The Gambling Commission’s consultation on three changes it proposes to make to its Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice (the “Consultation”) is due to close on 23 May 2023 and there is one issue to which licensees should pay careful attention: the proposal to add a specific reporting requirement to Licence Condition 15.2.2 requiring licensees to notify the Gambling Commission when they become aware that a person who has gambled with them has died by suicide.

The Gambling Commission’s proposed wording is:

“The licensee must notify the Commission, as soon as reasonably practical, if it knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that a person who has gambled with it has died by suicide, whether or not such suicide is known or suspected to be associated with gambling. Such notification must include the person’s name and date of birth, and a summary of their gambling activity, if that information is available to the licensee”.

There is no question of licensees not wishing to prevent suicide and ostensibly, the arguments in favour of this proposed requirement are logical and reasonable. However, this is an incredibly sensitive issue about which stakeholders will have opposing views. Indeed, we have some concerns ourselves: that a gambler commits suicide does not necessarily mean that the gambling is a contributory factor, nor is the Gambling Commission qualified to make such a judgement. It is therefore questionable whether it is appropriate for the Gambling Commission to require the provision of information of this nature.

As has been the case on many occasions in the past, the Gambling Commission is likely to proceed with imposing this requirement, irrespective of the responses it receives to the Consultation. Consequently, rather than explore the basis of the proposed requirement, this article considers its wording and impact, which as presently drafted potentially exposes licensees to a risk of regulatory bias, imposes a disproportionate burden upon them and is likely to be interpreted inconsistently.

Intention and consequence

The Gambling Commission explains in the Consultation that, in the past, some licensees have notified it when they have become aware that a customer has died by suicide; likely under ordinary code provision 1.1.1 which suggests that, as a matter of good practice licensees should inform the Gambling Commission “of any matters that the Commission would reasonably need to be aware of in exercising its regulatory functions”. However, to enable it to “assess the licensee’s compliance with conditions of its licence” and to help “inform ongoing consideration of policy” the Gambling Commission has determined it necessary to make this notification a licence condition, the breach of which would enable it to commence enforcement action and if appropriate impose a regulatory sanction.

The Gambling Commission also states in the Consultation that, to avoid placing a burden on licensees to determine which deaths by suicide they should notify it about, it proposes that “licensees are required to notify us where a person who has gambled with them has died by suicide irrespective of whether any link between the person’s death and gambling has been established or suggested” and that “the death should be notified to the Commission irrespective of the period of time that has elapsed between the death and the most recent gambling activity.”

The Gambling Commission, many of its key stakeholders, and indeed many of its critics, have made it abundantly clear that gambling related suicide must be a key focus, and rightly so. However, suicide is almost invariably the result of a complex array of factors, and it cannot be the case that irrespective of the time that has lapsed between an individual’s gambling and their suicide, gambling will necessarily have been a contributory factor. An investigation is therefore inevitable, and care needs to be taken by the Gambling Commission when conducting that investigation to ensure that there is no internal regulatory bias on its part: its focus should be on licensee’s adherence to their regulatory requirements and not to the tragic circumstances that have led to the notification being submitted.  

A regulatory bias in relation to gambling related suicide, or at least an indication of it, is evident in the Gambling Commission’s consultation Customer Interaction – Guidance for remote operators, where the Gambling Commission tells licensees that their staff “need to be trained on the skills and techniques they need to help them carry out customer interactions, including what to do if a customer becomes distressed or there is a risk of suicide”. Wording such as this suggests that, in the Gambling Commission’s view, it is the responsibility of licensees or their employees to identify the risk of suicide, and to act upon it. As we have set out in a previous article, this cannot be right: it is the responsibility of qualified professionals to identify that risk, not licensees, and it is dangerous on multiple levels, including in relation to the wellbeing of licensees’ employees, to suggest otherwise. Further, this risks suggesting there is a duty of care at law on the part of licensed gambling operators to prevent suicide, which is a dangerous precedent.

