstances, this creates tension between the gambling business and its investors, and the Gambling Commission and the gambling business (including us!). Published guidance is critical to ensure consistency and provide certainty to gambling businesses and their investors.

Glimmer of hope on the horizon

Turning to the positive, we understand that the Gambling Commission will be publishing guidance on its website regarding its source of funding requirements to “provide better information to applicants”. It is expected that the guidance will be published by the end of July 2023.

At this stage, we understand that the guidance will be non-exhaustive, but will include example scenarios, including those relating to investment funds.

We further understand that the guidance will explain how the Gambling Commission divides investors into two groups when determining its source of funding requirements:

a) Regulated – meaning entities that are regulated by any form of financial service regulator, including the Financial Conduct Authority and Securities Exchange Commission.

b) Unregulated.

For each group, the Gambling Commission will take either a percentage of the total value of the investment / transaction, or an investment amount (e.g. £50,000) and consider source of funding for investors that cross that threshold. Where investors do not fall within either category, the Gambling Commission will look to take a dip sample, which reflects our recent client work. We further understand that the Gambling Commission will want investors identified so it can carry out open source and online checks before deciding if further source of funding information is required for particular investors.

Of course, the exact detail of the guidance will not be known until it is published. We are hopeful that it will provide some clarity on the Gambling Commission’s requirements and explain the basis for such requirements.

How we can help

Harris Hagan can navigate you through your engagement with the Gambling Commission on source of funding, minimising disclosure for you and your investors wherever possible, as well as offer source of funding training, tailored to the specific needs of your business. If you would like to discuss further, please do get in touch.

27Jul

White Paper Series: Cryptoassets

27th July 2023 Hilary Stewart-Jones 234

Adopting the term cryptoassets as opposed to cryptocurrencies, the White Paper devotes little time to the fast growing consumer demand in the online gambling sector. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport (“DCMS”) acknowledges that there are no specific laws which preclude a customer’s use of cryptoassets to fund gambling, but indicates that it has thus far relied upon the Gambling Commission taking a “rigorous stance” against their use to date where: (i) they are used by end users as a means of depositing into online gambling accounts; (ii) the operator accepting the cryptoasset payment has raised funds via the issue of cryptoassets; or (iii) the business owners’ source of funds includes ownership and trading of cryptoassets. The net result, unsurprisingly, has been that currently the Government does not feel the need to intervene further with legislative changes, because there already exists a de facto ban for gambling usage. Sadly, this was a missed opportunity to oversee and probe the Gambling Commission’s application of its discretion, all the more so given that cryptoassets will be fully financially regulated in Great Britain in the not-too-distant future, and where their burgeoning use in offshore gambling will be another deterrent for end users in Great Britain to only wager with Gambling Commission licensees.

Plainly, the discretion afforded to the Gambling Commission on licence applications can give it a multitude of reasons to decline licence grant, only one of which may be a business plan/funding which includes cryptoassets. To that point, the Gambling Commission states in its Blockchain technology and cryptoassets guidance that its approach to assessing a licence applicant’s source of funds is to be sure that the business is not being funded by proceeds of crime and it needs the same level of assurance for all licence applications. The Gambling Commission further emphasises its position in this guidance:

“If you are considering using to fund a gambling business, we recommend that unless you are able to provide a full and complete history of with your application, do not submit as we will not consider Operating Licence applications with a crypto funding element without this evidence provided in full at application stage”

For existing licensees, the Gambling Commission’s controls are set out in licence conditions (“LCs”). LC 5.1.1 requires that:

“Licensees, as part of their internal controls and financial accounting systems, must implement appropriate policies and procedures concerning the usage of cash and cash equivalents (e.g. digital currencies) by customers, designed to minimise the risk of crimes such as money laundering, …”
“Licensees must ensure that such policies and procedures are implemented effectively, kept under review, and revised appropriately to ensure that they remain effective, and take into account any applicable learning or guidelines published by the Gambling Commission from time to time”.

In addition, licensees are required by LC 15.2.1(8) to notify the Gambling Commission as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any event within five working days, in circumstances where there is: “ny change in the licensee’s arrangements as to the methods by which, and/or the payment processor through which, the licensee accepts payments from customers using their gambling facilities…”. This is a notification, and not a clearance requirement, albeit there is no doubt that the Gambling Commission would investigate notifications that relate to licensees’ acceptance of cryptoassets. The DCMS assert that on data provided by the Gambling Commission that there have been “no instances” of licensed operators making a key event filing regarding cryptoassets. This is hardly surprising when the known response would be negative.

