22Sep

Gambling Commission establishes Industry Forum

22nd September 2023 Bahar Alaeddini 182

On 14 September 2023, the Gambling Commission announced the establishment of an Industry Forum, to be made up of representatives from the British gambling industry, with the role “to provide further insight into the views of operators… share industry views on areas such as account management, consultations and the Commission’s data programme.”

There will be approximately 10 cross-industry members.

The recruitment of a Chair will begin in September 2023, when the Gambling Commission will be inviting expressions of interest from industry to become a member. Details will be published on the Gambling Commission website.

We welcome this announcement. We also very much welcome that the Gambling Commission has listened with increased industry engagement, recognising that better relationships with industry leads to better outcomes. However, we make two important observations:

Why is the Industry Forum only being created now? It is: (a) nearly three years since the Gambling Act Review kicked off and the Lived Experience Advisory Panel was formed; (b) nearly six months since the publication of the White Paper; and (c) critically, the most important Gambling Commission consultations have already been published.

Cynically, it is titled a “forum”, which suggests the possibility (however remote) it may not be viewed with much value within the Gambling Commission itself. Why is the Industry Forum not placed on an equal footing to the Lived Experience Advisory Panel, Digital Advisory Panel and Advisory Board for Safer Gambling? The Lived Experience Advisory Panel is described by the Gambling Commission as “provid expert independent advice based on its members personal lived experience of gambling harms”. Putting aside the issue with this description and lack of members with positive experience (which I have written about previously and was raised by the DCMS Committee on 5 September 2023) why is the new forum not an “Industry Panel” providing “advice” to the Gambling Commission? Plainly, advice is just that and it can be ignored.

Further, as industry lawyers, we have not had any structured engagement with the Gambling Commission for two years since the last Industry Lawyers’ Group meeting in September 2021 (which used to meet once or twice a year) and even that had fairly limited value when the questions raised were not answered for six months.

Whilst we acknowledge, as Andrew Rhodes explained before the DCMS Committee on 5 September 2023, that the Gambling Commission has held more stakeholder engagements in the last year (220 to be precise), it appears to have been selective. In particular, it has excluded certain parts of the British gambling industry, including longstanding, experienced and balanced stakeholders and advisers, including us!

Industry lawyers are an important buffer between the Gambling Commission and applicants/licensees. This is perhaps most obvious in our immersion in compliance and enforcement. The Gambling Commission (in its current form) seems to confuse lawyers being unhelpful with lawyers acting on their clients’ instructions. Nowadays, the latter tends to require us to hold the Gambling Commission to account to comply with its own policies and procedures and the law. We very much hope the establishment of the Industry Forum will prompt the Gambling Commission to take a more strategic and holistic approach, and perhaps create, like other regulators, a framework for stakeholder engagement.

Whilst we are encouraged by the establishment of an Industry Forum, we are disappointed by its delay and remain keen to hear what other plans the Gambling Commission and its leaders have to engage with the industry and its stakeholders.

22Sep

White Paper Series: Regulatory Panel changes – Fair or unfair?

22nd September 2023 Bahar Alaeddini 182

In this blog, we consider the Gambling Commission’s most recent proposals to the Regulatory Panel.

It will not come as a surprise to readers that, as gambling lawyers, we have serious concerns about the proposals to:

use Adjudicators with only a minimum of five years’ post qualification experience (“PQE”); and
change the default from oral hearings to paper-based decisions subject to a fairness test.

Regulatory Panel and its importance

The Regulatory Panel provides an important opportunity for applicants and licensees to attend an oral hearing to challenge decisions made by Gambling Commission staff. It is the only avenue of recourse, outside the expensive options of the First-tier Tribunal and judicial review, when the Gambling Commission is going against you. Whilst we accept it is still, in fact, the Gambling Commission, it is an important accountability mechanism for Gambling Commission employees making decisions under delegated powers. This narrow and non-independent avenue of recourse should not be further eroded.

2020 consultation

On 18 May 2020, the Gambling Commission announced planned changes to its Regulatory Panel, which included: (1) the recruitment and appointment of legally-qualified Adjudicators, solely for the purpose of sitting on the Regulatory Panel with the “presumption” they will also provide legal advice; and (2) reconstituting the quorum as follows: (a) for operating licences: one Commissioner and one Adjudicator; and (b) for personal licences: one Adjudicator.

At the time, we were so concerned by the proposals and that the duty to act fairly was being compromised that we submitted a response to the 2020 consultation and shared it on our blog to assist others in preparing responses.

More than 14 months later, on 21 July 2021, the Gambling Commission published its consultation response which summarised the 22 written responses received from gambling operators, trade associations and others, including Harris Hagan. As explained in our August 2021 blog, The overwhelming majority of respondents disagreed with each of the Gambling Commission’s proposals, with a key concern being that “the independence and impartiality of the Panel would be adversely affected by the proposal to use adjudicators” as outlined in my May 2020 blog.

2023 consultation

The two main proposed changes are:

Quorum and composition

The Regulatory Panel will no longer comprise up to two to three Commissioners, advised by an independent legal adviser. Instead, it will be chaired by a legally qualified Adjudicator sitting alongside one Commissioner and one senior Gambling Commission employee. The Adjudicator would sit alone on case management matters and personal licensing cases.

The main reasons for the proposed change are to improve availability, improve governance and accountability and provide an enhanced skillset for decision making.

Our main concerns are:

Adjudicators will, as proposed in 2020, be employed by the Gambling Commission. In a small feat of victory, we note from the draft Governance Framework (published this time as part of the consultation) the Gambling Commission has acknowledged some of our previous concerns by indicating that Adjudicators’ will be home-based and appraisals will be run by a Commissioner.

Adjudicators will only need a minimum of five years’ PQE. The idea that someone with potentially as little as five years’ PQE would be adjudicating on a £20m fine, suspension or revocation of a licence is frightening. Where is the Gambling Commission’s evidence to support that five years’ PQE is appropriate? How is this a sufficient level of experience, bearing in mind they are likely to have absolutely no experience of gambling and, given their lack of seniority, very minimal experience making unsupervised decisions?

Unlike the 2020 consultation which failed to specifically mention other adjudication frameworks, this time, the Gambling Commission has made fleeting mention to the General Medical Council (regulates medical doctors), Ofqual (regulates qualifications, examinations and assessments) and Solicitors’ Regulation Authority (regulates law firms and solicitors) to support the move to a mixed model of decision-making. We remain wholly unconvinced by the Gambling Commission’s rationale. There are about 90 statutory regulators in the UK and yet the consultation includes no details, or evaluation, of the different models of adjudication and relative advantages and disadvantages (including appeal rates) of each model. Nor is there any reference to the determining factors for the chosen mixed model or the appropriateness of application to the regulation of commercial gambling. As with the 2020 consultation, we are left to assume this is deliberate given many of the other models appear impartial, independent and robust. By way of example, approximately half of the Financial Conduct Authority’s Regulatory Decisions Committee’s 18 members come from finance or financial services backgrounds. The other half have esteemed legal, governance, policy or academic backgrounds. Independence is further emphasised by the FCA handbook stipulation that: (i) none of the members are employees; and (ii) the committee has its own legal advisers and support staff.

The Principles of inspection and enforcement, as set out in Philip Hampton’s Reducing administrative burdens: effective inspection and enforcement report state: “egulators should be accountable for the efficiency and effectiveness of their activities, while remaining independent in the decisions they take setting out a number of core principles of effective regulation – the standard against which all regulators’ performance should be judged.” At a minimum, the Gambling Commission must publish its research into each adjudication model and its evaluation criteria for monitoring the “efficiency and effectiveness” of each model, together with the impact on applicants/licensees.

There is no mention of a trial period of using Adjudicators.

Default of paper decisions

Another proposal is to change the default from oral hearings to paper-based decisions. An oral hearing can be requested by the applicant/licensee; alternatively, the Panel itself may decide it is “required” – using a test of “fairness”, for example, where there are “material and significant disputes of fact”.

The main reasons for this proposed change are to reduce the burden on applicants/licensees particularly where they have unrepresented and find it difficult to navigate, and to increase the promptness of decision making.

Our main concern is that applicants and licensees will be denied the opportunity to bring their arguments to life. What is the test of fairness and why do we need one?

The requirements of fairness are flexible and fact specific. Legal history places huge importance on oral argument and, in our view, with good reason. Over 20 years ago, Lord Justice Laws recognised “oral argument is perhaps the most powerful force there is, in our legal process, to promote a change of mind.” Further, in R (H) v Secretary of State for Justice EWHC 2590 (Admin), Cranston J summarised the legal position in respect of oral hearings as follows:

Procedural fairness sometimes demands an oral hearing. There can be greater confidence with an oral hearing that the relevant standards have been properly applied and that the facts on which the decision is based are accurate. The oral hearing also gives the person affected by the decision the opportunity to tailor the arguments to the concerns of the decision maker.

Another concern is the matter of mutual respect for the Gambling Commission and the applicant/licensee with the latter’s perception of the process being central, as acknowledged in Osborn v Parole Board UKSC 61, in which Lord Reid referred to the principle that:

…justice is intuitively understood to require a procedure which pays due respect to persons whose rights are significantly affected by decisions taken in the exercise of administrative or judicial functions. Respect entails that such persons ought to be able to participate in the procedure by which the decision is made, provided they have something to say which is relevant to the decision to be taken.

We feel strongly that the Gambling Commission’s proposals do not conform to the necessary standards of fairness. The proposed barrier should therefore be removed, and the policy should simply say that an oral hearing can be chosen on request. This will address the Gambling Commission’s main reason for the proposed change whilst still enabling those who want one, a fair hearing.

The consultation cites the stress that the unrepresented applicants/licensees experience in attending hearings as a reason for changing the default to paper decisions. However, there is no mention of how many of the 12 requests, to the Regulatory Panel, last year were unrepresented. The Consultation is silent (no doubt, intentionally) on the introduction of a policy dealing with unrepresented parties.

Concluding thoughts

It is undeniable that the Gambling Commission is a very powerful regulator. How many other UK regulatory authorities can impose limitless fines, commence criminal proceedings and decide to close multi-million pound businesses?

