23Dec

Where is the harm? Implications of regulatory revisionism for customer interactions

23rd December 2022 David Whyte 217

In this – the second in a series of articles on the Gambling Commission’s (the “Commission”) consultation (the “Consultation”) on the proposed Customer Interaction – Guidance for remote operators (the “Guidance”) – Harris Hagan and Regulus Partners consider the concept of ‘vulnerability to harm’ that underpins the Guidance. The Commission proposes that licensees be required to identify “harm”, “potential harm” and “vulnerable states” by monitoring customer behaviour, scrutinising private information and making assessments based on a range of demographic characteristics. While licensees should always be sensitive to customer wellbeing, the Commission’s attempt to translate common sense into a bureaucratic checklist appears to be at odds with the intent of the Gambling Act 2005 (the “2005 Act”), regulatory coherence and the best interests of consumers.

Vulnerability and harm

The Guidance requires licensees to identify customers exhibiting “indicators of harm” as well as those who – for a wide variety of reasons – may be “vulnerable” to gambling harms. For these terms to be meaningful, it is important first to understand what the regulator wishes to convey by the term “harm”. While the Guidance itself is silent on this matter, the Commission has defined gambling harms in its Update: Pilot of survey questions to understand gambling-related harm as “the adverse impacts from gambling on the health and wellbeing of individuals, families, communities and society.” Emphasising the breadth of the concept, it adds that “these harms are diverse, affecting resources, relationships and health, and may reflect an interplay between individual, family and community processes. The harmful effects from gambling may be short-lived but can persist, having longer-term and enduring consequences that can exacerbate existing inequalities.”

To hammer home the scale of the problem, the Commission enumerates 27 “harms” experienced by gambling consumers and a further 13 “harms” to “affected others”. Some of these adverse impacts are incontrovertible – financial consequences such as problematic debt being the least ambiguous – but others are less clear-cut. The Commission, for example, defines having less money to go to the cinema or “other forms of entertainment” as a harm from gambling. Spending money on one pastime in preference to another – as the Australian academic, Professor Paul Delfabbro has pointed out – is “more akin to opportunity costs than true harm”. Its inclusion in the ‘Index’ suggests a moral judgement on those people who prefer to spend their own money on betting in preference to the movies or a meal out. Among the Commission’s other “harms”, we also encounter “feeling like a failure” which in its weakest form is a potential corollary of all unsuccessful wagers and “spending less time with people you care about”, a test that many activities, including going to work or attending a school or college, would fall foul of.

Are these the “harms” or “potential harms” that the Commission expects its licensees to identify? If so, how does it expect them to do so? Will licensees, for example, be required to scrutinise bank statements in order to understand whether or not customers are movie-goers? With what degree of regularity must customers be going to the flicks in order to satisfy the regulator? This may be a case of reductio ad absurdum – but it illustrates the fact that the Commission has in fact set some fairly absurd tests for what should be considered harmful. In the absence of clearer direction, operators are expected to make their own judgements about which of the “harms” listed by the Commission they should be attempting to identify.

A list of 21 prescribed “indicators of harm” are provided in the Guidance as a minimum – but not exhaustive – set of standards. The basis for the selection of these indicators is not made clear, supporting evidence is often not cited, and generally they lack all but the most conceptual definitions. For licensees, this presents a significant challenge in terms of operationalising the indicators. How, for example, should a licensee create a rule for “amount of money spent on gambling compared with other customers”? Is this intended to suggest that anyone spending above the mean (or median) is displaying an indicator of harm? As written, it could be used to describe anyone wagering more than the lowest-spending decile, which would be more than “other customers”. Another example is the “use of multiple products”, without any definition of what constitutes a “product”. Are football betting and tennis betting different “products” or a single product (i.e. sports betting)? Is a ‘Rainbow Riches’ slot game a different product to ‘Cleopatra’, as manufacturers would certainly contend? Where certain activities are concerned, any participation at all is considered potentially problematic. In-play betting is classified as an automatic indicator of harm. Although, as we will explain in a further blog, this appears to be based on the Commission’s misreading of its own evidence.

So much for harm; but what about “vulnerability”? Here, the Guidance does at least provide some kind of definition of what a “vulnerable person” is: “somebody who, due to their personal circumstances, is especially susceptible to harm, particularly when a firm is not acting with appropriate levels of care”.

Harris Hagan has raised previously its concerns about the transformation of what the Commission considers to be “vulnerability” and its inclusion of a definition of the term in guidance. It is for Parliament, not the Commission to define a statutory term that is included in the 2005 Act and which Parliament did not find it necessary to define, having clearly considered the interpretation of vulnerability a straightforward matter. Reference in the third licensing objective firstly to children, and then to other vulnerable persons adequately sets out Parliament’s intention that the licensing objectives apply to those people not able to make properly informed or ‘adult’ decisions.

The operative phrase in the definition in the Guidance – “especially susceptible to harm” – implies that vulnerability is a rare or exceptional condition rather than a state shared by the majority. This conceptualisation is however, undermined by the Commission’s use of illustrative examples. “Young adults” are categorised as vulnerable (around 12% of the population are between the ages of 18 and 24 years); but so are “older adults” (23% of the population are 65 or older). Poor physical health denotes vulnerability (43% of adults have a long-standing medical condition); as does poor mental health; (17% have a common mental health disorder; 16% have an eating disorder). One is vulnerable if one is bereaved (15% of us each year), has caring responsibilities (13%) or has dyslexia (10%). Most perplexing of all, a “higher than standard level of trust or appetite for risk” – a quality that might be said to be a defining characteristic of any gambler – is also sufficient to qualify an individual as vulnerable.