The implication suggested by DCMS/the Gambling Commission in the White Paper that licensees may have no desire to accept cryptoassets because of inherent volatility/bet closing values and transparency issues, is unlikely to be the root cause of this reluctance. It is far more likely to be due to their concerns about the negative attention they would attract from their regulator and potential for licence review. In this regard, most licensees remain painfully aware of a fine meted out to one operator in circumstances where it did not accept cryptoassets as payment but allowed a customer with a regulated (as a financial service) digital wallet to deposit with fiat, in which wallet there was a risk that cryptoassets may have been (but not necessarily had been) deposited. The Gambling Commission justified the censure as a demonstrable lack of AML due diligence by the operator on the payment service provider, merely because it allowed deposits in fiat and cryptoassets, in circumstances where the wallet was, as stressed, regulated and there was nothing to preclude its commercial offering of the product. If that comprises a gambling regulatory benchmark, then on a broad application surely it should also preclude a relationship with any number of banks/payment service providers, many of whom offer cryptoasset trading services? One has to ask, the funding and suitability issues aside (of which more below), what is the real concern? Most gambling operators who accept cryptoassets do not do so anonymously as all require a form of KYC/CDD/EDD to open an account. The larger operators also tend to only accept stable coins, and do not allow any form of trading exchange within the gambling ecosystem i.e. USDT in, USDT out. In short, a very limited scope for anonymous money laundering.

The Gambling Commission’s antipathy seems to be primarily rooted in cryptoassets’ opaque nature, having stated “the anonymity afforded by some , along with any weaknesses in the process of obtaining them, have consistently caused problems for applicants….”. However, this suggests that the cryptoasset itself can be tainted by a previous illegal use, despite the fact that the current cryptoasset owner would be fully disclosed to the operator and by extension (if requested) the Gambling Commission. Meanwhile, back in the real world, none of us can account for prior uses of all money in our bank accounts since the creation of that currency. For proceeds of crime/AML purposes one can understand that fiat monies can taint other fiat monies in a single account (where they cannot be separately identified) but not cryptoassets where each unit is separately reported in the blockchain. In addition, as can be inferred from Europol’s December 2021 report, the early adoption by criminals for payment in non-private cryptoassets for illegal activities (e.g. human trafficking and money laundering) through such transactions is actually on the wane. The report observes that unlike private coins where the ledger is obfuscated, there is with most types of reputable cryptoassets a public blockchain ledger, so that all trades are recorded: the detail retained therefore leaves a trail that cash could not. Indeed, as Europol emphasises, that ledger was key to unlocking the source of funds in several prosecutions, demonstrating that the prior users were neither truly anonymous nor untraceable. In any event in its conclusion, it points out: “….., the use of cryptocurrencies for illicit activities seems to comprise only a small part of the overall cryptocurrency economy, and it appears to be comparatively smaller than the amount of illicit funds involved in traditional finance.”

Both the DCMS and the Gambling Commission also allude to cryptoasset volatility and that such issues would impact gambling because of the problems of establishing financial limits and affordable gambling. However, again the criticism does not seem to be well thought through. A customer who has bought cryptoassets has presumably had the wherewithal to do so, affordability issues aside. If they then gamble with an element of the cryptoasset that goes up in value after the deposit but before any wager, then any safer gambling (“SG”) limits pegged to fiat (which could be easily imposed as a LC) would still snag before the sums were wagered, as the exchange rate could take place before play. If the volatility is in the licensee’s favour on pay-out (and it could go either way) the customer has still not lost any more than the SG limit set, which is entirely in line with the current loss limit philosophy that underpins the White Paper’s approach to consumer protection. In any event, the Gambling Commission should not ignore that cryptoassets are fast becoming a real and critical part of the world’s economy, and certainly the case for continued objection to licensees accepting deposits in fiat, where the known source is cryptoassets or there had been a digital wallet intermingling cryptoassets traded via a licensed exchange, seems antiquated. Meanwhile other regulators appreciate the need to accommodate change. The Markets in Cryptoassets (“MiCA”) regulation was passed by the European Union (“EU”) in May 2023. MiCA has four objectives:

to provide a legal framework to regulate cryptoassets;
to support innovation and fair competition;
to protect consumers, investors and market integrity; and
to guard against the financial uncertainty

These regulations will sit alongside the existing cryptoasset travel rule which requires entities enabling the exchange , transfer, sale or related financial services and safeguarding (the so called “VASP” services) to let the sender and recipient of cryptoassets have personal identifiable information of the other (legal name, address and account number) for all transactions over USD 1,000, or as determined by each Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) member state (by way of example, the current U.S. rule is USD 3,000).

Whilst Great Britain is no longer part of the European Union, it is expected that it will ultimately pass legislation which will address the high risk nature of cryptoassets, to reach parity with high risk investment services (e.g. those requiring a consumer cooling off period) and to attach criminal offences to non-compliance (currently British-based firms providing cryptoasset services are obliged to register with the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) and to comply with existing money laundering regulations and obligations). It is also notable other gambling regulators already have well advanced regimes for the acceptance of cryptoassets for gambling, albeit that the majority of the operators accepting cryptoassets have tended to cluster in traditional grey-market licensing hubs.