It appears that the Gambling Commission’s primary focus is to cut costs. Inevitably, good decisions will not be made in the public interest, nor will those decisions be made following a fair process. The new proposals will have a far bigger negative impact than announced changes in 2021, which will be implemented at the same time (as amended). The only possible – dim – glimmer of hope is that decisions will or should be quicker. However, if those decisions are of poor quality and unfair, it means that they will be more routinely appealed to the First-tier Tribunal, which will be lengthy, uncertain and expensive. Therefore, any possible benefit gained from quicker decisions will be more than outweighed by the drawbacks.

If we look at the regulatory landscape, the Gambling Commission is proposing to make these significant changes at the same time as it is escalating fines and sanctions.

Effective regulation requires effective accountability, and it seems to us that the Gambling Commission is removing a weakening mechanism which holds the regulator to account for its own policies and procedures and the law.

In conclusion, and repeating the final words from my May 2020 blog, the proposed changes do not offer a practical vision for adjudication that is consistent with good regulatory and legal practice. There is nothing to suggest that fairness has been a consideration. The only consideration appears to be about saving cost, time for the Gambling Commission and Commissioners, and speeding up the process. In doing so, the duty to act fairly has been compromised.

Respond to the consultation

We strongly encourage industry and its stakeholders to respond to the consultation, which closes on 18 October 2023.

22Sep

White Paper Series: Defining the Future VIXIO Webinar

22nd September 2023 Harris Hagan 189

On 15 September 2023, Bahar Alaeddini appeared as a panellist on a VIXIO Regulatory Intelligence (formerly GamblingCompliance) webinar titled “UK White Paper: Defining the Future” together with Tim Miller from the Gambling Commission, Sarah Fox from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and Dan Waugh from Regulus Partners. The panellists had an insightful and lively discussion about some of the proposals in the recent wave of consultations and next steps:

01Sep

Gambling Commission sets its sights on late regulatory returns and incorrect fee categories

1st September 2023 Gemma Boore 176

In its latest E-Bulletin, the Gambling Commission has reminded operators that it is a licence condition (15.3.1 of the Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice) to submit regulatory returns on time.

The update goes on to note that the Gambling Commission is aware that some regulatory returns have been overdue since 1 April 2023, and advises operators to bring these up to date “immediately”.

“Operators who fail to submit returns on time will be escalated to our Enforcement team to consider regulatory action and may result in a financial penalty under section 121 of the Gambling Act 2005.”

This is an important reminder from the Gambling Commission, which should not be taken lightly, and it is clear a tougher approach is now being taken.

Background

Gambling licence holders in Great Britain are required to submit a regulatory return for each type of activity for which they hold a licence.

Depending on licence type, regulatory returns must be submitted on a quarterly or annual basis. Quarterly returns must be submitted within 28 days of the end of each quarterly reporting period. Annual returns must be submitted within 42 days of the end of each annual reporting period.

All returns must be submitted via the online regulatory returns system within the Gambling Commission’s eServices Hub.

The Gambling Commission uses the information to publish bi-annual industry statistics and to inform its understanding of its licensees and the wider gambling industry. The information also helps the Gambling Commission ensure licensees are within the correct fee category for their licensed activities.

An imperfect system

The Gambling Commission publishes information on when and how to submit regulatory returns in its Regulatory Returns Guidance, which is split by licence type.

However, the guidance is simple, and a repetition of what is asked within the regulatory return forms. There is no additional detail as to the type of information that should be captured in the form, and where. The lack of clarity, in our experience, has sometimes resulted in incorrect data being provided with the regulatory returns, or being provided under the wrong licensable activity.

In our experience, licensees often require assistance with the following:

Non-GB revenues – they should only be reported if taking place in reliance on the Gambling Commission operating licence;

B2B online casino revenues that are not revenue shares – the form only allows for GGY (revenue share) to be reported, and not fixed fee revenues, although the Gambling Commission is now aware of this issue from us.

It is important that information provided in regulatory returns is accurate. If a licensee misrepresents or fails to reveal information that it is asked to provide, unless it has a reasonable excuse it will commit an offence under section 342 of the Gambling Act 2005.

Beware exceeding your fee category

Regulatory returns go hand in hand with ensuring a licensee is in the correct fee category and, recently, we have noticed an increase in the Gambling Commission using regulatory returns to identify and contact licensees that it believes have exceeded the upper threshold of their fee categories.

Fee categories are a licence condition, included on the face of an operating licence. Therefore, an application to vary the fee category must be submitted before the upper threshold has been exceeded and it is a licensee’s responsibility to proactively monitor its fee category to ensure the upper threshold is not exceeded.

We urge licensees to routinely consider whether they are approaching the maximum limit of their fee category and whether a change of fee category is warranted. Licensees should be aware that the fee category licence condition follows the licence year, and will not necessarily align with the regulatory returns reporting period.

The process for submitting an application to vary is relatively simple. The applications can be completed through the eServices portal and carry a fee of £40. It is important to note that:

fee category increases by one level do not require any supporting documentation;
fee category increases by two levels or more must be supported by:
- new or updated financial projections;
- new or updated business plan;
- evidence of how the expansion of the business is funded;
decreases in fee categories must be supported by a full explanation.

Gambling Commission working group

In order to address some of the issues with the regulatory returns system, the Gambling Commission has established a working group and is seeking feedback from licensees on the questions currently posed in regulatory returns.

The last time the regulatory returns process was reviewed was in 2020 when, following a Consultation on changes to information requirements in the LCCP, regulatory returns, official statistics, and related matters, the Gambling Commission simplified the regulatory returns processes. In its consultation response, the Gambling Commission also committed: (1) to publish guidance for regulatory returns (which went live on 4 May 2021); and (2) to improve the usability, accessibility and availability of the regulatory returns system.

Three years on, the system is under review again – but it appears there will be no consultation and, consequently, fewer licensees will be aware there is an opportunity to help shape forthcoming improvements.

Next steps

We strongly recommend licensees use the online contact form to tell the Gambling Commission about their concerns with the regulatory returns process, forms and guidance as soon as possible, so they can be improved.

We hope that the working group will use this, as well as our recent feedback on the Gambling Commission’s guidance, to improve the current system.

In the meantime, licensees should also:

submit any outstanding regulatory returns as soon as possible;

endeavour to submit complete and accurate regulatory returns within the timeframes set by the Gambling Commission. The Gambling Commission is taking a much tougher approach and late and/or inaccurate regulatory returns will be referred to the Enforcement Team; and

routinely review whether they are in the correct fee category and, if necessary, submit an application to vary before exceeding the upper threshold of a fee category.

Please get in touch if you have any questions regarding the regulatory returns process and/or if you would like our assistance preparing a regulatory return or changing your fee category.

With credit and sincere thanks to Jessica Wilson for her invaluable co-authorship.

24Aug

Gambling Commission publishes new remote customer interaction guidance

24th August 2023 Adam Russell 189

On 23 August 2023, the Gambling Commission announced that they have published new remote customer interaction guidance in relation to Social Responsibility Code Provision 3.4.3 (“SRCP 3.4.3”) of the Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice.

Context

In April 2022, the Gambling Commission introduced new “stronger and more prescriptive” remote customer interaction requirements for remote gambling operators under SRCP 3.4.3, which tightened the rules on identifying at-risk customers and taking “proportionate timely action to reduce harm”.

At the time, the new remote customer interaction requirements were due to take effect on 12 September 2022 and in June 2022, the Gambling Commission published associated guidance, designed to support compliance with the new requirements under SRCP 3.4.3.

However, to widespread surprise, in September 2022, the Gambling Commission announced their decision to delay the implementation of:

paragraph 3 of SRCP 3.4.3 (“Licensees must consider the factors that might make a customer more vulnerable to experiencing gambling harms and implement systems and processes to take appropriate and timely action where indicators of vulnerability are identified. Licensees must take account of the Commission’s approach to vulnerability as set out in the Commission’s Guidance”);

paragraph 10 of SRCP 3.4.3 (“Licensees must prevent marketing and the take up of new bonus offers where strong indicators of harm, as defined within the licensee’s processes, have been identified”); and

other references in SRCP 3.4.3 to the guidance,

until at least 12 February 2023.

In the intervening time, the regulator decided that it would “be beneficial to use the time now available” to conduct a consultation on the guidance itself.

The consultation on the remote customer interaction guidance closed in January 2023.

The Gambling Commission also announced that, irrespective of the consultation on the guidance, requirement 10 of SRCP 3.4.3 would come into force on 12 February 2023 in any event.

New customer interaction guidance now published

Seven months after the consultation closed, the Gambling Commission have finally published the new remote customer interaction guidance, together with the associated consultation response.

The new remote customer interaction guidance contains various updates to the guidance originally published in June 2022, which we will explore in an upcoming blog.

Remote operators will be required to take into account the new remote customer interaction guidance from 31 October 2023.

In addition, SRCP 3.4.3 requirements:

to take into account the guidance; and

to “consider the factors that might make a customer more vulnerable to experiencing gambling harms and implement systems and processes to take appropriate and timely action where indicators of vulnerability are identified”,

will come into force on the same date.

Next steps

We are closely reviewing the new guidance and consultation response, and will be sharing our analysis and insights in due course.

Please get in touch with us if you would like to discuss this development, or if you would like assistance on drafting/updating your policies and procedures in light of the new guidance.

18Aug

White Paper Series: Gambling Commission’s remote game design proposals – simply following suit?

18th August 2023 Jessica Wilson 194

On 26 July 2023, the Gambling Commission’s opened its first consultation (the “Consultation”) following the White Paper. This included proposals to amend the Remote Gambling and Software Technical Standards (“RTS”) “to reduce the speed and intensity of on online products while making them fairer and increasing consumer understanding about game play”. In the White Paper, Government concluded that products other than slots should be considered to create wider design codes and safer product design standards for other online products. In this blog, we summarise the proposals.

The Gambling Commission last made changes to the RTS in October 2021 when it introduced design requirements for online slots products, including limitations on speed of play, auto-play and the illusion of false wins. In June 2023, the Gambling Commission published a report assessing the impact of those changes, noting that they have “reduced play intensity…and not resulted in harmful unintended consequences”. Tim Miller, Director for Policy and Research, noted that whilst the results are positive, “we aren’t complacent and will continue to monitor this specific part of the sector for both any unintended circumstances, or non-compliance.”