The Guidance refers to the Financial Conduct Authority’s (“FCA”) observation that 46% of adults “display one or more characteristics of vulnerability” and indeed, the Commission’s definition of vulnerability is identical to that used by the FCA in its Guidance for firms on the fair treatment of vulnerable customers – February 2021 (the “FCA Guidance”). The FCA Guidance is, however, prepared to serve an entirely different purpose. It is issued under s139A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (legislation which, unlike the 2005 Act, makes no reference to vulnerability) and provides guidance on the FCA’s Principles for Business, which state that, “a firm must pay regards to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly”. Principle-based regulation of this nature almost certainly requires guidance and the FCA is justified in defining vulnerability in that context; that the Commission seeks to take an identical approach to the FCA, in an entirely different context, is not.

There is a difference between the FCA’s intention that regulated firms identify “characteristics of vulnerability” to ensure they treat their customers fairly and in accordance with their needs, and the Commission’s duty under the 2005 Act to permit gambling in so far as it thinks it reasonably consistent with, the licensing objective of “protecting children and other vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by gambling”. The Commission’s reinterpretation of “vulnerability” as a universal rather than exceptional state risks distorting and undermining the legislation that it is required to enforce – replacing parliamentary sovereignty with regulatory fiat. Furthermore, the Commission prescribes a requirement in SRCP 3.4.3. It therefore had the opportunity, following consultation, to set out precisely its definition of vulnerability when introducing that requirement. That it now seeks to widen the parameters of that requirement in the Guidance, is plainly wrong.

The concept of vulnerability

The suggestion that we are all vulnerable may be true at a certain banal level – but it is inconsistent with the intent of the legislation and also the Commission’s own conception of ‘especial susceptibility to harm’. A system of customer monitoring predicated on the idea of universal vulnerability risks failing those in genuine need of protection. There are a number of other practical considerations which the Guidance fails to address. For instance, it suggests, by way of reference to past enforcement cases, that operators must routinely scrutinise customer bank statements in order to harvest medical information, or risk facing sanctions for failing to do so. This raises complex ethical issues of discrimination and data protection. Should operators, for example, treat customers differently on the basis of a perceived medical condition (which they are expected to glean from banking data)? How might customers feel about betting companies holding information (however obtained and however accurate) about their health?

To illustrate the scale of the challenge presented by the Guidance, consider the following fictitious scenario. A 24-year-old with dyslexia who bets in-play on football and cricket and spends slightly above the average for his age group could plausibly be said to raise three ‘vulnerability’ flags and three ‘indicators of harm’. As we observe in the next in this series of articles, a licensee would be required to determine for itself whether or not the presence of six ‘indicators’ would necessitate an interaction, and if so of what variety. It is inevitable that operators will adopt widely divergent interpretations in such instances, with implications for market distortion. Perhaps more significantly, the Guidance creates ample scope for disagreement between licensees and the Commission about whether a customer is vulnerable or displaying genuine indicators of harm.

That “vulnerability” is to be determined by whether a “firm”, which we understand to mean a licensed operator (again the use of “firm” a reflection of the Commission’s use of the FCA’s definition), is “acting with appropriate levels of care”. The decision as to whether a licensee has acted with appropriate levels of care must ultimately rest with the Commission and therefore it seems that vulnerability will be determined subjectively by the Commission, almost certainly in hindsight. Further, by suggesting, incorrectly, that licensees have a duty of care at law to prevent customers from gambling if they are or might meet the Commission’s definition of vulnerability, the Commission risks improperly introducing such a duty in law, or at least exposing licensees to such a challenge. This is dangerous territory for any regulator, and for licensees.

Autonomy – a wider debate

Finally, there are some genuine ‘slippery slope’ consequences for the wider economy, privacy and personal freedom. One of the Commission’s key items of evidence for the proposed interactions regime is a survey carried out in 2020 by the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute (‘MMHPI’) included in the report A Safer Bet. The Commission states that 24% of people with mental health problems experienced financial problems in consequence of online gambling and 32% said that they had bet more than they could afford to lose. This representation of the findings is misleading (the survey was of people with mental health problems who had gambled online and not all people with mental health problems – an important distinction); as is the Commission’s repeated misuse of the Problem Gambling Severity Index item “bet more than afford to lose”, which is a risky behaviour rather than a harm.

Quite aside from matters of precision, there is an important omission of context. In the same year, the MMHPI also published the results of a survey on online shopping by people with mental health problems – with very similar, and in some cases more alarming, results. The MMHPI report, Convenience at a cost found that 29% of respondents had spent more than they could afford when shopping online while 63% “had cut back on essentials” and 56% “had fallen seriously behind on payments for bills or debt repayments as a result of not being able to control their spending.” In short, the basis for regulatory intervention on remote gambling could just as easily be applied to shopping with Amazon or Tesco. Context is important because it helps us understand whether state action in one domain is consistent with broader societal ‘rules’ – and so deters unfair discrimination against particular groups (in this case, people who enjoy gambling). The Commission’s deliberate exclusion of this information, which was brought to its attention as part of the original consultation, is unhelpful and reinforces the idea that the regulator is not in earnest in its use of public consultations.

The Commission’s obsession with vulnerability suggests a rather hopeless outlook on life. To the extent that we are all, to some extent vulnerable, we are all resilient too and possessed of broad powers of self-regulation. An exclusive focus on what makes us weak with no recognition of what makes us strong is distortive and may lead to negative consequences – most obviously through undermining individual agency, which is an essential ingredient for wellbeing.

The identification of harm and vulnerability set out in the Guidance is the basis for ramping up operator interactions with customers, which may in some cases be warranted. The practical implications of the requirements to interact, and to evaluate the effect of those interactions, is the subject of our next article.

With thanks to Dan Waugh from Regulus Partners for his invaluable co-authorship.

22Apr

The Affordability Debate (2): Ambiguous Regulatory Requirements

22nd April 2021 David Whyte 286

Following the closure of the Gambling Commission’s (the “Commission”) consultation Remote customer interaction – Consultation and Call for Evidence (the “Consultation”), on 9 February 2021, which yielded some 13,000 responses, we are now in the midst of an ‘affordability debate’. However, this debate is largely focused on the future, to the detriment of the present. At a time when licensees are proactively striving to improve their standards and prioritising their approach to safer gambling, it is apparent that licensees are unsure as to precisely what they need to do to remain compliant with present Commission affordability requirements, what those requirements are, and where they are specified.