Despite this, and the moves for financial services regulation of cryptoassets already in motion, the Treasury Committee’s report Regulating Crypto, published on 10 May 2023 (the “Fifteenth Report”), instead called for cryptoassets to be regulated as gambling, emphasising that:

“… their price volatility exposes consumers to the potential for substantial gains or losses, while serving no useful purpose. These characteristics more closely resemble gambling than a financial service…”

Whilst one can understand there being a false sense of security for a volatile, albeit financially regulated asset (the so called “halo” effect) this proposal would put Great Britain out of step with the vast majority of other jurisdictions. Moreover, it would be the ultimate irony were the Gambling Commission be called upon to regulate an industry for which it plainly has the greatest mistrust Mercifully, the proposal does not have the support of Government and on the 19 July 2023, it made its response to the recommendations contained in the Fifteenth Report clear; cryptoassets would remain financially services regulated:

“Such an approach would run completely counter to globally agreed recommendations from international organisations and standard-setting bodies… …These recommendations are grounded in the principle of ‘same activity, same risk, same regulatory outcome’, meaning that any cryptoasset activity that performs a similar function, and poses similar risks, to those in the traditional financial system (for example, operating a trading platform or providing custody services) are subject to regulation that ensures equivalent outcomes.
The Committee’s proposed approach would therefore risk creating misalignment with international standards and approaches from other major jurisdictions including the EU, and potentially create unclear and overlapping mandates between financial regulators and the Gambling Commission.”

In conclusion, the dithering over cryptoassets and gambling needs to stop. Again, time has been lost with the distraction over the Fifteenth Report. Some online casinos accepting cryptoassets have reported gross gambling revenue of USD 2.6 billion for 12 months trading alone, so the product is clearly of appeal. One cannot simply assume that all or a majority of those end users have nefarious intentions. Given the ongoing profits of fiat-only operators too, one must also assume they are reaching an as yet untapped gambling demographic. The Treasury Committee report noted that in Great Britain alone 10% of adults hold or have held cryptoassets, with the majority of those concluding that it was a “fun” asset and where the transaction costs were considerably less than with fiat transfers. Given this is no longer: (a) a niche pastime; or (b) the preserve of criminals only, the Gambling Commission would be advised to give priority to what would comprise adequate safeguarding for cryptoasset usage in gambling rather than de facto fettering its discretion and imposing an outright ban. In addition, the longer the wait the less likely it is for governments and regulators to adequately anticipate/safeguard against the next wave of technology advancements in the cryptoasset space. The sooner the dialogue and the desire to find middle ground starts, the better.

With thanks to David Whyte and Gemma Boore from Harris Hagan for their invaluable co-authorship.

See paragraph 135 on page 68 of the White Paper.

See the Gambling Commission’s Blockchain technology and cryptoassets guidance note.

In this regard DCMS is using the terminology also used by the Gambling Commission, which had in turn adopted that used by the Treasury Committee (see its Twenty-Second Report of Session 2017-19 published September 2018).

11Jul

White Paper Series: Update from the Gambling Commission

11th July 2023 Jessica Wilson 253

On 7 July 2023, Tim Miller, Executive Director of Research and Policy at the Gambling Commission, published an update on the Gambling Commission’s plans for implementing its 24 key actions as detailed in the Government’s White Paper. The update follows the Gambling Commission’s virtual briefing held on 5 July 2023 for operators.

Web content

Miller reiterated that the Gambling Commission has already completed its first deliverable by launching its White Labels Hub, which gives a consolidated guide to White Labels. Please see our blog for further details. Miller confirmed that the Gambling Commission intends to publish web content regarding its approach to vulnerability in July 2023.

Data and evidence

Miller explained that the Gambling Commission is progressing its work to improve evidence and data for gambling in Great Britain, which is a part of its commitment to the Gambling Review. Miller highlighted the publication of the Gambling Commission’s three-year Evidence Gaps and Priorities Review as evidence of its progress.

Consultations

The most anticipated next step is publication of the Gambling Commission’s consultations. Miller confirmed that the Gambling Commission intends to publish six consultations later this month (July 2023), four of which relate to measures detailed in the White Paper. The Gambling Commission expects most of the consultations to last 12 weeks, with closing dates in October.

The consultations relating to the White Paper measures are as follows:

Age-verification in land-based premises: Including test purchasing by small bingo premises, adult gaming centres and betting operators, and updating the ordinary code from Think 21 to Think 25.
Remote game design: Including changes to the Remote Technical Standards and building on the Gambling Commission’s previous work on online slots.
Direct marketing and cross-selling: Including proposals to amend the social responsibility code regarding marketing to enhance consumer protection.
Financial risk and vulnerability checks for remote operators: Including the proposed defined thresholds for financial risk checks, transparency requirements and a timetable for implementation.

The two additional consultations are:

Rules about Personal Management Licences: Proposal to clarify and extend the requirement to hold a PML for certain functions.
Procedures for Regulatory Panels: Proposal on a package of changes in relation to regulatory panels, including amendments to the Statement of Principles.

Miller explained that the second tranche of White Paper consultations will take place before the end of the year, likely in Autumn 2023, including consultations on socially responsible inducements and gambling management tools. Pre-consultation engagement is expected to begin in the coming weeks.

Statutory levy

Miller’s blog highlighted the Gambling Commission’s role regarding the statutory levy, a pillar reform from the White Paper. He confirmed that whilst the Government will lead the creation of the statutory levy, the Gambling Commission’s role will be about administration of the levy, including collection and distribution. Miller explained that, once the levy is introduced, the Gambling Commission’s list of approved organisations for RET payments will likely no longer be relevant or needed. The Gambling Commission also needs to consider the impact of a levy system on the destination of any future regulatory settlements.