The Gambling Commission made it clear in its response to its consultation regarding slots game design that those changes were “just one step in reducing the risk of harm”. Given the positive outcome from the October 2021 design changes for slots, it is not surprising that requirements for other products are likely to follow suit.

Summary of Gambling Commission proposals:

Proposal 1: Player-led “spin stop” features. Removing features which can speed up play to reduce the harm experienced by consumers who are gambling particularly quickly or intensely

Impact: Amendment of RTS requirement 14E – The gambling system must not permit a customer to reduce the time until the result is presented.

Applies to: all gambling (not just slots).

Proposal 2: 5 second minimum game speed

Impact: New RTS requirement 14G – It must be a minimum of 5 seconds from the time a game is started until the next game cycle can be commenced. It must always be necessary to release and then depress the start button or take equivalent action to commence a game cycle.

Applies to: all casino games (excluding peer to peer poker and slots)

Proposal 3: Prohibition on autoplay extended to all online products

Impact: Replacement of current RTS8. New RTS8 – The gambling system must require a customer to commit to each game cycle individually.

Applies to:all gaming.

Proposal 4: Prohibition of features which may give the illusion of “false wins” extended to all casino products

Impact: Amendment to RTS requirement 14F – The gambling system must not celebrate a return which is less than or equal to the total stake gambled.

Applies to: all casino games (not just slots).

Proposal 5: Prohibition on operators offering the ability to play multiple products simultaneously

Impact: amendment to RTS requirement 14C – The gambling system must not offer functionality which facilitates playing multiple games or products at the same time.

Applies to: gaming (including bingo) and betting on virtual events (not just slots).

Proposal 6: Extending requirement to display elapsed time and net spend

Impact 1: amendment to RTS requirement 13C – The elapsed time should be displayed for the duration of the gaming session.

Impact 2: amendment to RTS requirement 2E – All gaming sessions must clearly display a customer’s net position, in the currency of their account or product since the session started.

Applies to: casino (excluding peer to peer poker) (not just slots).

Proposal 7: Technical update to RTS security requirements to reflect the 2022 update to ISO 27001

Impact 1: the addition of 11 new controls in line with the 2022 update.

Impact 2: the addition of ISO27001 2022 standard section 5.23 regarding information security for use of cloud services as an RTS requirement for security audits.

Applies to: remote operating licensees (excluding betting intermediary) and non-remote gaming machine technical and gambling software operating licensees.

As anticipated, the majority of the proposals aim to align the requirements currently in place for slots with other online gambling products. Given the positive impact of the October 2021 changes, and the important harm minimisation effects, it is unsurprising that the Gambling Commission is taking this approach.

However, we note the Gambling Commission is mindful of the fact that certain online gambling products have different features to slots, and therefore certain RTS requirements cannot have a blanket application across all online products. For example, the Gambling Commission has noted that the majority of games it sampled (including online roulette, blackjack, and live versions of games) have a slower minimum game speed than the 2.5 second restriction applied to slots products. Proposal 2 (to introduce a 5 second minimum game speed) is therefore more reasonable and appropriate than simply extending the current restriction for slots to other products.

Further, in respect of Proposal 6 (display of elapsed time and net spend), the Gambling Commission notes that this should not be a requirement for peer to peer poker as, whilst time spent gambling is a risk factor, poker does not require a customer to be staking every hand to participate, unlike other casino games. The Gambling Commission itself notes that it is “mindful of imposing unnecessary regulatory burden” and we welcome this considered and reasonable approach.

Respond to the consultation

The Gambling Commission is accepting responses until 18 October 2023. We strongly encourage gambling businesses to respond to the Consultation.

Please let us know should you require any assistance preparing a response.

11Aug

White Paper Series: Give your two pounds’ worth on DCMS’ consultation for online slots stake limits

11th August 2023 Chris Biggs 188

The consultation season well and truly began on 26 July 2023, with the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (“DCMS”) publishing the first two of its promised consultations from the White Paper. In this latest edition of our White Paper Series, we discuss DCMS’ proposals and reasoning for a maximum stake limit for online slots games in Great Britain (the “Slots Consultation”) and strongly encourage the industry to respond.

1. Background

As discussed in our previous White Paper Series blog on stake limits, DCMS foreshadowed its reasons for the Slots Consultation in the White Paper.

It noted that slots have the highest average losses per active customer of any online gambling product, the highest number of players, the longest play sessions and the greatest potential for financial harm, due to the velocity at which people can stake, with no statutory limit on the amount they can stake. On the other hand, it was acknowledged that online operators are uniquely able to regularly monitor and scrutinise their customers’ spending on slots and intervene where necessary.

In the end, having considered the evidence available to it, DCMS concluded that reform was necessary. Although evidence of a clear causative relationship was limited, there was sufficient evidence of an association between higher stakes on online slots and identified risks of harm. DCMS determined it was time for change: there would be a consultation in summer 2023 on a stake limit for online slots of between £2 and £15. In addition, DCMS would also consult on a preferred £2 limit for those aged 18 to 24.

2. The proposals – General population

The Slots Consultation has now been published and DCMS has proposed four options for the maximum stake limit which should apply for online slots, seeking opinions on which option “strikes an appropriate balance between preventing harm and preserving consumer freedoms”.

We discuss the options and DCMS’ headline reasoning for each stake limit below:

Option 1 – A maximum online slots stake limit of £2 per spin

The industry knew £2 stake limits were going to be the starting point for the Slots Consultation and unsurprisingly, this option would have the greatest impact on consumers and businesses alike. DCMS recognises that 97% of all individual online slot stakes are below £2. However, up to 35% of players stake over £2 on a single spin at least once a year. Of course, £2 is a relatively low bar especially given that stakes over this threshold contribute to an estimated 18% of annual slots gross gambling yield (“GGY”). Option 1 would therefore have a significant impact on online casino operators and the industry’s GGY broadly.

Option 2 – A maximum online slots stake limit of £5 per spin

A £5 maximum stake per spin, as DCMS notes, is equal to the highest limit currently permitted on any land-based gaming machine.

There may be a superficial attraction to aligning online slots with the limits imposed on their land-based counterparts, but it would not come without a significant impact to the online industry which already has a wider system of safer gambling protections in place. Indeed, DCMS acknowledges this in the White Paper:

“The stake limits already applied to electronic gaming machines in the land-based sector could be a sensible starting point. However, taking an equitable approach to product regulation should take account of the wider system of protections in place online. For instance, the opportunity for data-driven monitoring of online play may justify a higher limit for online products than in relatively anonymous land-based settings.”

DCMS estimates stakes over £5 represent only 0.5% of online slots staking events but represent approximately 7.4% of slots GGY.

Option 3 – A maximum online slots stake limit of £10 per spin

Although a £10 maximum stake per spin is higher than any stakes permitted on a land-based gaming machine, DCMS is considering whether these higher limits are appropriate in the online world given that there are additional protections for online players, who are required to create an account to play and can therefore be more adequately monitored by licensed operators for signs of gambling-related harm (as suggested in the above quote).

This is particularly relevant given that DCMS does not anticipate severe disruptions to the majority of slots players if Option 3 is implemented, noting that 37% of all stakes placed above £10 were made by high and medium risk players.

As we hinted in our previous blog, it is possible DCMS will be drawn to setting £5 (Option 2) as the maximum stake limit for online slots, noting this figure appeared in an earlier leaked version of the White Paper. However, given its acknowledgement in the above quote, we believe DCMS is open to considering evidence-based responses which favour a higher limit. This is of course dependent on the industry submitting compelling evidence-based responses to the Slots Consultation.

Option 4 – A maximum online slots stake limit of £15 per spin

As with Option 1, the industry was aware a £15 stake limit would represent the maximum stake per spin in the Slots Consultation. Broadly, DCMS considers this stake limit would impact only a small minority of “habitually or occasionally high-staking players”, where stakes over £15 represent 0.05% of all stakes on online slots and 2% of GGY. We consider it unlikely that Option 4 is the option that will finally be adopted.

3. The proposals – 18 to 24 year olds

As we previously discussed, the White Paper committed to consulting on additional protections for young adults aged between 18 to 24 years on the basis that this age group may be a “particularly vulnerable cohort”.

The Slots Consultation cites the Gambling Commission’s Advice to Government for the Review of the Gambling Act 2005 in identifying a number of potential factors influencing gambling behaviours in young adulthood, including continuing cognitive development, changing support networks and inexperience with money management. DCMS separately noted that problem gambling rates are highest in the 16 to 24 years age group, according to the Public Health England and Gambling-related harms evidence review of 2019.

Accordingly, the Slots Consultation seeks views on the following three options:

Option A – A maximum online slots stake limit of £2 per spin for 18 to 24 year olds
Option B – A maximum online slots stake limit of £4 per spin for 18 to 24 year olds
Option C – Applying the same maximum stake limit to all adults, but building wider requirements for operators to consider age as a risk factor for gambling-related harm.

In setting out its evidence, DCMS acknowledges that typical online slots stakes for those aged 18 to 24 are lower than for other adult age groups. Data captured between July 2018 to June 2019 indicates the mean stake in this cohort was £1.05 compared to £1.30 across all adults aged 25 and over, and DCMS cites data indicating the age group’s average stake is 20% lower than the average for all adults (according to Patterns of Play).

In respect of the specific limits proposed in Options A and B, DCMS does not cite data that specifically indicates either maximum stake limit would be best suited to this age group. The reasoning simply appears to be that as a potentially vulnerable cohort, there should be extra protections in place, i.e. lower maximum stake limits than those for the general population.

Option C would of course be the least intrusive option for operators and their customers, and any action required of operators would likely align with the Gambling Commission’s consultation on, and likely increase to, the requirements for operators to check customers’ individual financial circumstances in respect of indicators that their losses are harmful. Watch out for more on this in a forthcoming White Paper Series blog.

4. DCMS data and considerations

The status quo

In the Slots Consultation, DCMS cites Gambling Commission data in summarising the best available statistics about current slots play, set out below:

Furthermore, DCMS sets out staking behaviour for the 2022/23 financial year (representing more than 76 billion spins) which it uses to underpin its consideration of the likely impact of each maximum stake limit:

(The estimated % of slots GGY in Figure 2 assumes that all slots games have a 95% return to player and the distribution of spend within each bucket is modelled as non-linear.)