Tim Miller, in his speech at the CMS Conference in March 2021, stated that “the process of giving detailed consideration to all the evidence is still ongoing with extensive further work and engagement likely to be needed.” Mr Miller went on to state that “clarifying existing rules will be our immediate priority in any next steps.” What Mr Miller does not say, however, is when that will be and what is going to happen in the interim.

A cynic may say that this lack of clarity operates to the benefit of the Commission in its pursuit of its affordability objectives as outlined in the Consultation. Two consequences are clear. Firstly, there are signs that the Commission is subjecting licensees to a series of requirements, none of which are clearly set out in licence conditions, codes of practice, or formal guidance issued by the Commission under its statutory remit.

Secondly, licensees concerned to ensure that they adhere to the Commission’s expectations are likely to interpret the limited formal guidance on affordability cautiously; many in our experience even taking into account the Consultation itself. This can only be to the advancement of the Commission’s affordability objectives. We will deal in a later article with the impact of this precipitate action by the Commission on the Consultation and the Gambling Review.

Current position

Despite what some licensees may have experienced when engaging with the Commission, the measures proposed in the Consultation are not in force. The Commission’s present requirements are instead spread across its last two annual enforcement reports and one formal guidance document, in addition to its published regulatory sanctions and/or settlements.

The Commission takes the view that its enforcement reports serve as indicators to licensees of its expectations, for which licensees can be held to account; these reports therefore arguably contain policy positions that, if enforced, are more akin to licence conditions or code provisions. We have discussed previously our concerns that the Commission may be making indirect changes to licence conditions and/or code provisions through its introduction of requirements to adhere to guidance and this is perhaps another, somewhat broader, example of the same.

We do not agree that the enforcement reports carry the weight of formal guidance. It is clear from the content of the licence conditions and codes of practice (“LCCP”) that in cases where the Commission expects licensees to adhere to formal guidance, it says so. Social Responsibility Code Provisions 2.1 (anti-money laundering – casino) and 3.4 (customer interaction) are examples of the Commission explicitly requiring licensees to adhere to, or take into account, specific formal guidance, the latter requiring that licensees take into account the Commission’s formal guidance on customer interaction. Nowhere in the LCCP is there any reference to the enforcement reports carrying such weight: the closest the Commission comes to this is in licence condition 12.1.1 (3) which, solely in relation to licensees’ obligation to ensure they have appropriate policies, procedures and controls to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, requires that they:

“… take into account any applicable learning or guidelines published by the Gambling Commission from time to time.”

Putting aside the breadth by which this statement may be interpreted, it is clear that this obligation relates to anti-money laundering and not directly to safer gambling or affordability. This appears to be the cause for ambiguity in this area; an evolution of affordability from its apparent origins as a money laundering concern – historically some licensees’ customers having been identified as having gambled with criminal spend – to it now being central to the Commission’s expectations from a safer gambling perspective.

This is further evident from a consideration of the Commission’s introduction to its section on affordability in Raising Standards for Consumers – Enforcement report 2018-19 (the “Enforcement Report 2019”) where it states:

“Some of these individuals have funded their gambling activity through the misappropriation of monies from businesses, the taking out of unaffordable loans and misappropriating the funds from vulnerable people.”

The obligation, as outlined in the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, that licensees who hold casino operating licences obtain evidence of source of funds and source of wealth on a risk-based approach in order to mitigate money laundering risks will of course extend to their consideration of affordability. However, this should be as a risk factor that may, when subjectively assessed, increase the risk of money laundering and the financing of terrorism and trigger further enquiries. It is not at present a requirement at a certain level of spend.

When affordability is considered solely from a safer gambling perspective, a formal requirement to obtain evidence of affordability is impossible to identify and the Commission’s expectations are ambiguous at best, even more so given our contention that the enforcement reports may not operate as formal guidance on this matter. How then, is it reasonable for the Commission to hold licensees to account for failings in this area?

1. Enforcement Report 2019

The Enforcement Report 2019 outlines various open-source data sources that may help licensees to “assess affordability for its GB customer base and improve its risk assessment and customer interventions.” This data focusses largely on Office of National Statistics (ONS) and YouGov data highlighting average annual salary and monthly personal disposable income. The report goes on to state that:

“The above disposable income data identified clear benchmarks that should drive Social Responsibility (SR) triggers which will help to identify gambling-related harm by considering affordability.”
“Benchmark triggers should be a starting point for engaging with customers and are not intended to definitively demonstrate a customer is suffering from gambling related harm – but they can help identify instances when an operator needs to understand more about a customer, their play and affordability.”
“If an operator is going to set specific triggers for a customer base not representative of the general public, various documents sources should be relied upon, but they must contain sufficient information to substantiate the trigger level set.
In conclusion, we would recommend that operators revisit their framework on triggers and consider their customer base and their disposable income levels as a starting point for deciding benchmark triggers.”

It is of note that there is no recommendation in the Enforcement Report 2019 that licensees should obtain evidence of affordability from customers whose losses reach national average incomes. As we have discussed above, this requirement, it seems, comes from the Commission’s interpretation of money laundering legislation and certain licensees’ obligations to obtain, on a risk-based approach, evidence of source of funds and source of wealth. Rather, the Enforcement Report 2019 focusses on disposable income data being used to set “benchmark triggers” as a starting point for engagement.

