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Gambling Law

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10Nov

The Legal 500 Country Comparative Guide 2022 – Gambling Law

10th November 2022 Adam Russell Anti-Money Laundering, Harris Hagan, Marketing, Responsible Gambling, Training 192

Partner Bahar Alaeddini acted as the contributing editor, and together with Associate Francesca Burnett-Hall jointly contributed the UK chapter, to The Legal 500: Gambling Law Comparative Guide (the “Guide”).

UK ChapterDownload

The esteemed publication (which currently spans 16 jurisdictions) provides an overview of gambling law, regulatory and licensing requirements in the UK, including: key gambling legislation; types of gambling licences with the associated application procedures; prohibited gambling products; gambling advertising; marketing affiliates; penalties for unlawful gambling; Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice; relevant anti-money laundering requirements; responsible gambling requirements; shareholder reporting and approval thresholds; enforcement powers; and tax rates. A critical commentary on key trends affecting the gambling industry is also covered.

The Guide provides readers with the opportunity to compare jurisdiction here.

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10Nov

Recap on the Fourth National Lottery Licence Competition

10th November 2022 Jessica Wilson Uncategorised 203

On 20 September 2022, the Gambling Commission formally awarded the Fourth National Lottery Licence (“Licence”) to Allwyn Entertainment UK (“Allwyn”), which will be the second National Lottery Licence holder since its launch in 1994.

As explained in our previous blog, the Fourth National Lottery Licence Competition (“4NLC”) process got off to a bumpy start when delays were announced as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. In fact, the whole 4NLC process was not as smooth sailing as perhaps expected, with legal appeals being brought against the Gambling Commission criticising how it ran the 4NLC.

Now that Allwyn has been awarded the Licence formally, due to commence in February 2024, we take a look back on the ups and downs of 4NLC process.

4NLC is launched…finally

The 4NLC was announced in November 2018 and, after a three-month delay, was formally launched on 28 August 2020. In the interim period, the Gambling Commission set up an Expert Advisory Group to help inform and design the 4NLC and carried out global market engagement with all interested parties.

The 4NLC was divided into multiple stages:

  1. Selection questionnaire
  2. Invitation to apply
  3. Announcement of preferred applicant
  4. Transition period
  5. Expiry of third National Lottery licence and commencement of the fourth National Lottery licence

Delays to stages 1 to 3 were incurred for several reasons; to “provide additional time for applicants to complete the applications and for the Gambling Commission to feedback”, to “contribute to a fair, open and robust competition by providing applicants with sufficient time”, “to provide opportunity for applicants to further refine their proposals”, and due to the impact of Covid-19 restrictions on the preparation of applications.

Such delays resulted in the third National Lottery Licence (held by Camelot UK Lotteries Ltd (“Camelot”)) to be extended by six months to February 2024.

Allwyn takes the Crown

The Gambling Commission received four final applications: Allwyn, Camelot, Sisal SpA, and The New Lottery Company Ltd.

After rumours of Camelot being the Preferred Applicant again, the Gambling Commission announced Allwyn (a Czech group previously known as Sazka Entertainment) as its preferred applicant on 15 March 2022, almost seven months after the intended announcement date of August 2021. Camelot was named as the Reserve Applicant.

The Gambling Commission stated that “the selection of Allwyn as the Preferred Applicant follows a fair, open and robust competition which received four applications at the final stage. This is the highest number of applications since the first National Lottery licence was awarded in 1994”.

A busy Summer for the Courts

Despite the Gambling Commission’s adamance that the 4NLC was fair, open and robust, in April 2022 the Gambling Commission received legal proceedings from Camelot and its technology provider, International Games Technology PLC (“IGT”), challenging the 4NLC process and appealing the Gambling Commission’s decision of appointing Allwyn as the new licensee.

Proceedings were issued in the High Court, with Camelot claiming that the Gambling Commission got the decision “badly wrong” and demanding a “proper explanation” as to why it was not chosen as the Preferred Applicant. Camelot stated that the Gambling Commission “failed to provide a satisfactory response” leaving Camelot “with no choice but to ask the court to establish what happened”.

The proceedings placed an automatic suspension on the Gambling Commission’s ability to formally aware the Licence to Allwyn. The Gambling Commission appealed the suspension on the basis that it would “present potentially severe consequences for the National Lottery and good causes”. Ruling in favour of the Commission, on 29 June 2022, the High Court lifted the automatic suspension, citing public interest as a strong factor in the Court’s decision:

“…maintaining the suspension until resolution of the dispute will cause delay to the Fourth Licence. In turn, this will cause delay to the benefits of the Fourth Licence, giving rise to reduced contributions to the good causes and delayed introduction of the enhanced game portfolio and new technologies. Balanced against the commercial losses that might be suffered by Camelot and IGT, for which damages would be an adequate remedy, in this case, allowing the Commission and Allwyn to proceed with the Fourth Licence is the course that will produce the least risk of injustice if ultimately it proves to be wrong”.

However, the Gambling Commission’s win was short-lived. On 14 July 2022, the Court of Appeal granted permission for Camelot and IGT to appeal the High Court’s decision, putting the automatic suspension on the Licence back in place…but only until September when both Camelot and IGT withdrew their appeals, deciding instead to pursue damages only.

Allwyn officially takes the crown

On 20 September 2022, the Gambling Commission, no longer bound by the suspension, formally awarded the Licence to Allwyn. The parties have now entered into an Enabling Agreement, confirming the official granting of the Licence to Allwyn, and are in a transitional period with Camelot until the Licence takes effect in February 2024.