Aside from the sheer scale of online slots activity in the last financial year, the data presented in the Slots Consultation (including that shown in the above two figures) breathes life into DCMS’ proposals which, if we return to first principles, have been drafted in order to address the fact that there is evidence of a relationship between higher staking on slots and gambling-related harm.

By removing the ability for an arguably very small proportion of slots players to stake high(er) amounts on slots, will this aim be achieved? From the above data, we can see that most online slots spins from the last financial year would not be impacted by any of the proposed stake limits. However, the changes would result in a significant reduction in the industry’s GGY (we discuss this in further detail below).

Potential impact

So, has an appropriate balance been struck? Whilst we do not think there is a straightforward answer to this question (hence DCMS releasing the Slots Consultation), the potential impact of each of the options considered are set out in DCMS’ Online Slots Stake Limit Impact Assessment (the “Impact Assessment”), published alongside the Slots Consultation.

Interestingly, the Impact Assessment models the estimated reduction in annual GGY in the industry for each option considered in Slots Consultation, as follows:

To summarise this data, the Impact Assessment suggests that there will be an estimated reduction in the current annual online slots GGY of between 0.5% to 13.8%, ranging in real terms, from a £16.1m to £413.5m reduction in revenue annually.

Aside from the costs to business, the Impact Assessment also sets out the potential benefits of the maximum stake limits and shares the associated assumptions that DCMS made in coming to these conclusions. It is particularly worth noting that DCMS acknowledges it is difficult to accurately estimate gambling harm reduction from stake limits, stating:

“Gambling harm is complex and often the result of numerous factors both within and external to the actual gambling environment. It would be difficult to isolate the causal mechanism between staking at various levels (that will no longer be available) and the reduction in gambling harm.”

However, it goes on to note that there are clear, qualitative benefits to the stake limits for both the customer and the public sector. To pick a crucial example, the Impact Assessment identifies that each stake limit will have an impact on a customer’s risk of incurring runaway losses, and suffering gambling harm as a result of these losses.

Additionally, public sector benefits would include potential reductions in costs incurred by the public sector in respect of harmful gambling costs which include:
a) Primary care mental health services, secondary mental health services, and hospital inpatient services;
b) Job seekers allowance claimant costs and lost labour tax receipts;
c) Statutory homelessness applications; and
d) Incarceration costs.

We encourage all licensees and stakeholders to review the Impact Assessment, in addition to the Slots Consultation, for a closer look at the estimated costs and benefits of the proposed stake limits and to better inform views on where the balance between protection from harm and consumer freedom lies.

5. Responding to the Slots Consultation

The Slots Consultation will be open for responses for eight weeks only, until 11:55pm on 20 September 2023. Responses can be submitted through DCMS’ online survey, or as a Word or PDF document to [email protected]. DCMS is encouraging evidence from all parties who have an interest in the way gambling is regulated in Great Britain, including any international evidence.

Following the consultation period, DCMS will publish a formal response setting out its decisions in relation to the maximum stake limit proposals and its reasoning, as well as a final impact assessment, before implementing the changes. Changes will likely be made by way of the introduction of secondary legislation, e.g. the creation of a new licence condition for Gambling Commission licensees.

In the short time before the Slots Consultation closes, we strongly encourage all licensees and other stakeholders to consider the impact the proposals would have on their businesses and respond with evidence-based submissions. Now is the opportunity to influence positive change for consumer protection whilst tempering a potentially damaging blow to the commercial viability of the online slots industry in Great Britain.

Please get in touch with us if you would like assistance with preparing a response to this or any other DCMS and Gambling Commission consultations.
With thanks to Gemma Boore for her invaluable co-authorship.

03Aug

White Paper Series: Direct marketing and cross-selling in the crossfire

3rd August 2023 Gemma Boore 204

Welcome back to Harris Hagan’s White Paper Series of articles.

We have previously discussed the UK Government’s proposals relating to gambling sponsorship (see our previous White Paper Series article on sponsorship).

In this article, we outline changes proposed in the Gambling Commission’s Summer 2023 consultation regarding direct marketing and cross-selling (the “DM Consultation”), which was published on 26 July 2023 and will remain open for 12 weeks, closing 18 October 2023. We then contrast these proposals with the UK Government’s recommendations in the White Paper: High stakes: gambling reform for the digital age regarding direct marketing and cross-selling. Finally, we explain how, if implemented, the Gambling Commission’s proposals would change current privacy and direct marketing laws, and how they apply to the gambling industry as a whole.

1. Background

In Chapter 2 of the White Paper, which deals with marketing and advertising, tougher restrictions on bonuses and direct marketing are one of the key reforms proposed by the Government. In the introduction to the chapter, the Government confirms that it recognises that online bonus offers can present risk, particularly for those experiencing gambling harm. In order to mitigate this risk, one of the key recommendations in Chapter 2 is that the Gambling Commission consult on strengthening consent for direct marketing, with the aim to give customers more choice in terms of the marketing they receive and how.

According to the White Paper, the proposal to strengthen consent for direct marketing is in addition to what the White Paper refers to as (emphasis added):

“the forthcoming introduction of requirements to not target any direct marketing at those showing strong indicators of risk, as outlined in the Gambling Commission’s requirement 10.”

For those in the know, this rather cryptic/confusing reference is to Requirement 10 of social responsibility code provision (“SRCP”) 3.4.3 of the Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice (“LCCP”), which reads as follows (emphasis added again):

“Licensees must prevent marketing and the take up of new bonus offers where strong indicators of harm, as defined within the licensee’s processes, have been identified.”

Requirement 10, which is now in force, was originally due to come into effect on 12 September 2022 alongside the Gambling Commission’s revised Remote Customer Interaction Guidance (“RCI Guidance”). However, to widespread surprise, the Gambling Commission delayed the implementation of Requirement 10 to 12 February 2023 and decided at the last minute to consult on the RCI Guidance before it came into effect.

The subsequent Consultation on Remote Customer Interaction (the “RCI Consultation”) was launched on 22 November 2022 and open for only six weeks (subsequently extended to nine) instead of the traditional 12. Eight months later, the RCI Guidance is still not in effect and the Gambling Commission has yet to publish a response to the RCI Consultation.

It is therefore confusing that the White Paper (published on 27 April 2023):

links to the not-yet introduced RCI Guidance when it refers to Requirement 10;
refers to the Requirement 10 as “forthcoming”; and
suggests that Requirement 10 applies where there are “strong indicators of risk” (not “strong indicators of harm”, the latter being the language of both SRCP 3.4.3 and the RCI Guidance).

It is also perplexing that the Gambling Commission has chosen to publish the DM Consultation before the RCI Consultation, despite promising the contrary at IAGA’s 40^th Annual Gaming Summit in Belfast.

For further analysis on the RCI Consultation (which we now have no idea when the response to which will be received), please see our five-part series of articles with Regulus Partners. available here: Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4 and Part 5.

Back to the topic at hand: Direct marketing. In the White Paper, the Government sets out a number of proposed principles for the Gambling Commission to explore through the DM Consultation, set out below:

At first blush, these appear on balance to be sensible suggestions that broadly build upon principles in existing privacy and direct marketing laws; we discuss this in further detail below.

More recently, in a pre-briefing to selected industry stakeholders on 5 July 2023, the Gambling Commission used its own terminology/short hand to describe the areas upon which the DM Consultation would focus:

Finally, on 26 July 2023, the Gambling Commission published its first summer consultation, a copy of which is available here:

Download the DM Consultation

Below, we:

explain the current legal position in relation to each of the principles identified by the Government in the White Paper as requiring reform;
(attempt to) link the White Paper principles to the Gambling Commission’s proposal, as set out in the DM Consultation, to add a new SRCP to the LCCP regarding direct marketing preferences (“SRCP 5.1.12”); and
finally, share our views on possible implementation issues, timelines, practicalities and direct costs that may impact the industry should SRCP 5.1.12 come into force in its current form – with the aim to help respondents shape their own responses to the DM Consultation.

For ease of reference, the proposed wording for SRCP 5.1.12 is set out below:

“Applies to: All licences
SR Code – 5.1.12 – Direct marketing preferences
Licensees must provide customers with options to opt-in to direct marketing on a per product and per channel basis. The options must cover all products and channels provided by the licensee and be set to opt-out by default. These options must be offered as part of the registration process and be updateable should customers’ change their preference. This requirement applies to all new and existing customers.
Channel options must include email, SMS, notification, social media (direct messages), post, phone call and a category for any other direct communication method, as applicable.
Product options must include betting, casino, bingo, and lottery, as applicable. Operators must make clear to customers which products they offer are covered under relevant categories.
Where an operator seeks an additional step for consumers to confirm their chosen marketing preferences, the structure and wording of that step must be presented in a manner which only asks for confirmation to progress those choices with one click to proceed. There must be no encouragement or option to change selection; only the option to accept or decline their selection.
Customers must not receive direct marketing that contravenes their channel or product preferences.”

If you would like our assistance responding to the DM Consultation, please contact Gemma Boore or your usual contact in the Harris Hagan team.

2. Analysis

Principle A in the White Paper: Opt-in to marketing and offers should be clear and separate options at sign‑up, not bundled with other consent such as broader terms and conditions and privacy policy.

What is the current legal position?

As rightly noted in the White Paper, there are already clear requirements that operators must seek informed and specific consent to send direct marketing to consumers. These are outlined in the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (“PECR”) and UK General Data Protection Regulation, as implemented by the Data Protection Act 2018 (“UK GDPR”) – both enforced by the Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”).