2. Customer interaction – formal guidance for remote/premises based gambling operators – July 2019 (the “CI Guidance”)

When describing the Commission’s expectations as to how licensees must identify customers who may be at risk of experiencing harms associated with gambling, the CI Guidance refers to affordability and states:

“Operators should aim to identify those experiencing or at risk of harm and intervene to try to reduce harm at the earliest opportunity. Reliance on deposit or loss thresholds that are set too high will result in failing to detect some customers who may be experiencing significant harms associated with their gambling. It is therefore imperative that threshold levels are set appropriately.

Open source data exists which can help operators assess affordability for their GB customer base and improve their risk assessment for customer interactions. Thresholds should be realistic, based on average available income for your customers. This should include Office of National Statistics publications on levels of household income.”

Again, as with the Enforcement Report 2019, there is no suggestion in the CI Guidance that licensees should be obtaining evidence of affordability from customers whose losses reach national averages, rather it suggests that affordability is a factor that should be considered when developing customer interaction policies and aiming to identify customers who may be experiencing or at risk of experiencing harm. There is a significant difference between “ to try to reduce harm at the earliest opportunity” and requiring customers to produce extensive evidence to justify their level of spend when they reach a threshold.

3. Raising standards for consumers – Compliance and Enforcement report 2019-20 (the “Enforcement Report 2020”)

The Enforcement Report 2020 was published three days after the Consultation – a decision that will not have helped licensees to understand what is, and what is not, required. In referring to the recommendations it made in the Enforcement Report 2019, and considering customers who have “demonstrated gambling related harm indicators and been able to continue to gamble without effective engagement”, the Commission states:

“Furthermore, these individuals have funded their gambling without satisfactory affordability checks and appropriate evidence being obtained.”

The Enforcement Report 2020 goes on to outline various open source data sources that can help licensees to “assess affordability for GB customers and improve risk assessment and customer inventions”. Again, the data presented primarily focusses on average annual salary as outlined in the ONS survey of Hours and Earnings. The Commission goes on to state that:

“Open source information is an important element of an affordability framework because it is a parameter to consider when setting benchmark triggers that will drive early engagement with customers.”
“We are concerned licensees are creating complex and convoluted matrices and mappings within their affordability framework to place customers into trigger groups well over the gross earnings stated above, before disposable income is factored in. Of more concern, these trigger groups are set without any sort of customer interaction to influence their true affordability determination.”
“Operators must interact with customers early on to set adequate, informed affordability triggers to protect customers from gambling related harm. Failure to do so could render the operator non-compliant.”
“Customers wishing to spend more than the national average should be asked to provide information to support a higher affordability trigger such as three months’ payslips, P60s, tax returns or bank statements which will both inform the affordability level the customer may believe appropriate with objective evidence whilst enabling the licensee to have better insight into the source of those funds and whether they are legitimate or not.”

Importantly, outside of the Consultation, this is the first occasion on which the Commission makes any reference to licensees requiring customers to provide information or evidence in relation to affordability. This time, suggesting evidence is required only when customers wish to “spend more than the national average”. The obvious question here, and a conundrum which we know licensees have been struggling with, is “to what national average does the Commission refer?”

There is a significant difference between the national average salary (stated as c£30,500) and average weekly gross earnings (stated as c£585.00). Should customers be evidencing affordability for losses exceeding £585 per week, or for losses exceeding £30,000 per year; or is there another average that is relevant?

What is expected now?

In his Speech at the CMS Conference in March 2021, Tim Miller suggested in that he did not expect the Commission to be announcing its plans on affordability imminently. Mr Miller also stated:

“…in our casework and compliance activity we continue to see example after example of operators who have allowed people to gamble amounts that are clearly unaffordable with very limited or no customer interaction until a very late stage. Just to be clear, we are not talking about grey areas here. We are talking about clearly unaffordable levels of gambling.”

Some of the handpicked examples in the enforcement reports demonstrate what almost all would agree are, without evidence of affordability, “clearly unacceptable levels of gambling”, for example a customer losing £187,000 in two days with no regular source of income. However, other examples of which we are aware are not so straightforward and are certainly not at, on any reasonable interpretation, “clearly unacceptable levels”. This is, in practice, most certainly a grey area. The consequence is that licensees who have prioritised safer gambling and, due to their misunderstanding of the Commission’s expectations, are at best criticised, or at worst subjected to regulatory action, because of a failure to meet those expectations in relation to affordability.

Since the publication of the Consultation, we have heard of licensees being criticised during compliance assessments for failing to obtain evidence of affordability from customers who have exhibited no clear signs of problem gambling, are at a low risk of harm, have never raised any concerns themselves, and who have informed licensees that they are comfortable with their gambling spend. This is not to say that licensees should not adhere to the CI Guidance and conduct customer interactions with these customers when and if they reach internally identified thresholds. It is also not to say that licensees should not take affordability into account and discuss the same with customers; but when are they required to evidence affordability?

Ambiguity inevitably leads to inconsistencies. Can “benchmark triggers” or “trigger groups” roll over and/or reset monthly/annually or are they expected to be final? Spend of say £60,000 presents very differently when it has taken place at a consistent rate over 10 years. The same applies to losses of £5,000 in a 3–6-month period when there are no other reasons for concern; yet examples such as these are being raised as concerns by the Commission. These customers are not spending “above the national average”, whatever average to which the Commission means to refer in the Enforcement Report 2020, and therefore it is at least reasonable for licensees, to decide at their discretion that there is no need to require evidence of affordability in these cases.

Licensees’ use of open-source data is also criticised for being inadequate, even in cases where this data more than adequately mitigates risk by demonstrating income at or above the national average, despite reference in the Enforcement Report 2020 to the same being “an important element of an affordability framework”.

The result of this ambiguity is that in our experience Commission activity demonstrates a much lower tolerated threshold than the CI Guidance and enforcement reports suggest; a threshold more aligned with the Consultation. In the current climate, this not only exposes licensees to unreasonable criticism from the Commission, but also places those licensees who are unlucky enough to undergo a compliance assessment at a time of such uncertainty, at a commercial disadvantage; a diligent response to criticism being to reduce thresholds and require evidence of affordability sooner, even if this is neither deemed necessary nor yet a formal requirement. One may question whether the Commission has overlooked its statutory obligation to “permit gambling, in so far as thinks it reasonably consistent with the pursuit of the licensing objectives”.