What key changes can we expect with the fourth licence?

  • A fixed 10-year licence.
  • Incentive mechanism to ensure Allwyn’s incentives and delivery are better aligned with contributions to good causes.
  • Move to an outcomes-based approach, giving Allwyn greater responsibility to fulfil its obligations while retaining the Gambling Commission’s power to intervene if they do not.
  • Flexibility for Allwyn to adapt their offerings to reflect changing technology, consumer safety, regulation and consumer preferences.
  • A retail charter to ensure Allwyn engages proactively with retailers.

There is no doubt that the 4NLC process was a rollercoaster for all involved. The Gambling Commission may have learned some lessons along the way, and we hope that the next National Lottery Competition will be a more straightforward and less contentious process.

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05Jul

Lexology – Getting the Deal Through, Gaming 2022

5th July 2022 Harris Hagan Anti-Money Laundering, Harris Hagan, Marketing, Responsible Gambling 254

As Harris Hagan continues its contribution to the Lexology GTDT Gaming publication, we are pleased to share with our subscribers, complimentary access to the full reference guide which is now available online.

Our Associate, Jessica Wilson, remains the author of the United Kingdom report, which covers a range of British regulatory insights including land-based and remote gambling and quasi-gambling activities, including legal definition; anti-money-laundering regulations; director, officer and owner licensing; passive/institutional ownership; responsible gambling; taxes; advertising; supplier licensing and registration; change of control considerations; and recent trends in the industry.

The reference guide also allows for side-by-side comparisons with other local insights from jurisdictions such as Australia, Brazil, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Nigeria, South Africa and the USA.

We invite you to review the reference guide at your leisure.      

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11May

The Affordability Debate (3): Regulating beyond its means?

11th May 2021 Julian Harris Anti-Money Laundering, Harris Hagan, Responsible Gambling 270

This is the third in a series of articles considering different aspects of the affordability debate. We have already considered the right to protection, personal responsibility and freedom of choice (in article 1), and recently (in article 2), what the Gambling Commission (“the Commission”) has sought to require of operators at present, with an analysis of the manner in which it has done so. In this article, we turn to the wider powers of the Commission and consider whether they have been exceeded, or at least stretched, in relation to its approach to affordability.

The Customer Interaction Consultation

The Commission launched its ‘Remote customer interaction – Consultation and Call for Evidence’ (the “Consultation”) on 3 November 2020 and the Consultation closed on 9 February 2021. Further to our criticism in our 18 May 2020 article (‘New Gambling Commission Guidance for Online Operators: Changing the Basis of Regulation?’) of the Commission’s introduction of its ‘Customer interaction – Additional formal guidance for remote operators during COVID-19 outbreak’ (the “Covid-19 Guidance”) without consultation, and more generally its use of formal guidance as a means of expanding its Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice (“LCCP”), it was encouraging that on this occasion, the Commission did consult.

Whilst there is no impropriety in the Commission having a review on customer interaction, to include the consideration and gathering of evidence in relation to affordability, we remain concerned about the Commission’s increased use of guidance as a means of adding layers to existing formal requirements, and also about the nature and content of the Consultation. Firstly, whilst there may be cogent arguments in favour of guidance being used to explain and set out reasonable and proportionate expectations of requirements contained in the LCCP, it should not exceed this purpose to the extent that it is difficult to distinguish between requirements outlined in the LCCP and those contained within purported guidance. Secondly, when consulting, it is important that the Commission analyses all information available to it, rather than seemingly interpreting the information in its possession as a means to its ends.

The core proposal in the Consultation in relation to affordability is for the introduction of mandatory financial thresholds for affordability assessments. The evidence on which the need for such assessments is based is flimsy and unconvincing when properly analysed, which the Consultation does not attempt. In addition, the Commission relies on the 2018 Health Survey for England. This the Commission prays in aid of the proposition that “there is evidence to indicate that there is a large-scale issue with remote gamblers betting more than they can afford to lose and experiencing issues with their gambling”. The basis for this sweeping statement is a finding that 21% of respondents stated that they had bet more than they could afford “sometimes” when asked to choose between four options, the other three of which were “never”, “most of the time” and “almost always”. Without further questioning and analysis, this is hardly a basis for swingeing new regulations restricting the liberty of adults to make their own choices without having to prove their financial wellbeing; indeed, it could be that many of those who ticked that box occasionally bet more than they felt was wise, a position that most people would experience with many different kinds of spending: it is certainly not a guaranteed indicator of vulnerability or harm.

Of even greater concern is the scant regard which the Commission appears to have had for the 2018 Consultation Principles. These require, inter alia, that consultations by government authorities:-

    1. Include “validated impact assessments of the costs and benefits of the options being considered….where proposals have an impact on business…”;
    2. Consider whether “informal iterative consultation is appropriate using….open, collaborative approaches”;
    3. “Publish responses with 12 weeks of the consultation or provide an explanation why this is not possible.”