The current legal position can be broken down as follows:

PECR requires that, subject to limited exceptions, specific prior consent must be obtained to send direct marketing to individuals by electronic communication (e.g. emails, calls and texts – NB. this does not include non-electronic methods of communication, this will be important later on).
According to ICO guidance, the best way to obtain valid consent is to ask customers to tick opt-in boxes confirming they are happy to receive marketing calls, texts or emails from you.
Consent is defined in the EU General Data Protection Regulation (“EU GDPR”) (which was transposed into national law by UK GDPR following Brexit) as “any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her” .
To put things simply, the implementation of EU GDPR significantly strengthened the concept of consent for the purposes of PECR and meant that many companies needed to refresh consents previously obtained for direct marketing as they did not meet EU GDPR’s new higher threshold of consent. This was typically because existing consents had not been freely given (e.g. they were obtained in order to gain an incentive, such as an entry into a competition); were not specific enough (e.g. they did not specify who would send the marketing, or what type of marketing would be sent); or had been obtained by means of a pre-ticked box during sign up (which does not involve an affirmative action by the customer – rather, it requires inaction).
There is however, one key exception in PECR to the requirement to obtain consent to direct electronic marketing and this is known as the “soft opt-in”.
Broadly, the soft opt-in means that you do not need to obtain consent when you’re sending marketing emails or texts to offer similar goods or services to your customers or prospective customers. The example given in the ICO guidance is that “if a customer buys a car from you and gives you their contact details, you’d only be able to market to them things that relate to the car eg offering services or MOTs”.
To rely on the soft opt-in, you must give the customer a simple opportunity to refuse or opt out of the marketing, both when first collecting the details and in every message after that.

As can be seen from the above, there is an argument that the second limb of Principle A (i.e. consent should not be bundled with other consent such as broader terms and conditions and privacy policies) does not alter the current legal position. The higher threshold of consent to direct electronic marketing is already required and has been since 25 May 2018 (when EU GDPR came into force). It would be very difficult to argue that marketing consents bundled with consent to, for example, terms & conditions or privacy notices are “freely given, specific, informed or unambiguous” – and any gambling operators engaging in this practice are already at risk of enforcement action from the ICO. So, what did the Government want the Gambling Commission to change?

What is proposed in the DM Consultation?

SRCP 5.1.12 proposes new specific requirements for licensees to offer all customers (not just new) more granular consent options (per channel and per product) – with consent options set to opt-out by default (i.e. not pre-ticked). There is no exception to this rule, i.e. gambling companies will no longer be able to rely upon the soft opt-in. Arguably, this does not change the high bar of consent that is already required under UK GDPR and PECR (as intimated by the Gambling Commission’s pre-briefing); rather, it removes an exception to the high bar of consent which otherwise applies to all other commercial businesses in the UK.

Turning to the first limb of Principle A (i.e. opt-in to marketing and offers being clear and separate options at sign-up), this indicated that the Government wanted to give consumers more choice in terms of whether they receive (i) marketing and/or (ii) offers.

The Government’s commentary regarding submissions in the call for evidence from people suffering from gambling harms sheds some light on what was intended here:

“Submissions from people with personal experience of gambling harms elaborated on the negative effects which can come from… …direct marketing and inducements. These ranged from feeling ‘spammed’ by the volume of marketing, including in forms such as push notifications that they had not intentionally agreed to; to continuing to receive marketing even after an operator had removed them from offers due to the risk of harm and receiving promotions via email during periods of abstinence which triggered a relapse.”

It appears the Government is distinguishing between marketing of a service, on one hand (for example, provision on odds for sporting events or new casino games by email, text or push notification); from the provision of incentives such as free bets or bonus offers, on the other.

Surprisingly, there is no equivalent reference to this distinction in the DM Consultation.

What could possibly go wrong?

If operators can no longer rely upon the soft opt-in exception, this would:

significantly alter current practices whereby operators and affiliates have to date, in line with current rules, sent (e.g.) marketing emails and texts to customers offering similar services;
result in operators and affiliates needing to seek fresh consent from millions of individuals that have not actively opted-out to marketing – potentially losing huge tranches of customer databases in the process; and
mean gambling would stand alone – in terms of being the only commercial industry in which express consent is always required in order to send electronic marketing.

These changes are likely to have a huge impact on big and small operators alike, as well as the affiliates that send direct marketing on their behalf – each of which are likely to have spent significant time and money curating their customer databases lawfully since EU GDPR, often by relying on the soft opt-in.

And when would this momentous change take place? The Gambling Commission notes that preferences to receive offers would need to “be reconfirmed in a new format”, implying that fresh consent must be obtained in order to be able to continue marketing to customer databases after a certain date. Will this be the case from a hard-stop date, or will an operator be permitted to send marketing until its customer is next presented with the option to reconfirm preferences (e.g. the next time they sign in) – meaning that some customers will forever lie in limbo, receiving marketing but never confirming that they no longer wish to receive it?

The Gambling Commission’s commentary in the DM Consultation regarding the process for existing customers suggests that the latter option may indeed be the case:

“We are proposing that, if introduced, licensees must direct customers to the webpage or area of the site/app where they can decide whether to opt in to offers or not at the first opportunity after implementation date, for example upon next login.”

Either way, refreshing consent for all soft opted-in customers (or, in the worst-case scenario, all customers), will undeniably result in a huge number of customers that are currently receiving marketing with no objections, suddenly being suppressed from marketing lists – and consequential loss of revenue for operators and affiliates.

How many of those customers will expressly opt back in with each operator, for each product and for each channel – surely only a proportion…. was this what is intended? A clean start for the population as a whole – so those who wish to receive gambling marketing can, once again, choose to receive the (metaphorical) filth and the remaining population (who must have either gambled or opted into marketing at some point if they are currently receiving marketing – after all, EU GDPR did happen) can be spared? Was this really what the Government intended in the White Paper or the Gambling Commission’s way of quashing gambling advertising to the greatest extent possible, despite the Government’s conclusion that it could not find a causal link between advertising and gambling harms or the development of a gambling disorder?

Finally – although those in the pro-gambling camp may not wish to highlight this in their response – no commentary on the DM Consultation would be complete without acknowledging the lack of mention of the Government’s recommendation that opt-ins to marketing and offers should be clear and separate options at sign‑up. Although this may be a relief for the industry (who might want to distinguish consent for incentives vs generic marketing), what does it say about the Gambling Commission’s ability to transpose the UK Government’s recommendations into enforceable, realistic and practical requirements? Playing devil’s advocate, it is of course, possible that the Gambling Commission plans to save this final treat for its forthcoming consultation on free bets and bonus offers, which is due later this year.

We can but “watch this space”.

Principle B in the White Paper: Customers should be able to change preferences at any time through their account settings.

What is the current legal position?

The right to withdraw consent is entrenched under EU GDPR. Article 7(3) provides that the “data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time” and “It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent”.

Similarly, and as noted above, those seeking to send direct electronic marketing without obtaining consent under the soft opt-in must be given a simple opportunity to refuse or opt out of the marketing, both when first collecting the details and in every message after that.

The question is therefore how the DM Consultation was intended to build on current legal requirements.

Some light is shed on the issue by the following commentary in the White Paper:

“…a recent behavioural audit of popular online gambling operators found there was usually extra friction associated with unsubscribing from communications, including ‘scarcity messages’ to discourage consumers from doing so.”

This audit, which was conducted by the Behaviour Insights Team (“BIT”), cited various examples of ‘dark patterns’ used by gambling operators. Dark patterns are techniques used to encourage or compel users into taking certain actions, potentially against their wishes.

From a marketing perspective, the dark patterns identified in BIT’s audit included emotional messaging (e.g. making the customer feel guilty about wanting to unsubscribe) and false hierarchies (e.g. making buttons that the operator wants the customer to press brighter, more colourful, or easier to find, than for example, an unsubscribe button).

What is proposed in the DM Consultation?

SRCP 5.1.12 requires that options to opt-in for direct marketing must be offered to customers as part of the registration process and be “updateable” if customers want to change their preferences.

In addition, the Gambling Commission acknowledges the results of the BIT audit in the preamble to the DM Consultation and cites an example of one operator seeking confirmation when a customer opted-out of marketing in a way which appeared designed to introduce a fear of missing out on offers. In its commentary, the Gambling Commission notes that:

“While seeking a confirmation could be useful to ensure preferences haven’t been accidentally altered, any accompanying message shouldn’t be aimed at discouraging the player’s choice.”

This led to the following (slightly long-winded and very specific) requirement in SRCP 5.1.12:

“Where an operator seeks an additional step for consumers to confirm their chosen marketing preferences, the structure and wording of that step must be presented in a manner which only asks for confirmation to progress those choices with one click to proceed. There must be no encouragement or option to change selection; only the option to accept or decline their selection.”

What could possibly go wrong?

The first requirement for preferences to be “updateable” is of course, an extension of the White Paper’s explicit suggestion that customers should be able to change marketing preferences at any time via account settings. This practice of course, already being common within the industry (not least because the right to withdraw consent is a fundamental concept of EU and UK GDPR) – but not a specific requirement under the LCCP. By incorporating such a requirement into the LCCP as a SRCP, compliance will be a condition of licences and in the event of breach, the Gambling Commission will have the right to take enforcement action, as well as the ICO.

The second requirement, introduced to prevent operators from encouraging customers not to unsubscribe from marketing, in our view, feels a little short-sighted. Rather than limiting such a restriction to additional steps in the unsubscription process, the Gambling Commission could have sought to prohibit the use of dark patterns in direct marketing completely, potentially by publishing new guidance.

By side stepping the issue, SRCP 5.1.12 addresses only one of the problems identified by BIT in its audit. This means that the use of other dark patterns may continue to permeate gambling marketing following the implementation of the White Paper and beyond. For example, in terms of emotional messaging or false hierarchies in other parts of the customer consent journey or within direct marketing messages themselves (rather than just on one page that confirms a customer’s request to unsubscribe).

Principle C in the White Paper. Operators must offer the opportunity to opt-in and out of different forms of communication (e.g. text vs email vs push notifications).

What is the current legal position?

The position under PECR is best summarised in the ICO’s Direct Marketing Guidance, which states (emphasis added) that:

“When using opt-in boxes, organisations should remember that to comply with PECR they should provide opt-in boxes to obtain specific consent for each type of electronic marketing they want to undertake (eg automated calls, faxes, texts or emails). Best practice would be to also provide similar opt-in boxes for marketing calls and mail.”

The ICO goes on to give the following example of good practice:

Push notifications and direct messages on social media are not mentioned in the ICO’s Direct Marketing Guidance, but it follows that specific consent should also be obtained to these channels as they are examples of electronic marketing.

According to the White Paper, the Government is not convinced that the granular level of channel consent required by PECR is being obtained across the industry as a whole:

“When signing up, many major operators offer only an ‘all or nothing’ approach where a user is either unsubscribed from all marketing or provides consent to all communications.”