The impact

It is no secret that licensees are frustrated and confused, and understandably so. Discretion has given way to prudence; licensees are in the unenviable position of having to second guess what the Commission really expects and compliance assessments are becoming one-sided affairs where, in the main, Commission employees attend with an almost preconceived view as to what is and is not acceptable application of discretion. Nobody is perfect and, due to ambiguity, it is easy enough to call into question individual cases. This is not to say, however, that the vulnerable are not being protected. A very large proportion of the customers whose accounts are reviewed by the Commission never have and never will identify as problem gamblers; they are simply spending their money as they wish, even if at a level that Commission considers inappropriate.

Of course, the regulatory framework permits licensees to challenge the Commission’s findings. The reality, however, is that few choose to do so. Commercial realities, protracted Commission investigations, publicity considerations, cost and perhaps shareholder influence, result in most licensees entering into regulatory settlements with the Commission or accepting its findings. This is often their decision whatever the merits of their case. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that a general consensus amongst licensees is that the ultimate sanction will likely be the same anyway, particularly given the ambiguous guidance, so why incur further costs and prolong the inevitable?

Rather than regulate an industry that operates in fear: not the fear of deserved punishment, but fear of a being chosen and inevitably sanctioned for failing to do something it did not fully understand, the Commission would be better placed regulating an industry that is clear on what is expected of it. The present regulatory expectations in relation to affordability are grey and unclear. The Commission has acknowledged as much by consulting on prescriptive requirements. That Consultation now appears stymied, and it is incumbent upon the Commission to back up Tim Miller’s positive acknowledgement that “clarifying existing rules will be immediate priority” and act with urgency to clarify the existing requirements against which it is enforcing. The Commission had no reservation in moving quickly to issue additional formal guidance for remote operators during the Covid-19 outbreak last year, albeit without consultation, so it is capable of acting in haste.

Better understanding will raise standards and could easily be achieved through clarity in guidance. Informal engagement and discussion with the industry, and even possibly training (both internally and externally) controlled, prepared or delivered by the Commission would also be of benefit. How better to put effectively to use some of the £30 million paid in financial penalties and regulatory settlements in the past 12 months? In the meantime, what is absolutely not acceptable is for the Commission to wield its powers through compliance assessments to impose affordability requirements upon licensees which it has so far failed to implement through statutory consultation.

With thanks to Julian Harris for his invaluable co-authorship.

31Mar

Gambling Commission Consultation Response on Online Slots Game Design and Reverse Withdrawals

31st March 2021 Lucy Paterson 513

In July 2020, we blogged about the Gambling Commission’s consultation on online slots game design and reverse withdrawals, which proposed several changes aimed at reducing gambling-related harm caused by online slots games by reducing the intensity of slots play. The consultation proposed amending the Gambling Commission’s Remote gambling and software technical standards (“RTS”) to introduce new controls on online slots and to remove operators’ ability to reverse customer withdrawal requests.

The consultation closed on 3 September 2020, and on 2 February 2021 the Gambling Commission published its consultation response, announcing the new measures to be introduced in the updated RTS. The new provisions, which come into force on 31 October 2021, are clearly marked in red within the updated RTS, which are now available online.

Neil McArthur, now former Chief Executive of the Gambling Commission, said:

“This is another important step in making gambling safer and where the evidence shows that there are other opportunities to do that, we are determined to take them.”

The Gambling Commission, as expected, has proceeded with almost all of the proposed changes set out in the consultation document. We set out below the changes to the RTS and the Gambling Commission’s rationale for their introduction.

Display of elapsed time and net position

Expenditure and time spent gambling have been identified as the most relevant data points in minimising the risk of gambling related harm for consumers. From 31 October 2021, licensees providing slots will be required to permanently display consumers’ net position and time spent during slots gaming sessions on the screen. For the purposes of this new RTS, a “gaming session” begins when the game is opened or once play commences.

Display of elapsed time:

RTS requirement 13C

The elapsed time should be displayed for the duration of the gaming session.

RTS implementation guidance 13C

Time displayed should begin either when the game is opened or once play commences
Elapsed time should be displayed in seconds, minutes and hours

In relation to display of net position:

RTS requirement 2E:

All gaming sessions must clearly display the net position, in the currency of their account or product (e.g. pounds sterling, dollar, Euro) since the session started.

RTS implementation guidance 2E:

Net position is defined as the total of all winnings minus the sum of all losses since the start of the session.

Prohibiting auto-play functionality for online slots

The Gambling Commission’s proposal to prohibit auto-play functionality received low rates of support from all consultation respondent categories. Concerns raised ranged from the evidential basis for banning auto-play, to suggestions that auto-play could be used as a way to control gambling expenditure, and that removing it may negatively affect access to play for those with disabilities or other physical conditions. Given the views expressed, the Gambling Commission carried out further research (set out in Annex 2 of its consultation response), which, it states, supported its concerns regarding the potential intensity impact of auto-play. In our view, the Gambling Commission’s further research was very limited in scope. The sample size, which the Gambling Commission considered to be a “sizeable base”, was a mere 190 adults (from 358 online slots players) who had indicated they had used auto-play.

The Gambling Commission is therefore introducing a new RTS provision which will prohibit auto-play for slots from 31 October 2021.

RTS requirement 8C:

The gambling system must require a customer to commit to each game cycle individually. Providing auto-play for slots is not permitted.

Prohibiting reverse withdrawals

Reverse withdrawals allow customers to change their mind about withdrawing funds from their account by cancelling a withdrawal before the transfer to their bank or wallet is completed. In its guidance to remote operators issued on 12 May 2020 in the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Gambling Commission advised that remote operators should “prevent reverse withdrawal options for customers until further notice”. The changes to the RTS mean that this temporary ban on reverse withdrawals will be permanent from 31 October 2020. Importantly, the prohibition on reverse withdrawals will apply to all remote operators, and not just remote operators offering slots games.