It is disappointing that the Commission has in recent times shied away from informal engagement with the industry on matters of interest and importance to it and to its licensees.  Whilst there has been some collaboration with the Betting and Gaming Council, this has on occasion been preceded by the threat of action and then followed by negative comments by the Commission. Moreover, collaboration  underpinned by threat is not informal engagement. This, and the Commission’s apparent failure to consider the impact of its proposals on the industry and other stakeholders, such as the sports organisations, could once again lead an observer to question its motives, and ask if the consultation is really intended to open a debate and answer certain questions about safer gambling, social responsibility and affordability, or whether the Commission is simply going through the motions to tick the consultation box, with the intention, whatever the evidence produced, of imposing its own agenda. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Commission relies on questionable evidence from the 2018 Health Survey without mentioning that it also found that the incidence of problem gambling had fallen from 0.7% in the 2016 Survey to 0.5%.

As licensees are only too aware, and as we set out in our previous article on this subject, whilst the Commission has not formally imposed the proposals in the Consultation, it has sought to require operators to abide by them, or variants of them, outlined in its Enforcement Reports, by exerting pressure, threatening regulatory action and generally creating a climate of fear. That fear has been exacerbated by the uncertainty as to what the Commission actually requires.

This is the unfortunate consequence when a regulatory authority fails to have proper or sufficient regard for the statutory framework within which it is required to operate. We have already analysed the difficulties faced by the industry in trying to ascertain what is actually and properly required of it by law and regulation. The Commission has the power, and indeed the duty, to prepare codes of practice and impose appropriate licence conditions to regulate the way in which licensees operate. It is required to undertake consultation on such codes of practice. But in the case of affordability, the Commission expects licensees to abide by a series of “requirements” described, not in the LCCP, but in their Enforcement Reports and their existing Customer Interaction Guidance. Breach of a Code under section 24 of the Gambling Act, 2005 may properly be taken into account by the Commission in the exercise of its statutory function, but acting contrary to whatever opinions it expresses in its Enforcement Reports, or in speeches, may not. There can therefore be no basis for the Commission, when raising safer gambling concerns, to refer to those Enforcement Reports in its compliance assessment findings, licence review threats or regulatory actions, as it is increasingly doing.

It follows that similarly there can be no basis for the Commission to claim that affordability assessments are somehow already a requirement of the LCCP. Were that to be true, there would have been no need to write in different terms in the 2020 Enforcement Report from what was said in the 2019 Report, or in its current Customer Interaction Guidance (see article 2 for details), or indeed for the Consultation itself. Yet in reality, at present this is the only way the Commission could argue it properly makes these requirements of licensees.

Statement of Principles

The Commission publishes a ‘Statement of Principles for licensing and regulation’ (the “Statement of Principles”), as is required by section 23 of the Gambling Act 2005 (the “2005 Act”). This is expressed to have had regard to various documents, including the ‘Regulators’ Code (July, 2013: in force from 2014)’ (the “2013 Code”). Whilst the Commission makes reference to the principles included in the 2013 Code in the Statement of Principles, these are more clearly expressed in the 2013 Code, which requires, inter alia, that:-

“1.1 Regulators should avoid imposing unnecessary regulatory burdens through their regulatory activities and should assess whether similar social, environmental and economic outcomes could be achieved by less burdensome means. Regulators should choose proportionate approaches to those they regulate, based on relevant factors including, for example, business size and capacity.

1.2 When designing and reviewing policies, operational procedures and practices, regulators should consider how they might support or enable economic growth for compliant businesses and other regulated entities, for example, by considering how they can best:

    • understand and minimise negative economic impacts of their regulatory activities;
    • minimising the costs of compliance for those they regulate;
    • improve confidence in compliance for those they regulate, by providing greater certainty; and
    • encourage and promote compliance.

5.1 Regulators should provide advice and guidance that is focused on assisting those they regulate to understand and meet their responsibilities. When providing advice and guidance, legal requirements should be distinguished from suggested good practice and the impact of the advice or guidance should be considered so that it does not impose unnecessary burdens in itself”.

We do not know and cannot speculate as to whether the Commission has given careful thought to these obligations when preparing the Consultation. However, we cannot be satisfied that the level of burdensome proposals included in the Consultation and their probable economic impact, are demonstrably considered in the Consultation and this calls into question whether the Commission has had adequate regard to the requirements of the 2013 Code.

The vulnerable

When considering the Commission’s powers, the starting point is the licensing objectives, set out in section 1 of the Gambling Act, 2005 (“the 2005 Act”). These are:

“(a) preventing gambling from being a source of crime or disorder, being associated with crime or disorder, or being used to support crime;

 (b) ensuring that gambling is conducted in a fair and open way; and

 (c) protecting children and other vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by gambling.”

The Commission is required, by virtue of section 22 of the Act:

“(a) to pursue, and wherever appropriate to have regard to, the licensing objectives, and

 (b) to permit gambling, in so far as thinks it reasonably consistent with pursuit of the licensing objectives.”

The licensing objectives were not entirely new inclusions in the 2005 Act, having been carried forward from the Gaming Act, 1968, albeit somewhat reworded. The third licensing objective – “protecting children and other vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by gambling” is relevant, as the basis for affordability checks. In the Statement of Principles, the Commission at 5.26 states that:

“With regard to ‘vulnerable persons’, whilst the following list is not exhaustive, the Commission considers that this group will include:

    • people who spend more money and/or time gambling than they want to;
    • people who gamble beyond their means;
    • people who may not be able to make informed or balanced decisions about gambling, for example because of health problems, learning disability, or substance misuse relating to alcohol or drugs.”