Whether or not licensees are expected to investigate, the Gambling Commission will be doing so. The extent of that investigation is likely to extend beyond the licensee who has submitted the notification: how else will the Gambling Commission ensure that all licensees are adhering to the licence condition and/or that the individual concerned has not gambled elsewhere? Having been identified it is therefore inevitable that the Gambling Commission will have to request information from other licensees; the burden on licensees potentially extending considerably and a consistent and proportionate response difficult to maintain. If gambling is a contributory factor, we suggest it is more likely than not the individual will have gambled with many operators.

As most licensees who have been through a burdensome compliance or enforcement investigation process with the Gambling Commission have experienced, the Gambling Commission can be very unforgiving in its approach, 20/20 hindsight is applied and it is rare that such a process leaves a licensee unscathed. Many licensees have found themselves subject to criticism, and in some cases may have agreed a regulatory settlement, in cases where theirs and the Gambling Commission’s view about some failings identified are not perfectly aligned. Following a notification under this proposed requirement, licensees might be forgiven for being concerned about how any Gambling Commission investigation will be conducted and any consequences of that investigation, particularly given the risk of unintentional bias and the imbalance of power between the regulator and its licensees.

Practical implementation: expectation versus reality

The Gambling Commission states in the Consultation that:

1. its “current view is that licensees should notify when they become aware that a person who has gambled with them has died by suicide”;
2. it proposes a specific reporting requirement that “would impose a requirement on gambling licensees to notify the Commission if they become aware that a person who has gambled with them has died by suicide”;
3. that licensees “would only be able to notify us that a person who has gambled with them has died by suicide if they themselves are aware of this, either through direct contact or other means, such as media reports”; and
4. it “would not expect licensees to actively investigate or verify the information in order to make such disclosures – rather, would expect licensees to notify the Commission if they become aware of a death by suicide of any person who has gambled with them (for example, through media reports or notification from relatives of the deceased).”

However, the draft wording of the proposed license condition is ambiguous and goes further than the Gambling Commission’s stated intention in the Consultation. It not only refers to actual knowledge but also to a much broader “reasonable cause to suspect”. This risks imposing a disproportionate regulatory burden on licensees. What amounts to reasonable suspicion will almost certainly be interpreted differently and will ultimately be determined by the Gambling Commission subjectively and in hindsight. Further, the breach of a licence condition amounts to a criminal offence under the 2005 Act, and can lead to various regulatory sanctions, including revocation and the imposition of a financial penalty. Licensees are therefore likely to take a precautionary approach when considering whether a notification is required.

Unlike actual knowledge, which is precise and unambiguous, a licensee’s reasonable cause to suspect that a customer who has gambled with it has died by suicide could be considered to arise in various ways, for example: (1) if they are informed by a customer that they are having suicidal thoughts following which all customer contact ceases without any known explanation or reason; (2) if public information about an individual who has died by suicide exists; or (3) if a licensee is informed that a customer who has self-excluded with them has died, but the cause of death is unknown. To avoid criticism in hindsight from the Gambling Commission about what amounted to reasonable cause to suspect, licensees will inevitably carry out an active investigation or verification exercise. The draft provision therefore appears to conflict with the Gambling Commission’s stated position in the Consultation that an active investigation is not required and this imposes a disproportionate burden on licensees.

This complication is most likely caused by ambiguous drafting, rather than by a malicious desire by the Gambling Commission to extend the reach of the draft provision.  However, to ensure clarity of understanding, mitigate the risk of inconsistent interpretation by the Gambling Commission, and prevent the unreasonable or disproportionate use of the draft provision in the future, the Gambling Commission should be encouraged to address this ambiguity. Clarity could easily be achieved either by including additional wording in the draft provision that expressly states that active investigation or verification by licensees is not required, or by amending the draft provision entirely. Alternative and more appropriate wording that will retain the Gambling Commission’s desired objective might be:

“The licensee must notify the Commission, as soon as reasonably practicable, if it knows that a person who has gambled with it has died, and knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that the person has died by suicide.”