RTS requirement 14B:

Consumers must not be given the option to cancel their withdrawal request.

RTS implementation guidance 14B:

a. Once a customer has made a request to withdraw funds, they should not be given the option to deposit using these funds. Operators should make the process to withdraw funds as frictionless as possible.

Prohibiting multiple slot games

The Gambling Commission consulted on this proposal due to concerns regarding the introduction of functionality deliberately designed to encourage play on multiple slots simultaneously via a split screen. The new RTS requirement will prohibit operator-led functionality specifically designed to facilitate such play, but will not go as far as proposed in the consultation in requiring licensees to ensure that customers can only play one slot game at a time across multiple tabs, browsers, applications or devices, on the basis that this would be very complex to implement (though the Gambling Commission is continuing to explore this as part of its Single Customer View project).

RTS requirement 14C:

The gambling system must prevent multiple slots games from being played by a single account at the same time.

RTS implementation guidance 14C:

a. Operators are not permitted to offer functionality designed to allow players to play multiple slots at the same time. This includes, but is not limited to, split screen or multi-screen functionality.

b. Combining multiple slots titles in a way which facilitates simultaneous play is not permitted.

Introducing speed of play limits

The Gambling Commission is introducing a minimum game cycle of 2.5 seconds for online slots. The new provision also applies to any game played with funds made available to a customer in lieu of a stake, such as bonus funds.

RTS requirement 14D:

It must be a minimum of 2.5 seconds from the time a game is started until a player can commence the next game cycle. It must always be necessary to release and then depress the ‘start button’ or take equivalent action to commence a game cycle.

RTS implementation guidance 14D:

a. A game cycle starts when a player depresses the ‘start button’ or takes equivalent action to initiate the game and ends when all money or money’s worth staked or won during the game has been either lost or delivered to, or made available for collection by the player and the start button or equivalent becomes available to initiate the next game.

b. A game cycle starts when a player depresses the ‘start button’ or takes equivalent action to initiate the game and ends when all money or money’s worth staked or won during the game has been either lost or delivered to, or made available for collection by the player and the start button or equivalent becomes available to initiate the next game.

Prohibiting player-led ‘spin stop’ features

The Gambling Commission is introducing the proposed requirement to prohibit features that speed up play or give the illusion of control such as turbo mode, quick spin and slam stop. Features that allow customers to skip the animation that plays after the result is communicated are still permissible, as are “genuine” choice elements of play such as picking which box to open, or the number of steps to progress in a feature and/or bonus round.

RTS requirement 14E:

The gambling system must not permit a customer to reduce the time until the result is presented.

RTS implementation guidance 14E:

a. Features such as turbo, quick spin, slam stop are not permitted. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list but to illustrate the types of features the requirement is referring to.

b. This applies to all remote slots, regardless of game cycle speed.

c. This requirement does not apply to bonus/feature games where an additional stake is not wagered.

Prohibiting effects that give the illusion of “false wins”

The Gambling Commission’s consultation set out its concerns about the fairness of celebratory effects and the psychological impact that this could have by inducing a “hot state” in a customer, and proposed prohibiting such effects where the return is less than or equal to the amount staked. Despite concerns from many licensees that this would require redesign, redevelopment, internal and independent testing, the new RTS provisions will prohibit such effects in the circumstances set out in the consultation.

RTS requirement 14F:

The gambling system must not celebrate a return which is less than or equal to the total amount staked.

RTS implementation guidance 14F:

a. By ‘celebrate’ we mean the use of auditory or visual effects that are associated with a win are not permitted for returns which are less than or equal to last total amount staked.

b. The following items provide guidelines for reasonable steps to inform the customer of the result of their game cycle:

Display of total amount awarded.

Winning lines displayed for a short period of time that will be considered sufficient to inform the customer of the result. This implementation should not override any of the display requirements (as set out in RTS 7E).

Brief sound to indicate the result of the game and transfer to player balance. The sound should be distinguishable to that utilised with a win above total stake.

The suite of measures set out above must be implemented by licensees by 31 October 2020, although members of the Betting and Gaming Council (“BGC”), or supplying BGC members, will find that implementing the BGC’s Code of Conduct, they are one step ahead and will already have introduced some of the Gambling Commission’s new measures, including slowing down spin speeds and banning certain gaming features such as turbo play and multi-slot play.

Importantly, those licensees required to implement the new measures should bear in mind that they must satisfy themselves that they are offering games that are compliant. Where they are not sure, any existing game will require independent retesting by a Gambling Commission-approved testing house. Given that demand on external testing houses is likely to be high as licensees surge to implement the new measures, we would urge that licensees review their games now with a view to ensuring that testing is complete and games are updated in time for 31 October 2021 deadline.

If you would like any advice on implementing the Gambling Commission’s new RTS, please get in touch with us.

02Feb

The Affordability Debate: Protection, Responsibility and the Right to Choose

2nd February 2021 Julian Harris 314

That affordability checks are a critical issue for the British gambling industry is undeniable; they place a yet further onerous burden on an already stretched gambling industry. However, without fear of exaggeration, they also raise a question about the rights of British adults to make their own free choices, both good and bad and to have responsibility for their own actions. Other industry commentators have written at length on this controversial issue, but its importance is such that it bears further examination, not least as to the way in which this line of regulation is developing.

Where’s the evidence?

In its Consultation and call for evidence – Remote customer interaction requirements (the “Consultation”), the Gambling Commission identify the problem leading to the consultation and proposed new measures as being that some operators have inadequate customer interaction processes and triggers which are set too high, as evidenced by research, casework and “lived experience” evidence. They conclude that the resolution of this will be defined affordability assessments at thresholds set by the Gambling Commission.