Gambling Commission’s role

Miller reiterated that the Gambling Commission continues to support Government with the work on the White Paper and Gambling Review, and that they will continue to monitor the progress of the industry to deliver voluntary commitments.

“Full implementation of the will be a job of several years, especially when you include evaluating the impact of any changes. But that doesn’t mean we don’t want to progress things as quickly as possible. We are determined to make progress at speed”.

We look forward to seeing the next steps of the Gambling Review being put into action. Once the first tranche of consultations is launched in July 2023, we strongly encourage the industry to participate and would be delighted to assist with preparing responses.

11Jul

HM Treasury consultation: Reform of the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing supervisory regime

11th July 2023 Chris Biggs 252

On 30 June 2023, HM Treasury published its consultation on reform of the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing supervisory system (the “Consultation”). Released as part of the Government’s commitments within its Economic Crime Plan 2023-2026, the Consultation offers stakeholders the opportunity to provide their views on four possible models for improving the UK’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (“AML/CTF”) supervisory regime. The Consultation also seeks responses in order to determine whether there is a need for a more formalised system of sanctions supervision, noting that most AML/CTF supervisors do not have explicit powers to supervise sanctions compliance and controls.

In the Consultation’s preamble, the Treasury Lords Minister Baroness Penn emphasised the Government’s motivations for its proposals:

“Money laundering is the lifeblood of organised crime… Terrorism financing threatens national security and facilitates atrocities we have suffered here in the UK and across the rest of the world. To protect the integrity of the UK’s financial and professional services sectors, we must also do more to address illicit finance linked to corrupt elites…”

The current situation

Presently AML/CTF is regulated by various supervising authorities which oversee businesses that conduct activities classified under the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (the “MLRs”). Three statutory supervisors regulate various sectors under the MLRs, specifically: the Gambling Commission for the casino industry; the Financial Conduct Authority for financial institutions; and HMRC for a number of business sectors, including real estate agency businesses and accountancy, trust or company service providers not supervised by another authority or professional body. In addition, Professional Body Supervisors (“PBSs”) are responsible for supervising legal and accountancy firms.

However, in HM Treasury’s 2022 Review of the UK’s AML/CTF Regulatory and Supervisory Regime the Government concluded that, whilst there had been continued improvement to the regime, some weaknesses in supervision may need to be addressed through structural reform. The 2022 review set out four possible models for a future AML/CTF supervisory system and the Consultation further develops these four models, assessing them against three consultation objectives: (a) supervisory effectiveness; (b) improved system coordination; and (c) feasibility.

The proposed models

1. OPBAS+

In 2017, the Government created the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision (“OPBAS”). OPBAS was designed to ensure robust and consistent supervision of AML/CTF across the nation’s 22 PBSs. The Consultation proposes that OPBAS be given enhanced powers to increase the effectiveness of supervision by the PBSs.

The Consultation states this proposal would be most immediately feasible, as no structural changes would be required to the current regime. Evidently, this proposal would have little to no impact on the Gambling Commission’s regulation of AML/CTF, however it is possible that the Gambling Commission may seek to mirror any additional accountability mechanisms that this model would introduce.

2. PBS Consolidation

The Consultation proposes that instead of enhancing OPBAS, the number of PBSs be reduced. Specifically, either two or six PBSs would retain responsibility for AML/CTF supervision, whereby two oversee the legal and accountancy sectors respectively across the UK, or two PBSs oversee the legal and accountancy sectors respectively in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Two further variants proposed under this model relate to HMRC’s supervisory role for accountancy and trust or company service providers being removed or reduced.

Again, this model would retain the current system of supervision by PBSs but would reduce the inconsistency and complexity of the current system due to the number of PBSs. It is unlikely that this model would significantly impact the Gambling Commission’s regulation of AML/CTF.

3. Single Professional Services Supervisor

The Single Professional Services Supervisor (“SPSS”) model, as the name suggests, proposes that one single public body (existing or new) supervise all legal and accountancy sector firms for AML/CTF, and possibly some or all of the wider sectors currently supervised by HMRC. The Consultation suggests that the SPSS would be independent of any ministerial department, but accountable to HM Treasury. Its nature as a public body, accountable to Parliament, may be considered more appropriate: (a) because of the broad set of intervention powers it will hold; (b) because its policy remit can be set out in legislation; (c) to facilitate better information sharing; and (d) because it will be more flexible.

Again, it is unlikely that this model would significantly impact the Gambling Commission’s regulation of AML/CTF.

4. Single Anti-Money Laundering Supervisor

The Consultation’s proposal for a Single Anti-Money Laundering Supervisor (“SAS”) represents the most significant proposed change to the AML/CTF supervisory regime in the UK, and one that would change how Licensees are regulated in respect of AML/CTF.

The SAS, which would be a public body, would undertake all AML/CTF supervision in the UK, with the Gambling Commission and the other existing statutory supervisors and PBSs relinquishing their AML/CTF supervisory duties entirely. Similar to the SPSS model above, the SAS would benefit from being an operationally independent public body ultimately accountable to Parliament and HM Treasury.