Please get in touch with us if you would like assistance with any compliance or enforcement matters.

In this – the second in a series of articles on the Gambling Commission’s (the “Commission”) consultation (the “Consultation”) on the proposed Customer Interaction – Guidance for remote operators (the “Guidance”) – Harris Hagan and Regulus Partners consider the concept of ‘vulnerability to harm’ that underpins the Guidance. The Commission proposes that licensees be required to identify “harm”, “potential harm” and “vulnerable states” by monitoring customer behaviour, scrutinising private information and making assessments based on a range of demographic characteristics. While licensees should always be sensitive to customer wellbeing, the Commission’s attempt to translate common sense into a bureaucratic checklist appears to be at odds with the intent of the Gambling Act 2005 (the “2005 Act”), regulatory coherence and the best interests of consumers.

Vulnerability and harm

The Guidance requires licensees to identify customers exhibiting “indicators of harm” as well as those who – for a wide variety of reasons – may be “vulnerable” to gambling harms. For these terms to be meaningful, it is important first to understand what the regulator wishes to convey by the term “harm”. While the Guidance itself is silent on this matter, the Commission has defined gambling harms in its Update: Pilot of survey questions to understand gambling-related harm as “the adverse impacts from gambling on the health and wellbeing of individuals, families, communities and society.” Emphasising the breadth of the concept, it adds that “these harms are diverse, affecting resources, relationships and health, and may reflect an interplay between individual, family and community processes. The harmful effects from gambling may be short-lived but can persist, having longer-term and enduring consequences that can exacerbate existing inequalities.”

To hammer home the scale of the problem, the Commission enumerates 27 “harms” experienced by gambling consumers and a further 13 “harms” to “affected others”. Some of these adverse impacts are incontrovertible – financial consequences such as problematic debt being the least ambiguous – but others are less clear-cut. The Commission, for example, defines having less money to go to the cinema or “other forms of entertainment” as a harm from gambling. Spending money on one pastime in preference to another – as the Australian academic, Professor Paul Delfabbro has pointed out – is “more akin to opportunity costs than true harm”. Its inclusion in the ‘Index’ suggests a moral judgement on those people who prefer to spend their own money on betting in preference to the movies or a meal out. Among the Commission’s other “harms”, we also encounter “feeling like a failure” which in its weakest form is a potential corollary of all unsuccessful wagers and “spending less time with people you care about”, a test that many activities, including going to work or attending a school or college, would fall foul of.

Are these the “harms” or “potential harms” that the Commission expects its licensees to identify? If so, how does it expect them to do so? Will licensees, for example, be required to scrutinise bank statements in order to understand whether or not customers are movie-goers? With what degree of regularity must customers be going to the flicks in order to satisfy the regulator? This may be a case of reductio ad absurdum – but it illustrates the fact that the Commission has in fact set some fairly absurd tests for what should be considered harmful. In the absence of clearer direction, operators are expected to make their own judgements about which of the “harms” listed by the Commission they should be attempting to identify.

A list of 21 prescribed “indicators of harm” are provided in the Guidance as a minimum – but not exhaustive – set of standards. The basis for the selection of these indicators is not made clear, supporting evidence is often not cited, and generally they lack all but the most conceptual definitions. For licensees, this presents a significant challenge in terms of operationalising the indicators. How, for example, should a licensee create a rule for “amount of money spent on gambling compared with other customers”? Is this intended to suggest that anyone spending above the mean (or median) is displaying an indicator of harm? As written, it could be used to describe anyone wagering more than the lowest-spending decile, which would be more than “other customers”. Another example is the “use of multiple products”, without any definition of what constitutes a “product”. Are football betting and tennis betting different “products” or a single product (i.e. sports betting)? Is a ‘Rainbow Riches’ slot game a different product to ‘Cleopatra’, as manufacturers would certainly contend? Where certain activities are concerned, any participation at all is considered potentially problematic. In-play betting is classified as an automatic indicator of harm. Although, as we will explain in a further blog, this appears to be based on the Commission’s misreading of its own evidence.