Ultimately, the Gambling Commission seeks to reform the way that operators are required to identify customers who may be at risk of gambling harms, by imposing mandatory triggers for activity that should flag such customers to the operator, what action must be taken by operators when such triggers are identified, and how operators must ensure that they evaluate the effectiveness of their approach to interacting with customers. A new customer interaction ‘manual’ is proposed as part of the customer interaction reforms, which will explain the new requirements of the Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice and how operators are expected to meet these requirements. This would replace the current guidance, Customer interaction – formal guidance for remote gambling operators (July 2019). The actual spending limits on which the Gambling Commission will settle, remain to be determined following the Consultation. However, the references in the Raising standards for consumers – Compliance and enforcement report 2019-20 (the “Enforcement Report”) and the Consultation suggest very low figures indeed before intervention is mandated and evidence required: the Gambling Commission have referred to “firm requirements”.

We are concerned that the Gambling Commission is not adopting a risk based and proportionate approach, combined with the fact that the evidential basis for this Consultation includes research in which customers admit to having sometimes lost more than they can afford, rather than their gambling being unaffordable. Have not we all sometimes had more to drink than is good for us, without being harmed by alcohol any more than we choose to be? Further, the Gambling Commission cite the Enforcement Report, as evidence in support of these measures, when in fact the Enforcement Report deals with “clearly unaffordable’ gambling, whilst the proposed affordability constraints go far beyond customers losing tens of thousands, extending to affordability checks after lifetime losses of as little as hundreds of pounds. The Gambling Commission seems intent on eliminating any harm at all from gambling, seemingly believing all gambling to be inherently bad.

It is unfortunately the case that, as the Gambling Commission’s casework demonstrates, some operators are having insufficient regard for the existing requirements as to intervention and triggers at appropriate levels, leading to licence reviews and sanctions. This, however, is manifestly a problem which the Gambling Commission is addressing as regulator. Operators may not all have adapted to the tsunami of changes and additional requirements as quickly as they should, but progress has been made, and the cases referred to in the Enforcement Report are not sufficient evidence for a de facto penalty against the industry as a whole. Better surely to educate, persuade and, where necessary, take action to ensure compliance with current measures.

A further cogent reason for adopting this approach is that by prescribing fixed thresholds, the Gambling Commission would be moving away from the risk based system of regulation which is the basis of the legislation and regulation.

One additional word of caution; currently the Consultation is expressed to apply only to the online gambling industry. Do not take from this. In our opinion it will inevitable be applied to the land based sector as well; indeed the signs are that it already is.

Does the end justify the means?

One of the stated objectives of the Government’s Response to the House of Lords Gambling Industry Committee Report (the “Report”) is to “ensure balance between consumer freedom and preventing harm to the vulnerable”. We share the concern of others, that these fine words, stating a noble aim, may not reflect genuine intent. As yet, there is no new legislation, the Gambling Review has only just commenced, but already draconian new measures requiring affordability checks are effectively in force. Support for this approach is to be found as early as paragraph 5 of the Report’s introduction, which states:

“The Committee is also right to say that further progress to make gambling safer does not need to wait for the outcome of the Act Review.”

We have written previously of the Gambling Commission’s worrying foray into creating what is in effect new law and regulation without due process or consultation, commenting then that the Gambling Commission was “taking a novel approach that facilitates prescriptive changes to its regulatory framework without consultation or notice” (our blog on 18 May 2020: “New Gambling Commission Guidance for Online Operators: Changing the Basis of Regulation?”). Now that approach is apparently beingsanctioned by Government. Not that the Gambling Commission even waited for that rather pale green light; in the Enforcement Report, the Gambling Commission stated that operators must interact with customers early on to set adequate affordability triggers to protect customers from gambling related harm, threatening that “failure to do so could render the operator non-compliant.” Customers wishing to spend more than the national average disposable income should, according to the Gambling Commission, be asked to provide evidence to support a higher trigger. The Enforcement Report was published on 6 November 2020, just three days after the Gambling Commission launched its consultation on further checks.

Without being unduly cynical, once again the Gambling Commission has jumped the gun. It appears, as has been previously established with such consultations, that they are little more than a box ticking exercise; at worst, with no real intention to entertain alternative opinions and suggestions, or even expertise.

In this case, the emperor truly has been shown to have no clothes; the Gambling Commission has not simply disregarded the results of the Consultation, it has pre-empted it, demonstrating that the exercise is a sham. In effect, the word of the Gambling Commission is now law. We do not need to question their motives, which may be all to the good, with a genuine desire to protect the vulnerable. However, the end cannot always justify the means. The idea that the Gambling Commission has the power, in effect, to regulate by decree, an instrument reminiscent of autocracy or totalitarianism, is abhorrent.

Where’s the balance?

Tim Miller of the Gambling Commission has expressed the intention of having “an open discussion with the gambling industry, consumers, people with lived experience and other stakeholders, to ensure we strike the right balance between allowing consumer freedom and ensuring that there are protections in place to prevent gambling harm.”

Operators will no doubt do their utmost to challenge as part of the Consultation, the levels at which these inevitable new requirements are to be set. However, the evidence on which the Gambling Commission is likely to rely, will almost certainly not include the views of the silent majority of consumers who safely enjoy gambling; they are not included in the group of “people with lived experience”, which is made up solely of those adversely affected by gambling. But the real issue of liberty here is the principle that adults should be free to make their own choices: even bad ones. Most people would regard as unacceptable, the suggestion that their spending should be questioned by any authority; for example when buying alcohol. Nor do most consider it right that anyone, and certainly not a commercial enterprise, should demand private financial information from them. The fact that this is coming to pass in this industry perhaps illustrates the strength of the anti-gambling lobby and its sympathisers, if not supporters, within the regulatory authority. This is a threat to us all.