The Consultation acknowledges that supervisors should take a risk-based and data-led approach to their AML/CTF supervision and it goes without saying that unless seamless communication and data-sharing between supervisors exists, there will be inconsistencies. One overarching supervisory body, such as the SAS, may therefore be best placed to consider data from all sectors and apply a consistent standard of AML/CTF regulation.

From Licensees’ perspective, there has been confusion about the Gambling Commission’s approach to AML/CTF for some time, particularly in relation to the inevitable cross over between AML/CTF and safer gambling, affordability and vulnerability. Licensees may therefore consider that the SAS model will introduce consistency to the AML/CTF supervision of casinos that operate in the UK and introduce a more proportionate and coherent regime. However, Licensees should note that were the SAS model to be introduced, they would be faced with: (a) dual regulation which will inevitably introduce an additional burden; and (b) supervision by the SAS, a newly created regulatory body that will almost certainly have less industry expertise than the Gambling Commission.

Responding to the Consultation

Whether or not the SAS is the favoured model will be influenced by the responses and evidence submitted to the Consultation. The Consultation is open until 30 September 2023. HM Treasury encourages responses to be submitted through its secure online survey, but responses can also be emailed to [email protected]. We recommend that all Licensees review and respond to the Consultation.

Please get in touch with us if you would like assistance with preparing a response or with any AML/CTF compliance or enforcement matters.

With credit and sincere thanks to David Whyte for his invaluable co-authorship.

04Jul

White Paper Series: The Gambling Commission’s powers – more to come?

4th July 2023 David Whyte 255

As all stakeholders seek to get to grips with the White Paper and their focus is drawn to its high-profile proposals such as financial risk checks and stake limits, they might be forgiven for overlooking the potential aftereffects apparent from some of the more inconspicuous proposals, particularly when those proposals are considered in the context of the Gambling Commission’s Advice to Government – Review of the Gambling Act 2005 (the “Advice to Government”).

When referring to the Gambling Commission’s powers and resources in the White Paper, the Government states in its summary (our emphasis added):

“The Commission has a broad range of powers that enable it to regulate the industry effectively but there are some small changes that could be made around its ability to investigate operators, including improving the Commission’s responsiveness to changes of corporate control.”

There is limited information contained in the White Paper about what those “small changes” might be. Points of note are:

“The government and the Commission are clear that an enhanced approach to compliance enforcement is required to effectively monitor the industry and ensure that operators are abiding by the rules.”
The Gambling Commission has advised that “some of its powers concerning investigations could be enhanced to better protect consumers and hold operators to account”. In particular, “it is concerned that licence holders are able to take action that can hinder or frustrate an investigation, including surrendering their licence during the course of the investigation.”

The Government concludes:

“When Parliamentary time allows, we will legislate to give the Commission additional powers to assess and regulate new business owners, reflecting the increased complexity of the entities that it regulates. We will also look at the case for providing further powers to ensure that licensees are not able to interfere with the Commission’s ability to conclude its investigations or move their finances to reduce the size of their fine.”

To understand fully the extent of the “small changes” or “further powers” that the Government may decide are appropriate, it is necessary to consider the Advice to Government, within which the Gambling Commission proposes amendments to the Gambling Act 2005 (the “2005 Act”) “to allow for streamlined regulatory action in a number of areas”. This article focusses on three of those areas: (a) the process for change of corporate control (“CoCC”) applications; (b) options for investigations and licence surrender; and (c) flexibility for penalties that can be imposed on licensees.

Change of corporate control

Under section 102 of the 2005 Act, a change of corporate control (“CoCC”) takes place when a new person or other legal entity becomes a new “controller” of a licensee (more information on a CoCC can be found in our previous blog). When a CoCC occurs, licensees must notify the Gambling Commission, via eServices by means of a key event, as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event within five working days of them becoming aware. Licensees must then submit a CoCC application within five weeks of the event occurring or the Gambling Commission is obliged to revoke the licence, although it may, at its discretion, extend the five-week period. Presently, in determining a CoCC application, the Gambling Commission has a binary choice, it may, in law, only grant the application or refuse it. If the latter, the licence is revoked.

The complexity of corporate structures and financing have increased the burden on both the Gambling Commission and licensees to investigate and/or evidence proof of ownership and source of funds related to CoCC applications and this, along with suitability considerations, means increasingly prolonged investigations. The Gambling Commission recommends: (a) the removal of the binary nature of the CoCC decision, to allow for the possibility of it granting the application subject to its imposition of conditions on the licence; (b) an amendment to allow for the appeal by a licensee against the Gambling Commission’s decision not to grant an extension of the five-week period for the submission of a CoCC application, which at present can only be appealed by means of judicial review; and (c) that it be given the ability to apply a financial penalty for the submission of CoCC applications outside the five-week reporting window.