The wording of the third licensing objective refers firstly to children, and then to other vulnerable persons. The use of that word “other”, and the position in which it appears in the wording of this licensing objective is significant: it is there for a reason. Children are, by law, incapable of making adult informed decisions. Gambling is an adult activity, again by law, as is the consumption of alcohol or the use of tobacco products. In our view the use of other is to indicate that this is the standard by which vulnerability is to be judged; i.e, that it means people who are unable to make a properly informed, or ‘adult’, decision. Plainly, that would include those referred to in the Commission’s third bullet point above. It might include some in the second, though this is too widely expressed. The same point applies to the first. But both of these would depend upon fact and degree: who amongst us has not at some time spent more than we set out to do, carried away by the moment, in a pub, restaurant, or shop? It does not necessarily follow that we are vulnerable people.

In recent years the Commission has interpreted “vulnerable persons” increasingly broadly in its publications and speeches, to include not just those who demonstrate a problem with gambling, or even those who are at risk of being problem gamblers, but to include those “who may be at risk of harms associated with gambling”. In reality, this could include everyone who indulges in gambling at any level. Despite the fall in the percentage of problem gamblers in recent years, or perhaps because of it, the Commission has expanded the class of people whom it considers to be vulnerable. This is not what the legislation intended. Moreover, it is the exercise of arbitrary power with no Parliamentary oversight. The absence of this oversight is all the more concerning when the progress of the 2005 Act through Parliament is considered.

Volume I of the Joint Committee Report on the Draft Gambling Bill (Session 2003-04) was produced by the Joint Committee on the Draft Gambling Bill, appointed by the House of Commons and the House of Lords to consider and report on any clauses of the draft Gambling Bill.  It includes, at Annex 1, a schedule of detailed comments on the draft Bill. It is of note that, in response to a comment made by the Gordon House Association, that “the concept of protecting children and the vulnerable must be extended to include those whose lives are detrimentally affected by problem gambling”, the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (“DCMS”), indicated that it did not expect “vulnerable persons” to be interpreted so broadly when it stated:

“DCMS does not consider that the protection afforded by the Bill needs to extend to this wider group or persons who may be affected by the gambling of others.”

As a result of this ambiguity, the proposal in the Consultation on affordability to amend the Social Responsibility Code to require that licensees “must take account of the Commission’s definition of vulnerability”, amounts to an inappropriate suggestion that the Commission should make legislation, thereby assuming for itself that which is the prerogative of Parliament. The duty of the Commission is to uphold the licensing objectives, not to rewrite them, particularly when this rewriting appears to extend the ambit further than Parliament intended.

It follows that those who are not in fact vulnerable should be free to enjoy their gambling without interference, intrusive interrogation, or, worse still, demands for the provision of highly sensitive private financial information. For the Commission to seek to introduce measures to require such an invasion into the rights of individuals appears to be contrary to their duty to permit gambling where it is consistent with the licensing objectives.

The Gambling Review

Early in December the Government announced the Gambling Review. At the same time, DCMS published its Response to the House of Lords Committee recommendations (the “Response”). In relation to affordability, DCMS commented:

“However, we are not waiting for the Gambling Act Review to take action in this area. The Gambling Commission is, as recommended by the Committee, already consulting and calling for evidence on proposals to strengthen requirements on licensees to identify and interact with customers who may be at risk of harm. Alongside clear expectations on affordability checks, this consultation includes questions for discussion around markers of harm, how to identify and respond to vulnerability and how best to respond to risks for customers in particular situations.”

As we and other commentators, notably Regulus Partners have said, affordability affects every aspect of gambling structure and licensing objectives and potentially profoundly impacts them. In addition, it has massive implications for the cost of compliance and the economic health of the industry, as well as worrying implication for the liberty of consumers. There is therefore a very strong case for the type of affordability measures being proposed by the Commission to be considered as part of the Gambling Review. That affordability requirements were being introduced before the conclusion of the Consultation and before the Gambling Review, potentially renders much of the discussion and evidence irrelevant. By the time that Government and Parliament come to consider new legislation, the Commission will have pre-empted the process, with the consequence that the industry may already have been transformed beyond recognition, and not for the better.

In the Response, the Government – rightly in our view – said that addressing the risk of gamblers spending more than they can afford would involve a number of considerations, “including the need to strike an appropriate balance between player protection and the freedom of individuals to choose how they spend their money”.  These are matters which embrace constitutional and human rights questions, which fall outside the statutory remit of the Commission. It is for the Review, and subsequently Parliament, to determine the future course of gambling legislation and regulation, not the Commission. Whilst the duty of the Commission is to regulate, it cannot be within its power to determine the level of regulation.

It seems to us that the Commission, by its commendable but unrealistic desire to abolish all gambling related harm, is at the root of the problem; it has lost sight of what the then Government recognised in developing the Bill which became the 2005 Act, when it stated in paragraph 7.3 of “A Safe Bet for Success”: “It is impossible to do away with problem gambling; and excessive controls could make matters worse by encouraging the growth of illegal gambling.”  The Commission is dubious about the second part of that statement, but it certainly needs to accept the first part.

In the light of recent rumours, it is to be hoped that the process will now be halted, pending the Gambling Review. The issues raised are, in our opinion, too fundamental to fall within the purview or power of the Commission. This is not to say that the exercise was wasted; the evidence gathered can form part of the material for consideration as part of the Review.

The first stage on the road to recovery from any addiction, be it gambling, alcohol or drugs, is recognising and admitting the problem. This is a lesson which the Commission, which might be said to be at risk of developing a problem with regulation, would be wise to learn, or it may have to be taught by others: Government, Parliament or the courts.