So much for harm; but what about “vulnerability”? Here, the Guidance does at least provide some kind of definition of what a “vulnerable person” is: “somebody who, due to their personal circumstances, is especially susceptible to harm, particularly when a firm is not acting with appropriate levels of care”.

Harris Hagan has raised previously its concerns about the transformation of what the Commission considers to be “vulnerability” and its inclusion of a definition of the term in guidance. It is for Parliament, not the Commission to define a statutory term that is included in the 2005 Act and which Parliament did not find it necessary to define, having clearly considered the interpretation of vulnerability a straightforward matter. Reference in the third licensing objective firstly to children, and then to other vulnerable persons adequately sets out Parliament’s intention that the licensing objectives apply to those people not able to make properly informed or ‘adult’ decisions.

The operative phrase in the definition in the Guidance – “especially susceptible to harm” – implies that vulnerability is a rare or exceptional condition rather than a state shared by the majority. This conceptualisation is however, undermined by the Commission’s use of illustrative examples. “Young adults” are categorised as vulnerable (around 12% of the population are between the ages of 18 and 24 years); but so are “older adults” (23% of the population are 65 or older). Poor physical health denotes vulnerability (43% of adults have a long-standing medical condition); as does poor mental health; (17% have a common mental health disorder; 16% have an eating disorder). One is vulnerable if one is bereaved (15% of us each year), has caring responsibilities (13%) or has dyslexia (10%). Most perplexing of all, a “higher than standard level of trust or appetite for risk” – a quality that might be said to be a defining characteristic of any gambler – is also sufficient to qualify an individual as vulnerable.

The Guidance refers to the Financial Conduct Authority’s (“FCA”) observation that 46% of adults “display one or more characteristics of vulnerability” and indeed, the Commission’s definition of vulnerability is identical to that used by the FCA in its Guidance for firms on the fair treatment of vulnerable customers – February 2021 (the “FCA Guidance”). The FCA Guidance is, however, prepared to serve an entirely different purpose. It is issued under s139A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (legislation which, unlike the 2005 Act, makes no reference to vulnerability) and provides guidance on the FCA’s Principles for Business, which state that, “a firm must pay regards to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly”. Principle-based regulation of this nature almost certainly requires guidance and the FCA is justified in defining vulnerability in that context; that the Commission seeks to take an identical approach to the FCA, in an entirely different context, is not.

There is a difference between the FCA’s intention that regulated firms identify “characteristics of vulnerability” to ensure they treat their customers fairly and in accordance with their needs, and the Commission’s duty under the 2005 Act to permit gambling in so far as it thinks it reasonably consistent with, the licensing objective of “protecting children and other vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by gambling”. The Commission’s reinterpretation of “vulnerability” as a universal rather than exceptional state risks distorting and undermining the legislation that it is required to enforce – replacing parliamentary sovereignty with regulatory fiat. Furthermore, the Commission prescribes a requirement in SRCP 3.4.3. It therefore had the opportunity, following consultation, to set out precisely its definition of vulnerability when introducing that requirement. That it now seeks to widen the parameters of that requirement in the Guidance, is plainly wrong.

The concept of vulnerability

The suggestion that we are all vulnerable may be true at a certain banal level – but it is inconsistent with the intent of the legislation and also the Commission’s own conception of ‘especial susceptibility to harm’. A system of customer monitoring predicated on the idea of universal vulnerability risks failing those in genuine need of protection. There are a number of other practical considerations which the Guidance fails to address. For instance, it suggests, by way of reference to past enforcement cases, that operators must routinely scrutinise customer bank statements in order to harvest medical information, or risk facing sanctions for failing to do so. This raises complex ethical issues of discrimination and data protection. Should operators, for example, treat customers differently on the basis of a perceived medical condition (which they are expected to glean from banking data)? How might customers feel about betting companies holding information (however obtained and however accurate) about their health? 