In the main, these proposals are proportionate and reasonable. The removal of the binary nature of the CoCC decision will benefit both licensees and the Gambling Commission, as will the introduction of the proposed appeal process. The Gambling Commission has become increasingly strict in relation to the late submission of CoCC applications, so licensees will be unsurprised that it is now proposing the imposition of a financial penalty in those circumstances. Whilst a financial penalty is certainly better than the alternative of revocation, licensees may wish to seek clarification in relation to how the quantum of the proposed financial penalty will be calculated. A fixed fee would most certainly be preferable to the application of the Statement of principles for determining financial penaltie s (the “FP Statement”), which incudes no formula for calculating quantum, allows for uncapped financial penalties, and contains various criteria that may be not be appropriate to the late submission of a CoCC application.

Refusal of licence surrender

The Gambling Commission recommends that the Government considers amending the 2005 Act to permit it to refuse a licence surrender under certain circumstances when an investigation is taking place, so that it retains “regulatory authority” over licensees, post surrender, primarily with a view to it imposing a financial penalty. The implication from the Gambling Commission’s proposal, which is supported by little more than reference to “vidence from casework” is that, in its view, licensees may be utilising surrender as a means of avoiding a financial penalty, and that they may “move finances during, or in anticipation of, an investigation” to avoid the same.

Potential options proposed by the Gambling Commission are: (a) requiring its consent before the surrender of a licence in circumstances where enforcement action has been commenced; (b) extending the application of the relevant sections of the 2005 Act that provide the power for the Gambling Commission to impose a financial penalty, such that for a specified period they apply to a licence that has lapsed or been surrendered; and (c) amending the 2005 Act to prevent licensees from triggering a mandatory licence revocation by failing to pay their annual licence fee.

We have several concerns about this proposal and the Gambling Commission’s justification for it:

Licences are valuable assets that are difficult to obtain. Reputable licensees subject to enforcement action will: (a) wish to continue to operate in the British market, clear their name and protect their asset; and/or (b) be very concerned at having to disclose their surrender to regulators in other jurisdictions without having defended the alleged licence condition breach to a conclusion; and/or (c) be aware their previous standing will be taken into account in the context of any new licence application, as will that of the PML holders and controllers involved. Surrender is much more likely to be due to a desire to exit the market in Great Britain, likely influenced by ever-increasing regulatory requirements, the inordinate length of time taken by the Gambling Commission to carry out a licence review, or by other commercial or economic factors. Some licensees who do surrender might not even have considered doing so, but for the reminder included by the Gambling Commission in much of its enforcement related correspondence that a licence can be surrendered at any time. The implication of widespread manipulative intent in the Advice to Government is therefore wrong and perhaps provides valuable insight into how the Gambling Commission perceives the integrity of its licensees.
Very exceptionally, an unscrupulous licensee may surrender their licence deliberately to avoid a financial penalty. In those very rare instances, those who do so might better be dealt with by means of criminal prosecution and the consequence and protection that brings, rather than be subject to sanction by what will, at that stage, be an exacerbated Gambling Commission.
One of the reasons given by the Gambling Commission for its recommendation is that “a surrendered license leaves unable to protect consumers or take regulatory action to hold the licensee accountable for their actions.” We struggle to understand how imposing a financial penalty on a licensee that has surrendered their licence will further protect consumers. The surrender itself, prompted by the Gambling Commission’s action, must surely both protect consumers and hold licensees accountable.
Punitive sanctions form an important part of the Gambling Commission’s regulatory toolkit but when a licence surrender has already removed all risk, are not critical to its upholding of the licensing objectives set out at section 1 of the 2005 Act. We question whether it is appropriate for the Gambling Commission, or any other regulatory body, to retain regulatory authority over a former licensee in those circumstances, when the sole objective is to facilitate the imposition of a punitive financial sanction. If, as the Gambling Commission suggests, licensees have moved finances deliberately to avoid a financial penalty, the refusal of surrender is not going to guarantee a different outcome.
A financial penalty can only be imposed if there has been a breach of a licence condition, which, by virtue of section 33 of the 2005 Act, is a criminal offence. The Gambling Commission is therefore able to prosecute should it wish to seek to impose a punitive sanction. However, the Gambling Commission may be less inclined to take this approach because: (a) it would be obliged to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt, rather than to the lower burden of proof of balance of probabilities applicable to its imposition of a financial penalty; (b) it would likely be held to higher investigative standards and more restrictive time limits by the criminal courts; and (c) unlike a financial penalty which is unlimited and paid into the Consolidated Fund, the quantum of court fines is restricted by statute and fines are paid to the courts.

Licensees would be wise to monitor the Gambling Commission’s next steps in this area so that they may challenge the logic of this recommendation when it is revisited by either the Gambling Commission or the Government in consultation.

Flexibility for penalties that can be imposed on licensees

Statutory time limits

In the Advice to Government, the Gambling Commission refers to the 12-month time limit for laying criminal charges and the 24-month time limit for imposing a financial penalty prescribed by the 2005 Act. It suggests that these time limits have restricted its ability to prosecute or impose a financial penalty in cases where “establishing a breach” is “very complicated” and proposes amendments to the 2005 Act to: (a) introduce greater flexibility in the time limits for bringing prosecutions; and (b) explore extending the cut-off period for the imposition of a financial penalty.