With thanks to David Whyte for his invaluable co-authorship.

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22Apr

The Affordability Debate (2): Ambiguous Regulatory Requirements

22nd April 2021 David Whyte Anti-Money Laundering, Harris Hagan, Responsible Gambling 286

Following the closure of the Gambling Commission’s (the “Commission”) consultation Remote customer interaction – Consultation and Call for Evidence (the “Consultation”), on 9 February 2021, which yielded some 13,000 responses, we are now in the midst of an ‘affordability debate’. However, this debate is largely focused on the future, to the detriment of the present. At a time when licensees are proactively striving to improve their standards and prioritising their approach to safer gambling, it is apparent that licensees are unsure as to precisely what they need to do to remain compliant with present Commission affordability requirements, what those requirements are, and where they are specified.

Tim Miller, in his speech at the CMS Conference in March 2021, stated that “the process of giving detailed consideration to all the evidence is still ongoing with extensive further work and engagement likely to be needed.” Mr Miller went on to state that “clarifying existing rules will be our immediate priority in any next steps.” What Mr Miller does not say, however, is when that will be and what is going to happen in the interim.

A cynic may say that this lack of clarity operates to the benefit of the Commission in its pursuit of its affordability objectives as outlined in the Consultation. Two consequences are clear. Firstly, there are signs that the Commission is subjecting licensees to a series of requirements, none of which are clearly set out in licence conditions, codes of practice, or formal guidance issued by the Commission under its statutory remit.

Secondly, licensees concerned to ensure that they adhere to the Commission’s expectations are likely to interpret the limited formal guidance on affordability cautiously; many in our experience even taking into account the Consultation itself. This can only be to the advancement of the Commission’s affordability objectives. We will deal in a later article with the impact of this precipitate action by the Commission on the Consultation and the Gambling Review.

Current position

Despite what some licensees may have experienced when engaging with the Commission, the measures proposed in the Consultation are not in force. The Commission’s present requirements are instead spread across its last two annual enforcement reports and one formal guidance document, in addition to its published regulatory sanctions and/or settlements.

The Commission takes the view that its enforcement reports serve as indicators to licensees of its expectations, for which licensees can be held to account; these reports therefore arguably contain policy positions that, if enforced, are more akin to licence conditions or code provisions. We have discussed previously our concerns that the Commission may be making indirect changes to licence conditions and/or code provisions through its introduction of requirements to adhere to guidance and this is perhaps another, somewhat broader, example of the same.

We do not agree that the enforcement reports carry the weight of formal guidance. It is clear from the content of the licence conditions and codes of practice (“LCCP”) that in cases where the Commission expects licensees to adhere to formal guidance, it says so. Social Responsibility Code Provisions 2.1 (anti-money laundering – casino) and 3.4 (customer interaction) are examples of the Commission explicitly requiring licensees to adhere to, or take into account, specific formal guidance, the latter requiring that licensees take into account the Commission’s formal guidance on customer interaction. Nowhere in the LCCP is there any reference to the enforcement reports carrying such weight: the closest the Commission comes to this is in licence condition 12.1.1 (3) which, solely in relation to licensees’ obligation to ensure they have appropriate policies, procedures and controls to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, requires that they:

“… take into account any applicable learning or guidelines published by the Gambling Commission from time to time.”

Putting aside the breadth by which this statement may be interpreted, it is clear that this obligation relates to anti-money laundering and not directly to safer gambling or affordability. This appears to be the cause for ambiguity in this area; an evolution of affordability from its apparent origins as a money laundering concern – historically some licensees’ customers having been identified as having gambled with criminal spend – to it now being central to the Commission’s expectations from a safer gambling perspective.

This is further evident from a consideration of the Commission’s introduction to its section on affordability in Raising Standards for Consumers – Enforcement report 2018-19 (the “Enforcement Report 2019”) where it states:

“Some of these individuals have funded their gambling activity through the misappropriation of monies from businesses, the taking out of unaffordable loans and misappropriating the funds from vulnerable people.”

The obligation, as outlined in the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, that licensees who hold casino operating licences obtain evidence of source of funds and source of wealth on a risk-based approach in order to mitigate money laundering risks will of course extend to their consideration of affordability. However, this should be as a risk factor that may, when subjectively assessed, increase the risk of money laundering and the financing of terrorism and trigger further enquiries. It is not at present a requirement at a certain level of spend.

When affordability is considered solely from a safer gambling perspective, a formal requirement to obtain evidence of affordability is impossible to identify and the Commission’s expectations are ambiguous at best, even more so given our contention that the enforcement reports may not operate as formal guidance on this matter. How then, is it reasonable for the Commission to hold licensees to account for failings in this area?

1. Enforcement Report 2019

The Enforcement Report 2019 outlines various open-source data sources that may help licensees to “assess affordability for its GB customer base and improve its risk assessment and customer interventions.” This data focusses largely on Office of National Statistics (ONS) and YouGov data highlighting average annual salary and monthly personal disposable income. The report goes on to state that:

“The above disposable income data identified clear benchmarks that should drive Social Responsibility (SR) triggers which will help to identify gambling-related harm by considering affordability.”

“Benchmark triggers should be a starting point for engaging with customers and are not intended to definitively demonstrate a customer is suffering from gambling related harm – but they can help identify instances when an operator needs to understand more about a customer, their play and affordability.”