To illustrate the scale of the challenge presented by the Guidance, consider the following fictitious scenario. A 24-year-old with dyslexia who bets in-play on football and cricket and spends slightly above the average for his age group could plausibly be said to raise three ‘vulnerability’ flags and three ‘indicators of harm’. As we observe in the next in this series of articles, a licensee would be required to determine for itself whether or not the presence of six ‘indicators’ would necessitate an interaction, and if so of what variety. It is inevitable that operators will adopt widely divergent interpretations in such instances, with implications for market distortion. Perhaps more significantly, the Guidance creates ample scope for disagreement between licensees and the Commission about whether a customer is vulnerable or displaying genuine indicators of harm.

That “vulnerability” is to be determined by whether a “firm”, which we understand to mean a licensed operator (again the use of “firm” a reflection of the Commission’s use of the FCA’s definition), is “acting with appropriate levels of care”. The decision as to whether a licensee has acted with appropriate levels of care must ultimately rest with the Commission and therefore it seems that vulnerability will be determined subjectively by the Commission, almost certainly in hindsight. Further, by suggesting, incorrectly, that licensees have a duty of care at law to prevent customers from gambling if they are or might meet the Commission’s definition of vulnerability, the Commission risks improperly introducing such a duty in law, or at least exposing licensees to such a challenge. This is dangerous territory for any regulator, and for licensees.

Autonomy – a wider debate

Finally, there are some genuine ‘slippery slope’ consequences for the wider economy, privacy and personal freedom. One of the Commission’s key items of evidence for the proposed interactions regime is a survey carried out in 2020 by the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute (‘MMHPI’) included in the report A Safer Bet. The Commission states that 24% of people with mental health problems experienced financial problems in consequence of online gambling and 32% said that they had bet more than they could afford to lose. This representation of the findings is misleading (the survey was of people with mental health problems who had gambled online and not all people with mental health problems – an important distinction); as is the Commission’s repeated misuse of the Problem Gambling Severity Index item “bet more than afford to lose”, which is a risky behaviour rather than a harm.

Quite aside from matters of precision, there is an important omission of context. In the same year, the MMHPI also published the results of a survey on online shopping by people with mental health problems – with very similar, and in some cases more alarming, results. The MMHPI report, Convenience at a cost found that 29% of respondents had spent more than they could afford when shopping online while 63% “had cut back on essentials” and 56% “had fallen seriously behind on payments for bills or debt repayments as a result of not being able to control their spending.” In short, the basis for regulatory intervention on remote gambling could just as easily be applied to shopping with Amazon or Tesco. Context is important because it helps us understand whether state action in one domain is consistent with broader societal ‘rules’ – and so deters unfair discrimination against particular groups (in this case, people who enjoy gambling). The Commission’s deliberate exclusion of this information, which was brought to its attention as part of the original consultation, is unhelpful and reinforces the idea that the regulator is not in earnest in its use of public consultations.

The Commission’s obsession with vulnerability suggests a rather hopeless outlook on life. To the extent that we are all, to some extent vulnerable, we are all resilient too and possessed of broad powers of self-regulation. An exclusive focus on what makes us weak with no recognition of what makes us strong is distortive and may lead to negative consequences – most obviously through undermining individual agency, which is an essential ingredient for wellbeing.

The identification of harm and vulnerability set out in the Guidance is the basis for ramping up operator interactions with customers, which may in some cases be warranted. The practical implications of the requirements to interact, and to evaluate the effect of those interactions, is the subject of our next article.

With thanks to Dan Waugh from Regulus Partners for his invaluable co-authorship.