It follows that the DM Consultation would explore the need to reiterate current PECR requirements, by mandating that specific consent is obtained to each channel that will be used for direct electronic marketing.

What is proposed in the DM Consultation?

As drafted, SRCP 5.1.12 requires that licensees must provide customers with options to opt-in to direct marketing on a per-channel basis. Specifically:

“Channel options must include email, SMS, notification, social media (direct messages), post, phone call and a category for any other direct communication method, as applicable.”

What could possibly go wrong?

While we knew it was very likely (if not a certainty) that the DM Consultation would consult on requiring the industry to obtain specific, granular consent for electronic marketing channels such as email, SMS and by extension, push notifications and direct messages on social media; we are surprised that the Gambling Commission is also considering requiring prior consent to marketing by telephone or post. It is surprising because neither of these channels are currently subject to consent requirements in PECR – rather, the ICO refers to options to opt out of these channels as being “best practice”.

As is the case with the removal of the soft opt-in, this change will mean the gambling industry stands alone in the UK as the only commercial industry in which consent is required to send marketing by post or live phone call. Is this not perhaps, a step beyond what was intended by the Government in the White Paper? If we turn back to Principle C in the White Paper, it is notable that this mentions text, email and push notifications only. Did the Government really think new restrictions should also apply to live phone calls and post – or is this another example of the Gambling Commission exceeding its remit and seeking to further suppress gambling advertising even when the Government has concluded there is a lack of conclusive evidence of a relationship between gambling advertising and harm?

Finally, respondents will note that there is a question in the DM Consultation regarding whether the category “any other direct communication method” future proofs SRCP 5.1.12. In our view, this does indeed have the effect of future proofing the provision but, in the same way as the references to “post” and “phone call” in SRCP 5.1.12 extend consent requirements beyond PECR, the catch-all category will also extend it to all other present and future non-electronic methods of communication. For example, a face-to-face conversation with a gambler in a casino, bingo hall, betting shop, racecourse – or even on the street.

Once again, is this really what is intended and if it is, how does one obtain consent to having a conversation with someone without any communication in the first place? In our view, in order to be practical, prevent inadvertent breach by licensees and reduce the current (perhaps unintended?) regulatory creep, SRCP 5.1.12 should be restricted to the types of electronic communication for which prior consent to direct marketing is already required under PECR (e.g. texts, fax, emails, automated phone calls etc).

Principle D in the White Paper. Customers should be given the option to opt-in to bonuses and promotional offers separately from other marketing, and to set controls regarding which products they receive offers on. Specifically, there should be no ‘cross-selling’ without user opt-in.

What is the current legal position?

Please see our analysis of Principle A above, for a discussion regarding the distinction between incentives and generic marketing – and conclusion that Government’s recommendation to these two forms of marketing be distinguished for consumers has not come to fruition in the DM Consultation.

With regard to cross-selling (which is the practice of marketing a product (e.g. casino) to a customer that is actively participating in another product (e.g. bingo)), it is important to remember that consent under UK GDPR must be freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous.

The “specific” and “informed” aspects of this definition suggest that the practice of cross-selling different products and services could prove difficult when express consent is relied upon. If an individual has agreed to receive marketing regarding online bingo, they would not expect to receive marketing regarding sports betting opportunities, for example.

The soft opt-in exception to PECR however, is more permissive. In this case, marketing emails or texts regarding similar goods or services can be sent to customers without express consent being obtained in advance. According to the ICO’s Direct Marketing Guidance, the key question when determining whether products are similar is whether the customer would reasonably expect messages about the product or service in question.

In the White Paper, the Government revealed that it was particularly concerned regarding cross-selling practices in the industry. It noted that although causality between problem gambling and gambling on multiple products was not clear, various pieces of evidence presented to it revealed troubling findings:

“the number of different gambling activities individuals participate in is a risk factor for harmful gambling in young people, and that participating in seven or more gambling activities was associated with harmful gambling in adults.”

“engagement with multiple activities is associated with harm, raising important questions about the appropriateness of operators actively encouraging customers to expand their repertoire, particularly to those products associated with a higher problem gambling rate such as online slots.”

The White Paper goes on to recommend that there should be an increased level of customer choice around whether customers receive promotional offers and if so, what kind of offers and for which products.

The key question for the Gambling Commission to consider was therefore, how granular should any such requirement be? Marketing of (i) online slots to horse racing bettors; or (ii) online bingo to sports bettors (being the two examples given in the White Paper) are obvious examples that are likely to require separate consent going forward. But what about marketing online slots to land-based slots customers or marketing online poker to customers that play other card games online?

What is proposed in the DM Consultation?

The Gambling Commission appears to have gone for the easy option here. It has proposed, in new SRCP 5.1.12, that licensees provide customers with options to opt-in to direct marketing on a per product basis. Specifically:

“Product options must include betting, casino, bingo, and lottery, as applicable. Operators must make clear to customers which products they offer are covered under relevant categories.”

For clarity, examples of products that fall into these broad categories are set out in the preamble to the proposal:

“…the betting option includes virtual betting, gambling on betting exchanges, betting on lottery products as well as all real event betting. Casino includes slots, live casino, poker and all casino games. Bingo includes only games offered in reliance on a bingo licence e.g., not casino products. Lottery covers any lottery product offered in reliance on a lottery licence.”

What could possibly go wrong?

The Gambling Commission’s decision to broadly categorise all gambling products into four pots: (i) betting, (ii) casino, (iii) bingo and (iv) lottery, will be welcome news for marketing teams. By grouping the wide array of potential gambling products so broadly, there will still be many opportunities for cross-selling within each stand-alone category.

To provide some colour – although it will no longer be possible to market slot games to sports bettors – operators with diverse product offerings will still be able to cross-sell a wide range of products. For example:

someone receiving marketing about sports betting could be sent opportunities to bet fixed odds on the weather, politics, lotteries or virtual events – or even match bet other users on a betting exchange;
someone receiving marketing about slot games could be shown games such as keno, poker, roulette, baccarat or any of the other wide array of games in the casino family;
someone receiving marketing about lotteries could be offered scratch cards to raise money for the same, or a similar, good cause.

In each case, these communications could be sent without prior specific consent – provided the customer consented to receive direct marketing regarding the wider category of products. Arguably, such consent may have been given in the first place, with the expectation that direct marketing would be sent regarding products that the customer was already actively using only (e.g. sports betting offers for sports bettors; free stakes for slot game players etc.) – this will no longer be the case.

We query whether in fact, this change chips away at – rather than extends – the high bar of consent currently required by PECR.

3. Conclusion

In this article, we have delved into the proposals in the DM Consultation regarding direct marketing and given you, the reader, our high-level observations on some of the issues that may arise if SRCP 5.1.12 is introduced in its current form, without amendment. This is, however, just the consultation phase and the Gambling Commission has released the proposed wording for SRCP 5.1.12 with the stated intention (whether or not honourable) of collating feedback from interested stakeholders before making a final decision on how to proceed.

In the short time before the consultation closes on 18 October 2023, we urge you to consider (and if possible, investigate) the impact that SRCP 5.1.12 would, as drafted, have on your business. If the industry is to positively influence the consultation process, it is imperative that it engages by submitting evidence-based and fully considered responses. The more voices that are heard, the more likely the Gambling Commission is to take into account feedback on its proposals and, if appropriate, adjust them to better reflect the recommendations made by the Government in the White Paper and hopefully, reduce the likelihood of unintended consequences.

The time has officially come to speak now – or forever hold your peace. Please get in touch with us if you would like assistance responding to any of the Gambling Commission or DCMS consultations.

05Jul

White Paper Series: Gambling sponsorship of sport – a modern endemic or just the weapon du jour in political warfare?

5th July 2023 Chris Biggs 198

Twenty years after the first partnership between a Premier League football team and a gambling company, the Premier League clubs released a statement on 13 April 2023 confirming that they had “collectively agreed to withdraw gambling sponsorship from the front of clubs’ matchday shirts…” with the aim to reduce the prominence of gambling sponsorship in the Premier League from the end of the 2025/26 season (the “Voluntary Ban”).

Two weeks later, the UK Government released its White Paper High stakes: gambling reform for the digital age, in which the Government commended the Voluntary Ban and also endorsed the creation of a new cross-sport gambling sponsorship code (the “Sponsorship Code of Conduct”) to ensure sponsorship deals are socially responsible.

Critically, however, the White Paper did not – despite calls to the contrary from anti-gambling campaigners – ban gambling sponsorship of sports. For many, this raised eyebrows and prompted the question: did the Premier League and the Government go far enough?

Some say not. Indeed, in the most recent survey by the Football Supporters Association (the “FSA”), 73.1% (nearly three quarters) of respondents agreed with the statement:

“I am concerned about the amount of gambling advertising and sponsorship in football.”

In this White Paper Series blog, we delve deeper into the Voluntary Ban and the Sponsorship Code of Conduct and consider the effectiveness of these methods of self-regulation.

1. Background

The liberalisation of gambling advertising was one of the major changes introduced by the Gambling Act 2005 (the “2005 Act”). Before the 2005 Act, only bingo and lotteries were permitted to advertise on television. Since then the landscape has shifted significantly and gambling marketing, including by means of sponsorship, has become both highly visible and lucrative. Gambling brands provided 12% of sports sponsorship revenue according to a 2019 estimate.

Aside from horse racing and greyhound racing, which have integral links to betting, gambling sponsors are most strongly present in top-tier football, where 8 out of 20 Premier League teams in the 2022/23 season had a front-of-shirt gambling sponsor and all teams had an ‘official betting partner’. In smaller sports such as darts and snooker, a substantial amount of sponsorship revenue also comes from gambling operators.

Potentially as a result of its visibility and the associated revenue, the questions on sponsorship in the call for evidence published by the Government in preparation for its production of the White Paper attracted a high number of responses, with strongly polarised views. Industry stakeholders (as well as representatives of sectors that benefit from gambling advertising, such as broadcasters and sports governing bodies) broadly took the view that the current regulatory regime was fit for purpose. These respondents also emphasised the contributions that gambling revenue makes to other sectors.