“If an operator is going to set specific triggers for a customer base not representative of the general public, various documents sources should be relied upon, but they must contain sufficient information to substantiate the trigger level set.

In conclusion, we would recommend that operators revisit their framework on triggers and consider their customer base and their disposable income levels as a starting point for deciding benchmark triggers.”

It is of note that there is no recommendation in the Enforcement Report 2019 that licensees should obtain evidence of affordability from customers whose losses reach national average incomes. As we have discussed above, this requirement, it seems, comes from the Commission’s interpretation of money laundering legislation and certain licensees’ obligations to obtain, on a risk-based approach, evidence of source of funds and source of wealth. Rather, the Enforcement Report 2019 focusses on disposable income data being used to set “benchmark triggers” as a starting point for engagement.

2. Customer interaction – formal guidance for remote/premises based gambling operators – July 2019 (the “CI Guidance”)

When describing the Commission’s expectations as to how licensees must identify customers who may be at risk of experiencing harms associated with gambling, the CI Guidance refers to affordability and states:

“Operators should aim to identify those experiencing or at risk of harm and intervene to try to reduce harm at the earliest opportunity. Reliance on deposit or loss thresholds that are set too high will result in failing to detect some customers who may be experiencing significant harms associated with their gambling. It is therefore imperative that threshold levels are set appropriately.

Open source data exists which can help operators assess affordability for their GB customer base and improve their risk assessment for customer interactions. Thresholds should be realistic, based on average available income for your customers. This should include Office of National Statistics publications on levels of household income.”

Again, as with the Enforcement Report 2019, there is no suggestion in the CI Guidance that licensees should be obtaining evidence of affordability from customers whose losses reach national averages, rather it suggests that affordability is a factor that should be considered when developing customer interaction policies and aiming to identify customers who may be experiencing or at risk of experiencing harm. There is a significant difference between “ to try to reduce harm at the earliest opportunity” and requiring customers to produce extensive evidence to justify their level of spend when they reach a threshold.

3. Raising standards for consumers – Compliance and Enforcement report 2019-20 (the “Enforcement Report 2020”)

The Enforcement Report 2020 was published three days after the Consultation – a decision that will not have helped licensees to understand what is, and what is not, required. In referring to the recommendations it made in the Enforcement Report 2019, and considering customers who have “demonstrated gambling related harm indicators and been able to continue to gamble without effective engagement”, the Commission states:

“Furthermore, these individuals have funded their gambling without satisfactory affordability checks and appropriate evidence being obtained.”

The Enforcement Report 2020 goes on to outline various open source data sources that can help licensees to “assess affordability for GB customers and improve risk assessment and customer inventions”. Again, the data presented primarily focusses on average annual salary as outlined in the ONS survey of Hours and Earnings. The Commission goes on to state that:

“Open source information is an important element of an affordability framework because it is a parameter to consider when setting benchmark triggers that will drive early engagement with customers.”

“We are concerned licensees are creating complex and convoluted matrices and mappings within their affordability framework to place customers into trigger groups well over the gross earnings stated above, before disposable income is factored in. Of more concern, these trigger groups are set without any sort of customer interaction to influence their true affordability determination.”

“Operators must interact with customers early on to set adequate, informed affordability triggers to protect customers from gambling related harm. Failure to do so could render the operator non-compliant.”

“Customers wishing to spend more than the national average should be asked to provide information to support a higher affordability trigger such as three months’ payslips, P60s, tax returns or bank statements which will both inform the affordability level the customer may believe appropriate with objective evidence whilst enabling the licensee to have better insight into the source of those funds and whether they are legitimate or not.”

Importantly, outside of the Consultation, this is the first occasion on which the Commission makes any reference to licensees requiring customers to provide information or evidence in relation to affordability. This time, suggesting evidence is required only when customers wish to “spend more than the national average”. The obvious question here, and a conundrum which we know licensees have been struggling with, is “to what national average does the Commission refer?”

There is a significant difference between the national average salary (stated as c£30,500) and average weekly gross earnings (stated as c£585.00). Should customers be evidencing affordability for losses exceeding £585 per week, or for losses exceeding £30,000 per year; or is there another average that is relevant?  

What is expected now?

In his Speech at the CMS Conference in March 2021, Tim Miller suggested in that he did not expect the Commission to be announcing its plans on affordability imminently. Mr Miller also stated:

“…in our casework and compliance activity we continue to see example after example of operators who have allowed people to gamble amounts that are clearly unaffordable with very limited or no customer interaction until a very late stage. Just to be clear, we are not talking about grey areas here. We are talking about clearly unaffordable levels of gambling.”

Some of the handpicked examples in the enforcement reports demonstrate what almost all would agree are, without evidence of affordability, “clearly unacceptable levels of gambling”, for example a customer losing £187,000 in two days with no regular source of income. However, other examples of which we are aware are not so straightforward and are certainly not at, on any reasonable interpretation, “clearly unacceptable levels”. This is, in practice, most certainly a grey area. The consequence is that licensees who have prioritised safer gambling and, due to their misunderstanding of the Commission’s expectations, are at best criticised, or at worst subjected to regulatory action, because of a failure to meet those expectations in relation to affordability.