What are the implications? It does not need a Sherlock Holmes, or even an Inspector Clouseau to understand that in the absence of operators adopting affordability checks now, their licences are at risk of review, and consequently, of suspension or revocation. Indeed, we have already seen the Gambling Commission requiring such checks of those numerous operators currently the subject of regulatory action. Inevitably this, temporarily at least, places them at a disadvantage to their competitors. The means to protect the vulnerable are already in place. We do not need to assume that all gamblers, or all drinkers or any other class of consumer, is inherently and automatically at risk of harm. We must preserve the principle of freedom of choice.

09Jul

Gambling Commission Creates Interim Experts by Experience Group

9th July 2020 Bahar Alaeddini 330

On 19 June 2020, the Gambling Commission announced the creation of an interim Experts by Experience Group. The interim group “will provide advice, evidence and recommendations to the Commission to help inform decision making and raise standards, along with co-creating a permanent Experts by Experience Advisory Group to advise the regulator on a more established basis.”

An unidentified spokesperson for the interim group said:

“ comprises a group of people who have suffered a wide range of gambling harms, including recovering gambling addicts, family and partners of addicts, and those who have lost children to gambling suicides…the establishment of the group is long overdue. We are determined…to play a continuing and much more active role in the deliberations and decision making across the whole remit of the Commission as part of the National Strategy to reduce gambling harms. We bring a new and vital perspective on key issues of regulation and even how the Commission itself works.”

The interim group will be in place for at least six months, at which point the Gambling Commission plans to move to a permanent Experts by Experience Advisory Group, similar to the Advisory Board for Safer Gambling and the Digital Advisory Panel.

No terms of reference are published for the interim Experts by Experience Group and its members are not known. Names may be sensitive or confidential; however, at a minimum, the number of members, members’ backgrounds, the reason for their appointment and a register of interests should be published. Otherwise, the interim group runs the risk of being labelled a quasi-lobby group, financed and supported by the Gambling Commission.

Although it is only an interim group, plainly, it has a strong level of influence over the Gambling Commission’s work. It should, therefore, be treated no differently from the Advisory Board for Safer Gambling and the Digital Advisory Panel.

The objective bystander might wonder why the interim group’s members only comprise those who have experienced gambling harms when there are 400,000 people classified as problem gamblers and 32 million gamblers in Great Britain.

Unfortunately, the Gambling Commission’s lack of transparency detracts from the real and genuine value of the Experts by Experience Group and devalues contributions made by its members. To build a sustainable gambling industry, we could all learn and develop significantly from the work of the interim group and the experiences of its members. This requires us to work in partnership and adopt a balanced approach.

It seems the Gambling Commission has failed, again, to be transparent, balanced and independent.

06Apr

Banks Tackling Gambling-Related Harm

6th April 2020 Lucy Paterson 374

Last year the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (“DCMS”) ministers met with banks and gambling operators to discuss their growing concerns, and how companies could use technology and customer data to help those at risk of developing gambling problems. Brigid Simmonds, chair of the Betting and Gaming Council, recently called for the banking industry to intervene with their customers in the same way that gambling operators are required to – but are banks now starting to play their part?

In November 2018, Barclays became the first high street bank to assist problem gamblers in controlling their gambling, by allowing customers to block payments relating to certain categories of spending, including gambling. Unhelpfully, it can be switched instantly on and off through its online banking app. Since then, many other high street banks have followed suit in making similar measures available to customers, which work by automatically declining any attempted payments within selected categories.

Payment blocking is just one way that banks are attempting to protect customers from gambling-related harm, and the range of measures on offer varies greatly between banks.

Whilst many banks provide the option of blocking gambling payments via both credit and debit card, at present NatWest, RBS and MBNA only offer blocking on credit card payments. When the Gambling Commission’s ban on credit cards comes into effect on 14 April 2020 and customers have no option but to use their debit cards should they want to gamble, these banks will need to review this feature if it is to provide any useful function for customers at all.

Some banks are carefully considering how best to protect their customers from gambling-related harms and are innovating new ways to do so. Starling Bank now:

signposts a customer removing a gambling payment block to the National Gambling Helpline; and

has an automatic 48-hour cooling off period before actioning a customer’s request to remove a gambling payment block.

Similar cooling-off periods are already offered by a number of other banks, including HSBC, Lloyds Bank and Royal Bank of Scotland, and is likely to prove a useful tool for problem gamblers. Research shows that providing customers with a break or interruption in play provides a valuable opportunity to reflect on their gambling and, therefore, their decision to remove the gambling payment block, minimising the risk of impulsive decisions.

Monzo and NatWest go one step further. Monzo requires customers to speak to customer services before the gambling payment block can be removed, creating friction and perhaps another opportunity to reflect on their spending.

NatWest recently launched free psychological counselling in-branch to anyone, whether or not they are a NatWest customer, who has a gambling problem. The scheme was initially launched in several branches in London and the South East, but will be extended based on demand from problem gamblers. HSBC, meanwhile, has sought the assistance of GamCare to train its staff to respond to calls from customers about gambling, and has announced that it will analyse data on card spending to see who might benefit from advice.

A holistic approach is undoubtedly the best way to help those experiencing gambling-related harms and is also the approach advocated by the Betting and Gaming Council in key action four of its Safer Gambling Commitments. It is therefore encouraging to see banks of all sizes accepting that they too have a part to play in tackling the issue, and it is hoped that banks will continue to work closely with the gambling industry, DCMS, the Gambling Commission and gambling charities to improve the tools already on offer and to innovate new ways to help customers manage their gambling.

Gambling Related Harm

Where is the harm? Implications of regulatory revisionism for customer interactions

The Affordability Debate (2): Ambiguous Regulatory Requirements

Gambling Commission Consultation Response on Online Slots Game Design and Reverse Withdrawals

The Affordability Debate: Protection, Responsibility and the Right to Choose

Gambling Commission Creates Interim Experts by Experience Group

Banks Tackling Gambling-Related Harm