In contrast, many other respondents (particularly across the health, charity and academic sectors) argued that gambling advertising was in need of significant reform, with several stakeholders in this group advocating a complete sponsorship ban. Many of these responses expressed concern regarding the link between sports and gambling and a common theme was the need for a ‘precautionary’ approach to the regulation of advertising, arguing that the absence of evidence of harm must not be treated as evidence of an absence of harm.

In the end, the Government concluded that although the limited high‑quality evidence they received on sport sponsorship indicated that it does have a level of impact on gambling behaviour, this was not as marked as for other forms of marketing (such as seeing gambling advertising online or receiving direct marketing) and it was these latter advertising mediums that should be subject to reform following consultation – and we will discuss the proposed reforms in these areas in a later blog.

Returning to sports sponsorship, the White Paper commended the steps taken voluntarily by the industry and other regulators to date, including the Voluntary Ban, sports governing bodies’ agreement to adopt the Sponsorship Code of Conduct and the introduction of the strong appeal test by the Advertising Standards Authority (the “ASA”); as well as the ASA’s recent high profile enforcement action in relation to the strong appeal test (which we have previously discussed) – but did not recommend the introduction of any more draconian measures to curb the prevalence of gambling sponsorship of sports.

The Voluntary Ban and the Sponsorship Code of Conduct appear therefore to have been well-timed pre-emptive strikes for self-regulation, but will they go far enough?

2. Voluntary Ban – the toothless tiger?

It is without doubt that the Voluntary Ban is a positive step in the right direction by the Premier League. The reduction of children’s exposure to gambling by way of sponsorship, advertising or otherwise is, as the Secretary of State Lucy Frazer noted in her speech to Parliament unveiling the White Paper, a key motivation of both sides of Parliament and the industry as a whole:

“We must do more, which is why we are taking steps to make gambling illegal, in many forms, for under-18s. I welcome the Premier League’s announcement on banning gambling advertising from the front of shirts. Footballers are role models for our children, and we do not want young people to advertise gambling on the front of their shirts…”

The Government’s decision not to recommend further measures to reduce gambling sponsorship of sports (and specifically, football) has not, however, come without scepticism. During the unveiling of the White Paper, several members of Parliament questioned the effectiveness of the Voluntary Ban and criticised the Government’s decision not to take further action. Below we consider some of these arguments and ask whether the Voluntary Ban has actually gone far enough.

First and foremost, it is undeniable that the Voluntary Ban will, once it is implemented, be an important step in reducing the prevalence of gambling advertising to children, for example in football sticker albums that are directly marketed to children. However, the ban does not come into force until the end of the 2025/26 season (theoretically permitting three more football seasons and associated sticker collections with front of shirt sponsorship, at the time of writing) and even when it does come into force, the Voluntary Ban does not extend to the backs of matchday shirts nor other parts of the playing kit. Indeed, the sceptics amongst us will probably expect to see a sea of sleeves adorned with gambling logos in 2026/27.

The second point to note is that shirts (front or otherwise) really are the tip of the iceberg of gambling sponsorship. In the absence of significant reform (for example, in the Sponsorship Code of Conduct, discussed below), we can expect to continue to see gambling sponsorship on pitchside hoardings and structures within football stadiums that are visible to the crowd and/or those watching the match broadcast on television or online.

Thirdly, the Voluntary Ban applies to the Premier League only – lower divisions in the English Football League will be free to continue to accept sponsorship, including on the fronts of shirts – from gambling operators if they choose.

The final argument raised during the Parliamentary debate was that, without a firm stance from the Government, the Premier League could change its tune and reduce the extent of the Voluntary Ban or reverse it entirely. This is of course, an inherent risk of advocating reform by means of self-regulation by an industry – the industry retains control but this risk is countered by the fact that self-regulation is invariably the quickest method to achieve change. During the debate, the Government countered the possibility that the Premier League would subsequently change its position with the reassurance that it “made position very clear to the Premier League” regarding the action it ought to be taking, and it will take any further steps as necessary in the event of further research into the issue.

3. Make the code, not war

In comparison, the Sponsorship Code of Conduct remained largely outside the focus of the Parliamentary debate surrounding the White Paper’s publication.

This may be because the White Paper is rather vague on the scope of the Sponsorship Code of Conduct. Although it recommends that the new code will be common to “all sports” apart from greyhound and horseracing, we do not yet know what this will mean in practice. Will motorsports or esports be included, for example? Instead, the White Paper simply states that:

“Sports bodies need to ensure a responsible approach is taken to gambling sponsorship through the adoption of a Code of Conduct which will be common to all sports. For individual sports we believe that sports governing bodies are best placed to drive up standards in gambling sponsorship, recognising their specific context and responsibility to their fans. We welcome the work that is underway through sports governing bodies to develop a gambling sponsorship Code of Conduct, and will continue to support its development and implementation across the whole sporting sector…
…The measures included in a sponsorship Code need to be robust enough to provide meaningful improvements in the social responsibility of gambling sponsorships, while giving flexibility to accommodate the material differences between sports.”

The Government goes on to set out some possible principles to be included in the Sponsorship Code of Conduct:

Until we see the draft Sponsorship Code of Conduct, we will not know what impact, if any, it will have on current sponsorship arrangements. Certainly, a couple of the principles suggested in the White Paper appear to go no further than current requirements. By way of example:

(a) it is an offence under the 2005 Act to advertise unlawful gambling, including by means of sponsorship arrangements, and this offence carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks and a maximum fine of £5,000 (at the time of writing). If the possibility of committing a criminal offence is not a deterrent against accepting sponsorship from a gambling operator that is not appropriately authorised by a Gambling Commission licence, a commitment to a sports governing body under a voluntary Code of Conduct is unlikely to carry much additional weight; and

(b) operators are already required to follow relevant industry codes on advertising, notably the Industry Code for Socially Responsible Advertising, which provides that:

“advertising of adult-only gambling product suppliers should never be targeted at children….and this Industry Code continues to require that gambling operators do not allow their logos or other promotional material to appear on any commercial merchandising which is designed for use by children. A clear example of this would be the use of logos on children’s sports’ shirts.”

Lastly, it is currently unclear when the Sponsorship Code of Conduct will (1) be published; and (2) come into force. In terms of a timeline, the White Paper simply states that the Government will:

“work with sports bodies to refine the code over the coming months.”

Given the Government’s repeated promises that the White Paper (which took nearly 30 months to be published following the call for evidence) would be published in “the coming weeks”, many will be wary regarding this statement and likely, rightly so. Not only has the Government committed itself to maintain involvement in the process of agreeing the Sponsorship Code of Conduct (which may slow it down) but the new code must also be reviewed, approved and adopted by governing bodies across “all sports”. We for one, do not envy the person responsible for overseeing such a mammoth task.

4. Our final thoughts…for now

Ultimately, we have again been delivered the message to “hurry up and wait” by the White Paper. Until the Voluntary Ban comes into force and the Sponsorship of Code of Conduct is adopted across all sports (whenever that might be), it is likely that gambling sponsorship will continue to be the subject of keen debate in the press, politics and beyond. Indeed, in recent weeks, several Premier League Clubs have been caught in the crossfire and criticised for continuing to accept front of shirt sponsorship from gambling operators, even though the Voluntary Ban does not come into force until 2025/26.

When it does come in, there are also concerns that the Voluntary Ban may not significantly reduce the visibility of gambling brands in major sports – but is this really the issue that the press and politicians are making of it? Some may argue that gambling sponsorship is simply the weapon du jour in the ongoing political warfare surrounding gambling. The White Paper, which sought to be evidence-based, concluded that the limited evidence on gambling sponsorship considered by the Government revealed that sponsorship has a limited effect on gambling behaviour. So, does it really need to be curbed and if it does, what will be the real financial impact of this on sports clubs, some of which currently derive a significant proportion of revenue from gambling sponsorship?

In our view, the key question will be whether the Sponsorship Code of Conduct can find the balance that the White Paper, and most of the industry, seeks. If it is well-considered and efficiently implemented, the Sponsorship Code of Conduct may yet prove itself to be an example of effective self-regulation. But to achieve this, sports governing bodies must strike a balance between (a) reducing the commercial practices that unduly increase the risk of exposure of gambling to children on the one hand, and (b) on the other, permitting gambling sponsorship – along with the financial injection that it brings – safely for the benefit of all levels of sport.

With credit and sincere thanks to Gemma Boore for her invaluable co-authorship.

A recent study by Djohari et al. (2021) on the visibility of gambling sponsorship in football related products marketed directly to children revealed that gambling logos were visible, largely on the front of the shirts, in 42% of the stickers 2020 Panini Premier League sticker album.

04Jul

White Paper Series: The Gambling Commission’s powers – more to come?

4th July 2023 David Whyte 187

As all stakeholders seek to get to grips with the White Paper and their focus is drawn to its high-profile proposals such as financial risk checks and stake limits, they might be forgiven for overlooking the potential aftereffects apparent from some of the more inconspicuous proposals, particularly when those proposals are considered in the context of the Gambling Commission’s Advice to Government – Review of the Gambling Act 2005 (the “Advice to Government”).

When referring to the Gambling Commission’s powers and resources in the White Paper, the Government states in its summary (our emphasis added):

“The Commission has a broad range of powers that enable it to regulate the industry effectively but there are some small changes that could be made around its ability to investigate operators, including improving the Commission’s responsiveness to changes of corporate control.”

There is limited information contained in the White Paper about what those “small changes” might be. Points of note are:

“The government and the Commission are clear that an enhanced approach to compliance enforcement is required to effectively monitor the industry and ensure that operators are abiding by the rules.”
The Gambling Commission has advised that “some of its powers concerning investigations could be enhanced to better protect consumers and hold operators to account”. In particular, “it is concerned that licence holders are able to take action that can hinder or frustrate an investigation, including surrendering their licence during the course of the investigation.”

The Government concludes:

“When Parliamentary time allows, we will legislate to give the Commission additional powers to assess and regulate new business owners, reflecting the increased complexity of the entities that it regulates. We will also look at the case for providing further powers to ensure that licensees are not able to interfere with the Commission’s ability to conclude its investigations or move their finances to reduce the size of their fine.”