Since the publication of the Consultation, we have heard of licensees being criticised during compliance assessments for failing to obtain evidence of affordability from customers who have exhibited no clear signs of problem gambling, are at a low risk of harm, have never raised any concerns themselves, and who have informed licensees that they are comfortable with their gambling spend. This is not to say that licensees should not adhere to the CI Guidance and conduct customer interactions with these customers when and if they reach internally identified thresholds. It is also not to say that licensees should not take affordability into account and discuss the same with customers; but when are they required to evidence affordability?

Ambiguity inevitably leads to inconsistencies. Can “benchmark triggers” or “trigger groups” roll over and/or reset monthly/annually or are they expected to be final? Spend of say £60,000 presents very differently when it has taken place at a consistent rate over 10 years. The same applies to losses of £5,000 in a 3–6-month period when there are no other reasons for concern; yet examples such as these are being raised as concerns by the Commission. These customers are not spending “above the national average”, whatever average to which the Commission means to refer in the Enforcement Report 2020, and therefore it is at least reasonable for licensees, to decide at their discretion that there is no need to require evidence of affordability in these cases.

Licensees’ use of open-source data is also criticised for being inadequate, even in cases where this data more than adequately mitigates risk by demonstrating income at or above the national average, despite reference in the Enforcement Report 2020 to the same being “an important element of an affordability framework”.

The result of this ambiguity is that in our experience Commission activity demonstrates a much lower tolerated threshold than the CI Guidance and enforcement reports suggest; a threshold more aligned with the Consultation. In the current climate, this not only exposes licensees to unreasonable criticism from the Commission, but also places those licensees who are unlucky enough to undergo a compliance assessment at a time of such uncertainty, at a commercial disadvantage; a diligent response to criticism being to reduce thresholds and require evidence of affordability sooner, even if this is neither deemed necessary nor yet a formal requirement. One may question whether the Commission has overlooked its statutory obligation to “permit gambling, in so far as thinks it reasonably consistent with the pursuit of the licensing objectives”.

The impact

It is no secret that licensees are frustrated and confused, and understandably so. Discretion has given way to prudence; licensees are in the unenviable position of having to second guess what the Commission really expects and compliance assessments are becoming one-sided affairs where, in the main, Commission employees attend with an almost preconceived view as to what is and is not acceptable application of discretion. Nobody is perfect and, due to ambiguity, it is easy enough to call into question individual cases. This is not to say, however, that the vulnerable are not being protected. A very large proportion of the customers whose accounts are reviewed by the Commission never have and never will identify as problem gamblers; they are simply spending their money as they wish, even if at a level that Commission considers inappropriate.

Of course, the regulatory framework permits licensees to challenge the Commission’s findings. The reality, however, is that few choose to do so. Commercial realities, protracted Commission investigations, publicity considerations, cost and perhaps shareholder influence, result in most licensees entering into regulatory settlements with the Commission or accepting its findings. This is often their decision whatever the merits of their case. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that a general consensus amongst licensees is that the ultimate sanction will likely be the same anyway, particularly given the ambiguous guidance, so why incur further costs and prolong the inevitable?

Rather than regulate an industry that operates in fear: not the fear of deserved punishment, but fear of a being chosen and inevitably sanctioned for failing to do something it did not fully understand, the Commission would be better placed regulating an industry that is clear on what is expected of it. The present regulatory expectations in relation to affordability are grey and unclear. The Commission has acknowledged as much by consulting on prescriptive requirements. That Consultation now appears stymied, and it is incumbent upon the Commission to back up Tim Miller’s positive acknowledgement that “clarifying existing rules will be immediate priority” and act with urgency to clarify the existing requirements against which it is enforcing. The Commission had no reservation in moving quickly to issue additional formal guidance for remote operators during the Covid-19 outbreak last year, albeit without consultation, so it is capable of acting in haste.

Better understanding will raise standards and could easily be achieved through clarity in guidance. Informal engagement and discussion with the industry, and even possibly training (both internally and externally) controlled, prepared or delivered by the Commission would also be of benefit. How better to put effectively to use some of the £30 million paid in financial penalties and regulatory settlements in the past 12 months? In the meantime, what is absolutely not acceptable is for the Commission to wield its powers through compliance assessments to impose affordability requirements upon licensees which it has so far failed to implement through statutory consultation.

With thanks to Julian Harris for his invaluable co-authorship.

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18May

New Gambling Commission Guidance for Online Operators: Changing the Basis of Regulation?

18th May 2020 Julian Harris Harris Hagan 359

Introduction

The Gambling Commission’s recently published purported “guidance” for online operators (“New Guidance”), issued under social responsibility code provision 3.4.1 (“SRCP 3.4.1”) of the LCCP, highlights how carefully it is focusing on a perceived risk presented by the current COVID-19 crisis. If this risk does exist – and the evidence on which the Gambling Commission (the “Commission”) relies is questionable at best – it is unlikely that anybody would dispute the need to recognise and address it: operators do not want to benefit from problem gamblers, consumers must be protected, and the depreciating reputation of the industry in the wider public eye must be addressed.

However, the manner by which the Commission has implemented the New Guidance and the strength of its content, is suggestive of the Commission taking a novel approach that facilitates prescriptive changes to its regulatory framework without consultation or notice.

The data is, we have said, questionable, which is an issue for separate discussion. However, even if accepted at face value, it does not support emergency measures introduced at little notice without consultation. In their press statement, the Commission notes that “during lockdown gambling participation is down overall” and concludes that “there is no evidence to suggest an increase in problem gambling.”