Although the Gambling Commission states that it has “sound evidence from regulatory experiential knowledge and casework” that underpins its recommendations, the examples used by the Gambling Commission as justification are very broad and insufficiently detailed. As most licensees who have been involved in Gambling Commission enforcement action have experienced, the primary reason for the delay is not that “the increasing complexities of gambling businesses make establishing a breach in some cases very complicated” but rather the Gambling Commission’s inefficiency.

Licensees subject to the Gambling Commission’s enforcement process are often required to adhere to relatively short deadlines, whereas the Gambling Commission operates to much longer deadlines. Some licensees have had to wait six months or more to receive a response or update from the Gambling Commission, often only to receive a preliminary findings or findings letter that largely repeats the content of its previous correspondence. It is this inefficiency that leads to the expiration of statutory time limits. A significant factor that has led to the increasing complexity of the Gambling Commission’s investigations will likely be its inconsistent application of its regulatory requirements or a lack of clarity about the same, particularly given its increasing introduction of formal requirements through guidance, and the lack of clarity as to its expectations in relation to affordability.

Furthermore, it is not, as the Gambling Commission states in the Advice to Government, its charge to “establish a breach”: this is again an indication of its mindset. As a regulator it is obliged to investigate suspected breaches on a fair, reasonable and proportionate basis, and to reach a conclusion on the facts. A cynic might suggest that it is this determination to “establish a breach” that is prolonging its investigations. This is particularly so when Licensees’ have raised their standards significantly in recent years and therefore, despite published enforcement action, breaches may be harder to come by.

Long, process driven, delays do not only impact statutory time limits. They have a commercial impact on licensees, detract valuable resource from day-to-day compliance activities, and when related to individuals, impact their wellbeing. It is in all parties’ best interests that matters are dealt with expeditiously. Before amending primary legislation, the Government might wish to consider a careful and fact-based examination of the Gambling Commission’s productivity, including in relation to past enforcement cases. Efficient, proportionate, reasonable, and timely investigations are the very reason for the statutory time limits being imposed in the first place.

Extending the scope of financial penalties

The Gambling Commission sets out in the Advice to Government that extending the scope of financial penalties (which currently only apply to breaches of licence conditions) to encompass suitability concerns, would give it more opportunity to take action. It goes on to state that every case of a financial penalty “has also included suitability concerns which we have been unable to take into account when imposing the penalty” in inference being that if suitability concerns were to have been in scope, the financial penalties it has issued would have been greater.

We agree with the Gambling Commission’s statement: most of its cases of a financial penalty do include reference to it having suitability concerns. However, those suitability concerns are almost always directly linked to a breach of a licence condition. We therefore question whether extending the scope in the manner proposed is necessary, as a financial penalty can be imposed in those cases anyway.

If the Gambling Commission wishes to increase the quantum of the financial penalties it imposes, it has the ability to amend its FP Statement. At present, the FP Statement does not include a formula for calculating the quantum of financial penalties, much to the frustration of licensees and advisors alike. The FP Statement does, however, set out the criteria that is considered by the Gambling Commission when imposing a financial penalty. Much of those criteria could just as easily be relevant to any consideration of a licensee’s suitability: it could therefore be argued that the Gambling Commission is already taking suitability into account. Furthermore, should the Gambling Commission have serious concerns about a licensee’s suitability, it has the ability to suspend or revoke their licence. Licensees may again wish to challenge the necessity of this proposal, if it is introduced in future consultations.

Please get in touch with us if you would like assistance with any compliance or enforcement matters.

03Jul

White Paper Series: Cashless payments – finally bringing the land-based sector into the digital age?

3rd July 2023 Bahar Alaeddini 277

In the year ending March 2021, nearly £910 million was generated from gaming machines in Great Britain (excluding those located in pubs). In total, there were nearly 170,000 gaming machines located in bingo premises (41%), adult gaming centres (35%), betting premises (15%), family entertainment centres (8%) and casinos (4%). In the period April 2020 to March 2021 (during the pandemic), the largest revenues, by a country mile, were generated by gaming machines located in bingo premises (41%) and adult gaming centres (35%), with revenues slowly declining in most sectors. There is no reliable data on the number located in pubs, or associated revenues, but the figure is likely to be in the region of 70,000.

A lifeline in the White Paper is the proposed review of cashless payments on gaming machines with the plan to remove the current legislative prohibition, set out in the Gaming Machine (Circumstances of Use) Regulations 2007 (the “2007 Regulations”), banning cashless payments directly on gaming machines.

The original purpose of the prohibition was to protect players from over-spending as it was assumed players would have more control over their play if they were playing with cash, providing natural interruptions in play by stopping their gambling to obtain more cash. The lack of a break in play is viewed as a lost opportunity for the player to consider whether they wish to continue to play and spend more.

The lifeline offered in the White Paper is hugely positive and could result in the long-overdue modernisation of the land-based sector, bringing it into the digital age.