To understand fully the extent of the “small changes” or “further powers” that the Government may decide are appropriate, it is necessary to consider the Advice to Government, within which the Gambling Commission proposes amendments to the Gambling Act 2005 (the “2005 Act”) “to allow for streamlined regulatory action in a number of areas”. This article focusses on three of those areas: (a) the process for change of corporate control (“CoCC”) applications; (b) options for investigations and licence surrender; and (c) flexibility for penalties that can be imposed on licensees.

Change of corporate control

Under section 102 of the 2005 Act, a change of corporate control (“CoCC”) takes place when a new person or other legal entity becomes a new “controller” of a licensee (more information on a CoCC can be found in our previous blog). When a CoCC occurs, licensees must notify the Gambling Commission, via eServices by means of a key event, as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event within five working days of them becoming aware. Licensees must then submit a CoCC application within five weeks of the event occurring or the Gambling Commission is obliged to revoke the licence, although it may, at its discretion, extend the five-week period. Presently, in determining a CoCC application, the Gambling Commission has a binary choice, it may, in law, only grant the application or refuse it. If the latter, the licence is revoked.

The complexity of corporate structures and financing have increased the burden on both the Gambling Commission and licensees to investigate and/or evidence proof of ownership and source of funds related to CoCC applications and this, along with suitability considerations, means increasingly prolonged investigations. The Gambling Commission recommends: (a) the removal of the binary nature of the CoCC decision, to allow for the possibility of it granting the application subject to its imposition of conditions on the licence; (b) an amendment to allow for the appeal by a licensee against the Gambling Commission’s decision not to grant an extension of the five-week period for the submission of a CoCC application, which at present can only be appealed by means of judicial review; and (c) that it be given the ability to apply a financial penalty for the submission of CoCC applications outside the five-week reporting window.

In the main, these proposals are proportionate and reasonable. The removal of the binary nature of the CoCC decision will benefit both licensees and the Gambling Commission, as will the introduction of the proposed appeal process. The Gambling Commission has become increasingly strict in relation to the late submission of CoCC applications, so licensees will be unsurprised that it is now proposing the imposition of a financial penalty in those circumstances. Whilst a financial penalty is certainly better than the alternative of revocation, licensees may wish to seek clarification in relation to how the quantum of the proposed financial penalty will be calculated. A fixed fee would most certainly be preferable to the application of the Statement of principles for determining financial penaltie s (the “FP Statement”), which incudes no formula for calculating quantum, allows for uncapped financial penalties, and contains various criteria that may be not be appropriate to the late submission of a CoCC application.

Refusal of licence surrender

The Gambling Commission recommends that the Government considers amending the 2005 Act to permit it to refuse a licence surrender under certain circumstances when an investigation is taking place, so that it retains “regulatory authority” over licensees, post surrender, primarily with a view to it imposing a financial penalty. The implication from the Gambling Commission’s proposal, which is supported by little more than reference to “vidence from casework” is that, in its view, licensees may be utilising surrender as a means of avoiding a financial penalty, and that they may “move finances during, or in anticipation of, an investigation” to avoid the same.

Potential options proposed by the Gambling Commission are: (a) requiring its consent before the surrender of a licence in circumstances where enforcement action has been commenced; (b) extending the application of the relevant sections of the 2005 Act that provide the power for the Gambling Commission to impose a financial penalty, such that for a specified period they apply to a licence that has lapsed or been surrendered; and (c) amending the 2005 Act to prevent licensees from triggering a mandatory licence revocation by failing to pay their annual licence fee.

We have several concerns about this proposal and the Gambling Commission’s justification for it:

Licences are valuable assets that are difficult to obtain. Reputable licensees subject to enforcement action will: (a) wish to continue to operate in the British market, clear their name and protect their asset; and/or (b) be very concerned at having to disclose their surrender to regulators in other jurisdictions without having defended the alleged licence condition breach to a conclusion; and/or (c) be aware their previous standing will be taken into account in the context of any new licence application, as will that of the PML holders and controllers involved. Surrender is much more likely to be due to a desire to exit the market in Great Britain, likely influenced by ever-increasing regulatory requirements, the inordinate length of time taken by the Gambling Commission to carry out a licence review, or by other commercial or economic factors. Some licensees who do surrender might not even have considered doing so, but for the reminder included by the Gambling Commission in much of its enforcement related correspondence that a licence can be surrendered at any time. The implication of widespread manipulative intent in the Advice to Government is therefore wrong and perhaps provides valuable insight into how the Gambling Commission perceives the integrity of its licensees.
Very exceptionally, an unscrupulous licensee may surrender their licence deliberately to avoid a financial penalty. In those very rare instances, those who do so might better be dealt with by means of criminal prosecution and the consequence and protection that brings, rather than be subject to sanction by what will, at that stage, be an exacerbated Gambling Commission.
One of the reasons given by the Gambling Commission for its recommendation is that “a surrendered license leaves unable to protect consumers or take regulatory action to hold the licensee accountable for their actions.” We struggle to understand how imposing a financial penalty on a licensee that has surrendered their licence will further protect consumers. The surrender itself, prompted by the Gambling Commission’s action, must surely both protect consumers and hold licensees accountable.
Punitive sanctions form an important part of the Gambling Commission’s regulatory toolkit but when a licence surrender has already removed all risk, are not critical to its upholding of the licensing objectives set out at section 1 of the 2005 Act. We question whether it is appropriate for the Gambling Commission, or any other regulatory body, to retain regulatory authority over a former licensee in those circumstances, when the sole objective is to facilitate the imposition of a punitive financial sanction. If, as the Gambling Commission suggests, licensees have moved finances deliberately to avoid a financial penalty, the refusal of surrender is not going to guarantee a different outcome.
A financial penalty can only be imposed if there has been a breach of a licence condition, which, by virtue of section 33 of the 2005 Act, is a criminal offence. The Gambling Commission is therefore able to prosecute should it wish to seek to impose a punitive sanction. However, the Gambling Commission may be less inclined to take this approach because: (a) it would be obliged to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt, rather than to the lower burden of proof of balance of probabilities applicable to its imposition of a financial penalty; (b) it would likely be held to higher investigative standards and more restrictive time limits by the criminal courts; and (c) unlike a financial penalty which is unlimited and paid into the Consolidated Fund, the quantum of court fines is restricted by statute and fines are paid to the courts.

Licensees would be wise to monitor the Gambling Commission’s next steps in this area so that they may challenge the logic of this recommendation when it is revisited by either the Gambling Commission or the Government in consultation.

Flexibility for penalties that can be imposed on licensees

Statutory time limits

In the Advice to Government, the Gambling Commission refers to the 12-month time limit for laying criminal charges and the 24-month time limit for imposing a financial penalty prescribed by the 2005 Act. It suggests that these time limits have restricted its ability to prosecute or impose a financial penalty in cases where “establishing a breach” is “very complicated” and proposes amendments to the 2005 Act to: (a) introduce greater flexibility in the time limits for bringing prosecutions; and (b) explore extending the cut-off period for the imposition of a financial penalty.

Although the Gambling Commission states that it has “sound evidence from regulatory experiential knowledge and casework” that underpins its recommendations, the examples used by the Gambling Commission as justification are very broad and insufficiently detailed. As most licensees who have been involved in Gambling Commission enforcement action have experienced, the primary reason for the delay is not that “the increasing complexities of gambling businesses make establishing a breach in some cases very complicated” but rather the Gambling Commission’s inefficiency.

Licensees subject to the Gambling Commission’s enforcement process are often required to adhere to relatively short deadlines, whereas the Gambling Commission operates to much longer deadlines. Some licensees have had to wait six months or more to receive a response or update from the Gambling Commission, often only to receive a preliminary findings or findings letter that largely repeats the content of its previous correspondence. It is this inefficiency that leads to the expiration of statutory time limits. A significant factor that has led to the increasing complexity of the Gambling Commission’s investigations will likely be its inconsistent application of its regulatory requirements or a lack of clarity about the same, particularly given its increasing introduction of formal requirements through guidance, and the lack of clarity as to its expectations in relation to affordability.

Furthermore, it is not, as the Gambling Commission states in the Advice to Government, its charge to “establish a breach”: this is again an indication of its mindset. As a regulator it is obliged to investigate suspected breaches on a fair, reasonable and proportionate basis, and to reach a conclusion on the facts. A cynic might suggest that it is this determination to “establish a breach” that is prolonging its investigations. This is particularly so when Licensees’ have raised their standards significantly in recent years and therefore, despite published enforcement action, breaches may be harder to come by.

Long, process driven, delays do not only impact statutory time limits. They have a commercial impact on licensees, detract valuable resource from day-to-day compliance activities, and when related to individuals, impact their wellbeing. It is in all parties’ best interests that matters are dealt with expeditiously. Before amending primary legislation, the Government might wish to consider a careful and fact-based examination of the Gambling Commission’s productivity, including in relation to past enforcement cases. Efficient, proportionate, reasonable, and timely investigations are the very reason for the statutory time limits being imposed in the first place.

Extending the scope of financial penalties

The Gambling Commission sets out in the Advice to Government that extending the scope of financial penalties (which currently only apply to breaches of licence conditions) to encompass suitability concerns, would give it more opportunity to take action. It goes on to state that every case of a financial penalty “has also included suitability concerns which we have been unable to take into account when imposing the penalty” in inference being that if suitability concerns were to have been in scope, the financial penalties it has issued would have been greater.

We agree with the Gambling Commission’s statement: most of its cases of a financial penalty do include reference to it having suitability concerns. However, those suitability concerns are almost always directly linked to a breach of a licence condition. We therefore question whether extending the scope in the manner proposed is necessary, as a financial penalty can be imposed in those cases anyway.

If the Gambling Commission wishes to increase the quantum of the financial penalties it imposes, it has the ability to amend its FP Statement. At present, the FP Statement does not include a formula for calculating the quantum of financial penalties, much to the frustration of licensees and advisors alike. The FP Statement does, however, set out the criteria that is considered by the Gambling Commission when imposing a financial penalty. Much of those criteria could just as easily be relevant to any consideration of a licensee’s suitability: it could therefore be argued that the Gambling Commission is already taking suitability into account. Furthermore, should the Gambling Commission have serious concerns about a licensee’s suitability, it has the ability to suspend or revoke their licence. Licensees may again wish to challenge the necessity of this proposal, if it is introduced in future consultations.

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Gambling Regulation