The law 

The Commission issued SRCP 3.4.1 under section 24(2) of the Gambling Act 2005.  Section 24(10) which requires that before issuing or revising a code of practice, the Commission shall consult (inter alia): the Secretary of State; Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Customs and Excise; one or more persons who appear to the Commission to represent the interests of persons who carry on gambling businesses and are likely to be affected by the code or revision; and one or more persons who appear to the Commission to have knowledge about social problems relating to gambling.

SRCP 3.4.1 is not a licence condition; it is a code provision that, by virtue of section 82 and as a consequence of it being a SRCP, is subject to the licence condition that it is complied with. This is an important distinction as, were it to be a general licence condition under section 76 the requirements for general licence conditions under that section would apply. These prescribe that, before specifying the licence condition the Commission must consult and that at least three months’ notice be provided to the holders of affected operating licences.  Section 76(5) permits the Commission to specify a licence condition without providing this required notice “if it thinks it necessary by reason of urgency”, but requires it to “give as much notice as it thinks possible in the circumstances”. 

By combining its reference to SRCP 3.4.1 and the New Guidance in the same paragraphs when publishing it on its website, the Commission has caused confusion and led some operators and commentators to conclude that it has amended this SRCP. This misapprehension is then compounded by the fact that when the Commission first introduced its guidance on customer interaction in July 2019 (the “2019 Guidance”), it consulted on that change.

The Commission cannot properly have amended SRCP 3.4.1; had it done so, it would have acted in breach of the requirements of the Gambling Act 2005 by failing to consult in line with section 24. In this case, the Commission has introduced additional formal guidance under the SRCP.

2019 guidance

SRCP 3.4.1 requires that licensees “take into account the Commission’s guidance on customer interaction”. The 2019 Guidance sets out why customer interaction is a requirement and provides operators with suggestions as to how the Commission’s expectations can be met. The Commission states in this guidance:

“For compliance and enforcement purposes, we will expect licensees to demonstrate how their policies, procedures and practices meet the required outcomes. This can be through implementing relevant parts of the guidance or demonstrating how and why implementing alternative solutions equally meet the outcomes.”

Introducing guidance under SCRP 3.4.1 was an arguably sensible approach. It enables the Commission to outline to operators in more detail how they can meet its expectations in applying the SRCP.

The New Guidance: not what it seems

The New Guidance issued by the Commission is not as broad as the 2019 Guidance. It uses very different wording and is less outcome focused. It requires licensees to undertake specific measures. This is clear from the requirement that operators “prevent reverse withdrawal options for customers until further notice”, an issue that has justifiably been on the Commission’s radar for some time, now brought into effect and, given the Commission’s reference to a consultation on this issue following later this month, that is unlikely to change. By including such specific directions, this is guidance in name only; the consequence being that whether intentional or not, the Commission has amended the SRCP by the back door, avoiding the need to adhere to the requirements of the legislation

The New Guidance is made all the more difficult for operators to understand, given the mismatch between the press statement accompanying the New Guidance, and the New Guidance itself. An example of this is the statement included that “operators must take account of the Commission’s guidance, which makes it clear they should: … interact with customers who have been playing for an hour in a single session of play”. This is inconsistent with the New Guidance, which requires operators to “specifically, review time indicators to capture play in excess of one hour as this is a proxy for potential harm”. Should all customers be interacted with after an hour, or is this just an indicator to be considered?

Operators therefore find themselves in an unenviable position. Despite their ongoing efforts to protect consumers during the COVID-19 crisis, they are forced, with little notice and no consultation, to make immediate changes to their policies, procedures, terms and conditions and processes, in order to take into account prescriptive guidance. In the absence of any consultation, this guidance is difficult to interpret, it is based on limited and questionable data, and may be inconsistent with their own experience and observations: all at potential detriment to other valuable projects in the consumer protection field that may have to be side-lined.

Nobody would challenge efforts by the Commission to protect consumers throughout this crisis. However, a demonstrable understanding of the industry it regulates, sympathy for the time it takes to implement change, and adherence to the outcomes based flexibility that allows operators to focus on the consumer risks identified in their business, may ultimately produce better results. Arguably, a consultation, however short, would have enhanced the impact of the New Guidance, avoided confusion, and provided at least some notice.

A sign of things to come?

By taking the course of action that it has, the Commission has perhaps signalled a questionable new approach. Its introduction of guidance under SRCP 3.4.1 has, whether intentionally or not, made indirect, prescriptive changes to code provisions carrying the weight of licence conditions, without it having to consult, or provide notice. Operators should be aware of this and be ready to take prompt action the next time the Commission introduces further guidance at short notice. Whatever the merits of changes introduced by the Commission, it is vitally important that it acts transparently, proportionately and fairly in accordance with its own Statement of principles for licensing and regulation, if high standards are to be achieved and the industry’s trust in its regulator is to be maintained.

With thanks to my colleague David Whyte for his invaluable co-authorship

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16Apr

Vlog on Gambling Commission Licences

16th April 2020 Bahar Alaeddini Harris Hagan, Training 345

I am pleased to share our new training vlog on the basics of licences issued by the Gambling Commission. Happy watching!

The contents of this video are for general information purposes. Nothing in this video constitutes legal advice and legal advice should always be taken on appropriate gambling legal, regulatory and licensing requirements.

Harris Hagan is committed to creating and sharing content you will be interested about and will find useful.  Please email us with any (reasonable!) suggestions for future training vlogs.

If you have enjoyed watching our vlog, please like, comment or share.

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