Cash is dead

Since the 2007 Regulations, especially with the advent of contactless payments and global pandemic, non-cash payments have grown exponentially. Use of cash has declined across society with the expectation that it will not be used by 2035. In 2011, 72% payments in pubs were made by cash and, in 2020, this reduced to only 13%. In 2021, almost a third of all payments in the UK were made using contactless. This societal change has negatively impacted the land-based sector beyond belief, and it has been compounded by pubs no longer giving cashback and ATMs being removed. We now live in a world where hardly anybody uses cash. I – almost exclusively – use Apple Pay and regularly leave the house without cash or a bank card!

The restriction on using debit cards directly on gaming machines (credit cards are banned) has meant the land-based sector has been left behind. Whilst industry has been creative and found ways to make indirect debit card payments and protect players (in collaboration with DCMS and the Gambling Commission), take up has been slow and these are “not a fix-all solution”.

2018 Gambling Commission cashless advice

In March 2018, and in response to significant payment innovations in the retail economy, the Gambling Commission published advice on cashless payments in gambling premises (which remains in force), crystallising its position and key considerations for operators, as follows:

tracking play and collecting better data on player behaviour to make an informed assessment of those at risk of gambling-related harm;
providing tailored safer gambling information to players including transactional information on money spent/withdrawn;
player-led controls to enable better self-management such as a player’s own spend or withdrawal limits; and
the importance of gathering data both before and after the implementation of any measure to demonstrate the impact of control measures.

The guidance places responsibility squarely on operators to consider what measures are most effective and appropriate to their businesses. Further, it acknowledges the lack of evidence to suggest the optimum duration of a break, but sets out the expectation that, wherever possible, players should at least cease gambling and physically leave the gaming machine. Where players can access new gambling funds with only a limited or no physical break from the gaming machine, operators must nevertheless ensure players are otherwise provided a break from, or an interruption in, gambling before those funds can be used. The guidance also states the Gambling Commission “may consider taking regulatory action in individual cases if, for example, an operator was to increase the risk of harm to its customers without providing appropriate mitigations.”

DCMS will work with the Gambling Commission to develop “specific consultation options for cashless payments” (expected Summer 2023). DCMS is clear that any new or additional player protection measures will need to be in place before the legislative prohibition is lifted.

The Gambling Commission’s view is that the onus is on industry to demonstrate cashless payments can be offered without increasing gambling harm or crime. So, what does this mean for industry?

The White Paper has created a staggering volume of work for both DCMS and the Gambling Commission. As such, all proposals will not be treated equally, and a sceptical view is that cashless will not be a priority. As an important lifeline, it will require great effort by industry to keep it high on the agenda for DCMS and the Gambling Commission. One way to achieve this would be through an industry code, backed by evidence wherever possible, and promoting the associated benefits of cashless payments given, for example, low test-purchasing scores for gaming machines in alcohol-licensed premises. The greater the industry support, the more likely it is the proposed reform will be delivered in a timely, sensible and workable way.

Cashless industry code

Two of the challenges of developing an industry code are, firstly, gaming machines are in different types of gambling premises (each with their own unique “person, product, place” considerations), highlighting the difficulty of agreeing standards or codes of practice. By way of example, pubs are not regulated premises by the Gambling Commission. They are automatically entitled to offer gaming machines as part of their alcohol licence granted by the local licensing authority. Pubs and gambling premises will very likely have different baselines and priorities, and industry must inevitably set higher standards. The industry is better placed to do so and both DCMS and the Gambling Commission will expect them rise to the challenge. It is unclear what this means for pubs, particularly given their unsupervised nature, but given the 84% test purchasing fail rate (in 2019), they would be best placed to embrace a cashless industry code through amendment of the Social Responsibility Charter for Gaming Machines in Pubs issued by the British Beer and Pub Association.

Secondly, there are several types of cashless payment technologies each with different functionality. Unless banks facilitate player protection tools (for example, through online banking), physically or virtually presenting a debit card is very different from using a cashless gaming app or eWallet which connects to a gaming machine.

A practical solution would be to develop a cross-sector industry cashless code to reflect best practice and aim to install a minimum set of standards to address issues of risk. The central commitment would be to allow cashless payments whilst minimising the risks of gambling-related harm and protecting players. Standards may include the following:

a meaningful forced delay before the funds can be used (for example, 2 minutes, although in a cross-sector industry code it might be sensible to steer away from prescribing a timeframe);
personalised financial limits (deposit/spend) with clear messaging and calls to action;
personalised time limits with clear messaging and calls to action;
time and money spent totals with clear alerts;
prescribed maximum deposit in a single transaction or day etc.;
time-outs;
transaction history (ideally, searchable by last 24 hours, last week, last month etc.);
self-exclusion;
safer gambling messaging;
tracking player data to provide targeted messaging and/or interventions;
automatic disconnection from the gaming machine after inactivity with credit returned;
digital age verification to prevent underage gambling;
withdrawals must only be made to registered / the same card; and
restricted to one debit card.

Once agreed with DCMS and the Gambling Commission, compliance with the industry code could be incorporated as a licence condition in the Licence conditions and code of practice and/or gaming machine technical standards.

At the appropriate juncture, we will of course be happy to assist clients with their responses to the consultation where that would be helpful.

With credit and sincere thanks to Jessica Wilson for her invaluable co-authorship.